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The relationship between Congress and the Constitution and more specifically, 
constitutional deliberation within Congress, has been the focus of important scholarship 
(Pickerill, 2004; Devins & Whittington, 2005). This research furthers that enterprise 
through a comparative case study striving to understand the nature, content, and character 
of constitutional deliberation in the modern Congress. I examined a series of 
contemporaneous cases of constitutional interaction between Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and the Constitution itself, with particular emphasis on the content of 
congressional discourse. The cumulative evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, and the Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007 
suggest that constitutional deliberation in Congress can best be understood through a 
―political regime‖ analysis (Dahl, 1957; Clayton & May, 1999; Pickerill & Clayton, 
2004; Keck, 2007). More specifically, these cases, falling within reasonably the same 
―affiliated‖ era (Skowronek, 1997), demonstrate and illustrate the importance, and 
effects, of regime contestation: the normative engagement and debate between competing 
national governing coalitions. Operating as a part of this affiliated regime, Congress is a 
predictably highly partisan institution functioning within a highly political environment 
encompassing both fundamental ―settled‖ values and secondary ―unsettled‖ values. Its 
deliberation is for the most part symbolic and derivative in nature, acting under an 
umbrella of judicial supremacy and attempting to exert influence primarily on unsettled 
values, by which fundamental regime shifts are desired. These cases belie the notion of 
―settled‖ law and a ―settled‖ regime, yet, despite these deviations from an undiluted 
―republic of reasons,‖ Congress plays an important representational role by acting, and, 
vii 
 
further still, continues and perpetuates an ongoing dialogue (Fisher, 1988) with the other 






THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 




Regardless of the fact that the second portion of former Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s 
statement leaves proper delineation of the first part ambiguous, if the first half is accurate, 
it begs the obvious question: what role has the branch of government mentioned in 
Article I of the Constitution (Congress) played in ―interpreting‖ and ―applying‖ the 
Constitution? At the most elementary level, Congress is quite literally connected with the 
Constitution. Not only are members of Congress constitutionally required to take an oath 
―to support and defend the Constitution of the United States,‖
2
 but many observers agree 
that, at least to some degree, ―Congress as a political institution exerts influence on 
constitutional development,‖
3
 and that ―Congress is a particularly important site for 
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, and it is often crucial for both raising new 
constitutional controversies and settling old ones.‖
4
 As the branch of our government 
tasked with legislating, an ever-changing and never-ending endeavor involving first 
principles and policy prescriptions, how could it not? 
                                                 
1
 Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000). 
Rehnquist continues, ―but ever since Marbury [v. Madison] this Court has remained the ultimate expositor 
of the constitutional text.‖ Emphasis added. 
2
 U.S. Constitution, art. 6, cl. 3; 5 U.S.Code. § 3331 (1982). As Louis Fisher states, ―[m]embers of 
Congress take an oath of office to defend the Constitution, not the President.‖ Congress, Senate, Committee 
on the Judiciary, Statement by Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law: Exercising Congress‘s 




 sess., 30 Jan. 2007. Currie reminds us that 
―judges are not alone in this regard. Others swear to uphold the Constitution as well: presidents, cabinet 
officers, members of Congress – indeed every federal, state, and local officer in the land.‖ David P. Currie, 
―Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789-1861,‖ in Congress and 
the Constitution, eds. Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 19. 
3
 Gerald L. Neuman, ―Review: Variations for Mixed Voices,‖ Review of Constitutional 
Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process by Louis Fisher, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
137, no. 5 (May 1989): 1871. 
4
 Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington, ―Introduction,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 7. 
2 
 
More specifically, in terms of exegetical appreciation for the Constitution, 
―[m]any scholars have recently expressed interest in examining – and defending – the 
role of Congress in interpreting the Constitution,‖
5
 a desire more fully validated if it is 
true that ―Congress can be, and frequently has been, a responsible interpreter of the 
Constitution.‖
6
 Critics of ―Congress‘s ability to do so will invoke historical experience 
and recent episodes in which members of Congress disclaimed interest in assessing the 
constitutionality of a proposal before them. To that extent, the question is empirical: Do 
members of Congress engage in constitutional interpretation, and when they do, how well 
do they perform?‖
7
 Furthermore, even when it may desire otherwise, sometimes 
―Congress must interpret the Constitution in areas that the Supreme Court has never 




 Each chapter will detail more fully their respective issue‘s deliberative history. 
Nevertheless, a brief précis will not impede an effort at contextualizing Congress‘ 
previous constitutionally deliberative efforts. Historically, Congress has frequently 
demonstrated its prerogative to engage in serious and often intense constitutional debate. 
                                                 
5
 Mark Tushnet, ―Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two 
Informal Case Studies,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 269. 
6
 Mark Tushnet, ―Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two 
Informal Case Studies,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 288. Tushnet‘s chapter is devoted to only two 
case studies, and within those two at a very broad level. As he notes in his first footnote, ―[o]f course in the 
end one needs to evaluate congressional performance – and judicial performance – across the entire range 
of action. My informal case studies are designed to give some credibility to the claim that Congress does 
generally act in a constitutionally responsible manner, but they cannot establish that claim.‖ 290. 
7
 Mark Tushnet, ―Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two 
Informal Case Studies,‖ 269. 
8
 John C. Yoo, ―Lawyers in Congress,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, eds. Neal Devins and 
Keith E. Whittington (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 134. Yoo cites Gerhard Casper, Separating 
Power: Essays on the Founding Period (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); 
Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: 
Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
3 
 
David Currie has documented in great detail how ―[i]n the early Congress virtually 
everything became a constitutional question – from great controversies like those over the 
national bank and the president‘s removal power to ephemera of exquisite obscurity.‖
9
 
Virtually ―the whole business of legislation [was] practical construction of the 
Constitution‖
10
 and sometimes (according to Currie), Congress ―d[id] a better job of 
considering constitutional issues than the Supreme Court.‖
11
 
For example, the debate in 1789 over the President‘s removal power occupies 
several hundred pages of the Annals of Congress and, in the eyes of one scholar, 
constitutes an excellent analysis of the doctrine of implied powers.
12
 In 1811, 
Representative Peter Porter of New York observed that ―every member has a printed 
Constitution on his table before him – a Constitution drawn up with the greatest care and 
deliberation‖ – ―the injunctions of which, as we in our best judgments shall understand 
them and not as they shall be interpreted to us by others, we are solemnly bound, by our 
                                                 
9
 David P. Currie, ―Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 
1789-1861,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 21, citing Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The 
Federalist Period, 1789-1801 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
10
Mark Tushnet, ―Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation,‖ 9; citing, David P. 
Currie, ―Prolegomena for a Sampler,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, eds. Neal Devins and Keith E. 
Whittington (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 20 (quoting Rep. Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts). 
11
Tushnet, ―Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation,‖ 9. Tushnet is referring to 
Currie‘s example of the secession debate before the Civil War. Currie adds, ―The congressional and 
executive records sparkle with brilliant insights about the meaning of constitutional provisions. . . . Both 
the president and members of Congress addressed themselves seriously to the merits of the constitutional 
question. They did so long before that question ever came up in court. The arguments were of high quality, 
and the best of them were made by people largely forgotten today. Finally, when the Supreme Court 
ultimately got around to resolving the question, it had far less to say about it than had already been said by 
Congress, or even the president.‖ David P. Currie, ―Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation 
of the Constitution, 1789-1861,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 24, 32-33. 
12
Louis Fisher, ―Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress,‖ North Carolina Law 
Review 63 (April 1985): 709; see Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the 





 That same year Henry Clay declared members should ―make that 
Constitution, which we have sworn to support, our invariable guide.‖
14
 
During the early Republic, not only was ―[p]olicy leadership . . . often (though not 
exclusively) Congress-dominated,‖
15
 but ―constitutional analysis was by necessity 
dominated by Congress and the President.‖
16
 During the First Congress 
[r]espect for the Constitution . . . went far beyond ritualistic 
acknowledgement of its authority; a remarkable proportion of the debate 
centered on the task of determining its meaning. At the outset Madison 
admonished the House, as Washington had admonished him, that 
constitutional issues should be given ‗careful investigation and full 
discussion‘ because ‗[t]he decision that is at this time made, will become 
the permanent exposition of the [C]onstitution.‘
17
 Constitutional questions 
cropped up in the House and Senate every time somebody sneezed, and 
one proposal after another was subjected to intensive debate to determine 
its compatibility with relevant constitutional provisions. Members of 
Congress plainly thought it necessary to demonstrate that the Constitution 
supported their actions, and thus everything they did as well as everything 





                                                 
13




 sess., [H]642-64 (18 Jan. 1811). 
14




 sess., [S]216-218 (13 Feb. 1811). 
15
Charles Stewart III, ―Congress and the Constitutional System,‖ in The Legislative Branch, eds. 
Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29. Stewart adds, ―now it 
rarely is.‖ 
16
David P. Currie, ―The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805,‖ 
Wake Forest Law Review 33 (1998): 220, quoted in Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism, 7
th
 edition 
(Carolina Academic Press: Durham, North Carolina, 2007), 22. In fact, ―the early period of the Virginia 
Dynasty, forged in the presidencies of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and James 
Monroe, represented ‗a defining period in American constitutional history. The best minds in the country 
grappled with practical questions of applying the generalities of the Constitution to concrete and often 
unforeseen circumstances and with the fundamental issue of what sort of nation the Constitution had 
created. It was a time of great events that engendered great controversy: the Louisiana Purchase, the Burr 
conspiracy, the War of 1812, the Cumberland Road, the Missouri Compromise, the Monroe Doctrine. All 
of these controversies, and many others of the time, became, in part, constitutional controversies. And they 
were fought out almost exclusively in the legislative and executive branches, not in the courts.‖ Also see 
Mark Tushnet, ―Constitutional Interpretation outside the Courts,‖ review of The Constitution [in] Congress: 
The Federalist Period, 1789-1801; The Constitution [in] Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801-1829; The 
Constitution [in] Congress: Democrats and Whigs, 1829-1861; The Constitution [in] Congress: Descent 
into the Maelstrom, 1829-1861, by David P. Currie, Journal of Interdisciplinary History XXXVII: 3 
(winter, 2007). 
17




 sess., H514 (17 June 1789). 
18
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 116-117. 
5 
 
In addition, ―[n]ot only did the early Congress almost always interpret the Constitution 
before the courts did, and not only did it often do a better job; in many cases 
congressional debates provide our only official discussion of constitutional issues, for 
many crucial constitutional controversies have never been judicially resolved.‖
19
 Thus, 
constitutional questions were central to the early and later political life of the Republic.
20
 
                                                 
19
David P. Currie, ―Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 
1789-1861,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 22. George Thomas writes, ―[e]arly debates on the nature 
and meaning of the Constitution occur[ed] primarily between the executive and the legislature as well as 
within these branches. The debates over the president‘s removal power and the establishment of the 
national bank touch on central issues of constitutional interpretation and development, but in no way center 
on judicial interpretation and exposition. In these pivotal ‗Madisonian Moments‘ of constitutional 
development, the judiciary was essentially silent.‖ George Thomas, ―Recovering the Political Constitution: 
The Madisonian Vision,‖ The Review of Politics 66, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 245. As Fisher observes, ―[t]he 
historical record . . . demonstrates that Congress deliberated for years on such constitutional issues as 
judicial review, the Bank of the United States, congressional investigative power, slavery, internal 
improvements, federalism, the war-making power, treaties and foreign relations, interstate commerce, the 
removal power, and the legislative veto long before those issues entered the courts.‖ Fisher adds, 
―[c]ongressional debate was intense, informed, and diligent. Indeed, it had to be, given the paucity of 
direction at that time from the Supreme Court and the lower courts.‖ Louis Fisher, ―Constitutional 
Interpretation by Members of Congress,‖ North Carolina Law Review 63 (April 1985): 708-9, citing W. 
Andrews, Coordinate Magistrates: Constitutional Law By Congress and the President, (1969), 1-20 
(judicial review), 21-43 (Bank), 44-64 (slavery), 65-95 (interstate commerce), 109-30 (removal power), 
131-44 (war powers). For early debate on internal improvements, see W. Letwin, ed. A Documentary 
History of American Economic Policy Since 1789 (1961), 53-84. See also J. Hart, The American 
Presidency in Action (1948), 78-111 (treaties and foreign relations), 152-248 (removal power); C. Miller, 
The Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969), 52-70, 205-210 (removal power); Donald Morgan, 
Congress and the Constitution (1966), 49-57 (removal power), 101-118 (investigative power), 140-59 
(interstate commerce), 184-203 (legislative veto); Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and 
Constitutional Power (1976) (discussing constitutional deliberations by Congress from 1789-1829). See 
also David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress, Volumes I-IV. 
20
―It is difficult to imagine what could be said about the constitutionality of internal improvements 
or about the conditional admission of states that was not said by someone in Congress or in the executive 
branch during the period of this study. The same is true of scores of other constitutional issues, great and 
small, ventilated in the pitiless glare of political debate during the same time. Would you know about the 
reach of congressional authority or the relations between the executive and legislative departments? Look 
not to the judges, who, like blossoms at the whim of the capricious butterfly, pollinate the constitutional 
fields now and then according to the vagaries of litigation. Go to school rather with Presidents, with 
Cabinet ministers, with Members of Congress, who grapple with constitutional conundrums every day, in 
every action they contemplate, in every exercise of their official functions. . . . They will not always give 
you answers. Constitutional questions that are worth disputing have no answers. Look rather for insights, 
for wisdom, for guidance, for the raw materials that inform judgment, and you will not be disappointed. For 
constitutional interpretation is a matter of informed judgment, and there is nothing like the extrajudicial 
debates of the early years to inform our judgment as to what the Constitution means.‖ The Constitution in 
Congress: The Jeffersonians 1801-1829 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 344-345. 
During the period from the Constitutional Convention to the Civil War, ―Congress took a leading part in 
settlement of constitutional questions, narrow and broad, interpretive and implementational.‖ Donald G. 
Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study in Responsibility 120 (Belknap, 1966). 
6 
 
Vice-President Jefferson believed the Sedition Act of 1798 was unconstitutional.
21
 
Jefferson and Justice Marshall sparred over the proper allocation of judicial power.
22
 
Many Jacksonians thought the Whig and Henry Clay-inspired American System was 
unconstitutional.
23
 President Jackson believed ―[e]very public officer . . . took an oath to 
support the Constitution ‗as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.‘ The 
opinion of judges ‗has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has 
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.‘‖
24
 Congress was 
immersed in constitutional issues during the antebellum,
25
 Civil War, and Reconstruction 
eras.
26
 Later, it debated the Child Labor Act for a full decade, shifting its constitutional 
                                                 
21
Mark Tushnet, ―Constitutional Interpretation outside the Courts,‖ Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History XXXVII: 3 (winter, 2007): 416, ft. 2. 
22
In fact, ―[b]y the close of Marshall‘s chief justiceship, almost all of the basic measures to curb 
the Court had been seriously suggested or actually tried: impeachment, reduction of jurisdiction, 
congressional review of decisions, limited tenure, requirement for an extraordinary majority to invalidate a 
statute, Court-packing, presidential refusal to enforce a decision, and (at the state level) nullification and 
even resort to force.‖ Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court: A Case Study in the American Political 
Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1965), 63. 
23
Mark Tushnet, ―Constitutional Interpretation outside the Courts,‖ Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History XXXVII: 3 (winter, 2007): 417. ―[T]he dismantling of the American System was not simply the 
result of the Democrats‘ ideological opposition to, or policy disagreements with, the Whigs and other 
nationalists – although those were surely at the root of the matter.  Rather, the Jacksonian opposition was 
articulated in terms of constitutional principles and hence structured by the language of various 
constitutional provisions.  In short, the Jacksonian Democrats articulated their opposition to the American 
System and Whiggish nationalism as part of a constitutional vision.‖ J. Mitchell Pickerill, review of The 
Constitution in Congress: Democrats and Whigs, 1829-1861, by David P. Currie, Law & Politics Book 
Review 15, no. 11 (Nov. 2005): 954-958. 
24
Richard P. Longaker, ―Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary,‖ Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 3 
(Sept. 1956): 341, 358-61; quoted in Fisher and Adler, American Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 Constitutional 
Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism, 23-24. 
25
―[D]ebates about the nature of the constitutional compact, constitutional rights, natural rights, 
federal powers, and the meaning of democracy, were at the core of what Americans cared about most, and 
constitutional argument was taken extraordinarily seriously.‖ Ken I. Kersch, Review of The Constitution in 
Congress: Descent into the Maelstrom, 1829-1861, by David P. Currie, Law & Politics Book Review 16, 
no. 6 (June 2006): 466. 
26
For two such in-depth excellent treatments of this era, see David P. Currie, ―The Civil War 
Congress,‖ The University of Chicago Law Review 73, no. 4 (autumn 2006): 1131-1226; and ―The 
Reconstruction Congress,‖ The University of Chicago Law Review 75, no. 1 (winter 2008): 383-495. In the 
former Currie writes, ―there were numerous instances in which the quality of constitutional debate was 
high.‖ In the preceding sentence Currie quotes a scholar referring specifically to the Thirty-seventh 




rationale several times. From the turn of the nineteenth-century until the beginning of 
World War II Congress was in dialogue with the ―Lochner Court.‖
27
 
Finally, by way of historical example, the issue of war powers has also 
demonstrated Congress‘ role in constitutional deliberation. In 1801, Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote that ―[t]he whole powers of war being, by the [C]onstitution of the United 
States, vested in [C]ongress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides 
in this enquiry.‖
28
 Three years later, Marshall penned the Court opinion arguing that 
when a presidential proclamation in a time of war conflicted with a congressional statute, 
the statute prevailed.
29
 Fifty-nine years later, in the middle of the Civil War, the Court 
upheld President Lincoln‘s power to institute a blockade of Southern ports.
30
 
Nevertheless, Justice Robert Grier stated, ―[b]y the Constitution, Congress alone has the 
power to declare a national or foreign war.‖ Richard Henry Dana Jr., Lincoln‘s advocate 
during oral arguments, admitted that the president does not have the ―the right to initiate a 
war, as a voluntary act of sovereignty. That is vested only in Congress.‖
31
 
During the Korean conflict 
                                                 
27
For the full timeline, see J. Mitchell Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The 
Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System, 76-77. The Court invalidated Congress‘ initial efforts. 
Congress shifted from a commerce power to a taxing power rationale. The Court again ruled against 
Congress. By 1938, Congress shifted back to a commerce power justification. A unanimous Court now 
agreed. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 1056-57. See also Keith 
E. Whittington, ―Congress Before the Lochner Court,‖ Boston University Law Review 85, no. 3 (summer 
2005): 821-858. As is well-known, ―‗[t]he Lochner era‘ refers to a period of judicial decision making 
dating roughly from the turn of the century through 1937 and typified by the 1905 Supreme Court decision 
Lochner v. New York. This period, during which the Court overturned many legislative efforts that sought 
to regulate economic activity – including components of President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s New Deal – is 
often characterized as one of judicial activism that favored business interests and laissez-faire ideology.‖ 
Helena Silverstein, review of Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power & American 
Democracy, by George I. Lovell, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 36, no. 1 (summer 2005): 113. 
28
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801). 
29
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804). 
30
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). 
31
Louis Fisher, ―When the Shooting Starts,‖ Legal Times XXXI, no. 30 (week of 28 Jul. 2008). 
8 
 
[f]or three months . . . the Senate engaged in the ‗Great Debate‘ on the 
relative prerogatives of Congress and the President in exercising the war 
power. [Sen.] Taft believed that Congress had the power to prevent the 
President from sending troops anywhere in the world to involve the United 
States in war. In what could be read as a precursor to the War Powers 
Resolution, he urged Congress to assert its power in the form of a joint 
resolution.
32
 . . . Senator John McClellan offered an amendment requiring 
congressional approval of future plans to send troops abroad. Although the 
amendment was initially rejected, 44 to 46, it was later accepted. The 
Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 69 to 21, expressing its approval 
of Truman‘s sending four divisions to Europe but stating that ‗in the 
interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and 
understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy 
requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such 
assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty‘ 
and that no ground troops in addition to the four divisions should be sent 




Similarly, in Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer Justice Jackson wrote, ―[a] seizure executed by 
the president pursuant to an act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of 
                                                 
32
Congressional Record 55, 2987 (1951). 
33
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, 4
th
 ed. (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1997), 276-277; 97 Congressional Record 55, 2987, 3082-83, 3096, 3283 
(para. 6) (1951). Emphasis added. Fisher also writes: ―[f]rom 1789 to 1950, lawmakers, the courts, and the 
executive branch understood that only Congress could initiate offensive actions against other nations. This 
period is faithful to the intentions of the framers, who rejected the monarchical model of Britain and 
granted Congress the sole authority to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. They left the 
president with certain defensive powers ‗to repel sudden attacks.‖ Louis Fisher, ―War Power,‖ in The 
American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian E. Zelizer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2004), 688. ―Members of Congress can point to specific language in the Constitution for their 
authority to declare war and provide armed forces. More difficult to locate are the legal sources for 
presidential authority to initiate military operations. Yet over the last half century, Presidents have been 
able to make war before Congress has had a chance to act. Particularly in the period since World War II, 
executive war-making power has increased dramatically as Presidents seek ‗authority‘ from the United 
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rather than from Congress. . . . For 
constitutional as well as practical reasons, the two branches are supposed to work in concert. The President 
commands the troops, but only Congress can provide them. Congress declares or authorizes war but 
depends on the President to wage it. An associate of President Cleveland was present when a delegation 
from Congress arrived at the White House with this announcement: ‗We have about decided to declare war 
against Spain over the Cuban question. Conditions are intolerable.‘ Cleveland responded in blunt terms: 
‗There will be no war with Spain over Cuba while I am President.‘ A member of Congress protested that 
the Constitution gave Congress the right to declare war, but Cleveland countered that the Constitution also 
made him Commander in Chief. ‗I will not mobilize the army,‘ he told the legislators. ‗I happen to know 
that we can buy the Island of Cuba from Spain for $100,000,000 and a war will cost vastly more than that 
and will entail another long list of pensioners. It would be an outrage to declare war.‘‖ Louis Fisher, 
Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, 5
th
 ed., rev. (Lawrence, KS: University of 
Kansas Press, 2007), 249, quoting from Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland: The Man and the Statesman 2 
vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1923), 2:249-50. 
9 
 
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretations.‖ In addition, there is a 
―zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority or in which its 
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent 
presidential responsibility.‖
34
 In 1973, Congress overruled President Nixon‘s veto and 
passed the still-contentious War Powers Resolution.
35
 According to one critic, ―[t]he 
statute . . . shifted greater power to the president and gave Congress the illusion that its 
constitutional prerogatives would be protected by statutory procedures.‖
36
 Three years 
later, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act.
37
 Congressional constitutional 
prerogative in relation to war powers has remained deeply controversial. 
These varied and brief historical examples and the contemporary case studies 




                                                 
34
343 U.S. 579 (1952). Jackson added, ―I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to 
sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against 
the outside world for the security of our society. But, when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion but 





Louis Fisher, ―War Power,‖ in The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian 
E. Zelizer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 687. 
37
50 U.S.C. 1601-1651. The Act ―set up procedures for declaring emergencies and established 
automatic deadlines for the expiration of such declarations. At the time, several states of emergency dating 
to the 1930s technically were still in effect. The law requires that if the president declares a state of 
emergency he must cite which law or part of the Constitution gives him the power to do so. The 
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38
―There is no shortage of prominent recent events that invite a widespread discussion about the 
appropriate place of constitutional values and constraints in our public life. Many of these controversies, 
including the conflict with Iraq, the Bush administration‘s response to the September 11 terrorism attacks, 




In addition to this historical context and these important historical antecedents of 
constitutional deliberation in Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. 
Senate themselves are important. As Devins and Whittington point out, Congress: 
is the first branch of government established by the Constitution. Its 
priority within the constitutional text reflects the substantive importance 
that the Founders expected the legislature to have in the political system 
and its significance within their political theory. It was Congress, armed 
with the authority provided by popular election, that was expected to enjoy 
the greatest public support and to dominate national politics. It was 
Congress that would shoulder the task of making national policy and 
setting the national political agenda. It was Congress that carried the 
Founders‘ hopes for the success of the constitutional experiment, but it 
was also Congress and its frenetic ambitions that required the most careful 
attention at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia and the most 





Despite these affirming realities, there are difficulties in studying the relationship 
between Congress and the Constitution. Congress is a large body and often leaves an 
                                                                                                                                                 
impeachment trial of Bill Clinton, illustrate the centrality of Congress in constitutional affairs.‖ Bruce G. 
Peabody, ―Congressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 
61. 
39
Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington, ―Introduction,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 1. 
These observations were similarly made forty years ago by James Burnham: ―The primacy of the 
legislature in the intent of the Constitution is plain on the face of that document, as it is in the deliberations 
of the Philadelphia Convention. It is the Constitution‘s first Article that defines the structure and powers of 
the legislature. The legislative Congress is to be the sole source of all laws (except the clauses of the 
Constitution itself). In the conduct of the general government, Congress alone can authorize the getting or 
spending of money. It is for Congress to support, regulate and govern the Army and Navy, and to declare 
war. Save for the bare existence of a Supreme Court, it is for Congress to establish and regulate the judicial 
system. All officers of both executive and judiciary are subject to congressional impeachment; but for their 
own official conduct the members of Congress are answerable only to themselves.‖ James Burnham, 
Congress and the American Tradition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965), 97.  Mark Brandon also 
writes, ―[T]he allocation of interpretive authority can foster constitutional division.  It attends to the 
authority and activity of nonjudicial actors –especially Congress - in interpreting the Constitution. It 
suggests that the very function of Congress and the character of congressional action in a constitutional 
polity make the constitutional dimensions of that function and action inescapable.  In short, Congress, when 
it acts, is unavoidably ‗interpreting‘ the Constitution.  The functions and composition of Congress as an 
institution render it an interpreter with distinctive characteristics, one of which is its institutional tendency 
toward pragmatic accommodation and compromise.  Notwithstanding this tendency, when Congress solves 
problems in a way that appears to be institutionally successful, it can precipitate or exploit divisions in the 
polity.‖ Mark Brandon, Free in the World: American Slavery and Constitutional Failure (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), x-xi. 
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uncertain paper trail from which to decipher clear motives, beliefs, or interpretations.
40
 
Even more striking, critics charge that ―members of Congress pay very little attention to 
the Constitution, have almost no understanding of what that document means, and 
seldom, if ever, engage in . . . constitutionalism.‖
41
 Unquestionably, it is true that 
sometimes Congress spends very little time on the constitutionality of proposed 
legislation. As one member recently remarked, members consider ―[p]olicy issues first, 
[the necessary] consensus to pass the bill, six other things, then constitutionality.‖
42
 For 
example, according to Pickerill, the Gun-Free School Zones Act   
was never formally debated on the floor of either house, and there is no 
evidence of opposition to it. . . . Nowhere in the public record is there 
evidence that Congress considered the constitutional issue raised by Lopez 
– the very issue that ended up setting free a teenager who brought a gun to 
school for a gang war! . . . For the first time in sixty years, the Court had 






[a] detailed legislative history and interviews with relevant policymakers 
involved in drafting and passing the Brady Bill show that the Tenth 
Amendment received virtually no attention during the decade-long debate 
over the legislation. Members of Congress and others either did not 
identify the issue or were unconcerned about it, because the Court did not 




                                                 
40
As one observer has remarked, ―Congress is a notoriously difficult subject for legal scholars to 
grapple with. When Congress passes a statute, it does not issue documents like judicial opinions that 
provide relatively clear decisions, explain the authority of the decision-making body, and set out the 
reasons for the decision. Unlike the executive branch, Congress does not leave behind a trail of 
memoranda, briefs, or records of meetings that allows the legal scholar to reconstruct decision paths and 
thought processes. Congress is home to a cacophony of people, issues, arguments, reports, hearings, 
speeches, and events, in which it is often difficult for an outsider to determine what has happened, why it 
has happened, and sometimes when it happened. A legal scholar researching Congress sometimes must feel 
as the head of the KGB once did while gathering intelligence on the United States: when the subject under 
study makes so much noise, it is difficult to tell what is important and what is not.‖ Yoo, ―Lawyers in 
Congress,‖ 131. 
41
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44
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Furthermore, Congress operates within ―a collective institutional structure‖
45
 and may be 
in a difficult position in relation to interacting with the Constitution.
46
 Elizabeth Garrett 
and Adrian Vermeule ―[contend] that Congress‘s ‗constitutional performance‘ is lacking 




When Congress does engage the Constitution on a substantive basis, some 
criticism only heightens. In a 1983 critique, Judge Abner Mikva found constitutional 
debate by members of Congress ―superficial and . . . self-serving.‖
48
 He wrote that 
―legislative debate, for the most part, does not explore the constitutional implications of 
pending legislation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job of considering the 
constitutionality of the statutes it adopts.‖
49
 He criticized Congress for ―pass[ing] over the 
constitutional questions, leaving the hard questions to the courts‖ and stated 
constitutional issues become ―subsidiary to the desire to crack down on crime or bring 
administrative agencies under control.‖
50
 Fisher himself has admitted that ―congressional 
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Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, ―Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,‖ in 
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46
Mikva cautioned in 1983, ―both houses are large, making the process of engaging in complex 
arguments during a floor debate difficult. For the most part, the speeches made on the floor are designed to 
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legislation, the time spent with constituents, and the technical knowledge required to understand the 
background of every piece of legislation, it is infrequent that a member considers the individual merits of a 
particular bill. Often a vote is determined by a thumbs up-or-down sign by the party leader, or by a political 
debt that needs to be repaid. While it is true . . . that a majority of the members of Congress are lawyers, 
they have not kept up-to-date on recent legal developments. In fact, most Supreme Court opinions never 
come to the attention of Congress. Unlike judges, the Representatives and Senators are almost totally 
dependent on the recommendations of others in making constitutional judgments.‖ Abner J. Mikva, ―How 
Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,‖ North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 609. 
47
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, ―Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,‖ Duke 
Law Journal 50 (2001): 1277-1333. 
48
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49
Fisher, ―Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress,‖ 707; citing Abner J. Mikva, 
―How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,‖ 587. 
50
Mikva, ―How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,‖ 609. Incidentally, 
Mikva disagrees with the assessments of Currie and Fisher. Mikva writes, ―from the earliest years of the 
Republic the Congressional Record casts little light on the great constitutional debates that have 
13 
 




Whether better described as substantive or superficial, Congress has had, as 
briefly discussed, an important relationship with the Constitution. Given this relationship 
and the fact that as the legislative body operating under our constitutional system, 
legislation and legislative action always fall somewhere in the milieu of its various 
understood and accepted (or contested) powers and limitations, attention to it is 
warranted. Devins and Whittington  
[c]onclude[] that Congress is institutionally well equipped to interpret the 
Constitution. . . . lawmakers seek to enact good public policy and . . . the 
legislative process promotes fact finding and deliberation. And while 
constitutional issues may not be front and center in these legislative 
deliberations, Congress is still better positioned than the Court to set the 





Any analysis involving the contemporary Congress has to take into consideration 
numerous contextual and structural issues. For example, ―[c]ongressional reforms in the 
1970s (including . . . efforts to shift power away from committee chairs and provide new 
mechanisms for confronting the ‗imperial presidency‘), new electoral and institutional 
pressures (such as the rise of constituents‘ expectations and the emergence of the 
‗permanent campaign‘), and altered, often hostile, relations with the presidency, are all 
plausible influences on Congress‘s formation and enforcement of its constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                 
periodically divided the country.‖ Mikva, ―How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the 
Constitution?,‖ 611. 
51
Louis Fisher, ―Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies,‖ in Devins and Whittington, eds., 
Congress and the Constitution, 81. In contrast, elsewhere Fisher has written that Congress ―makes 
significant contributions by participating in that constitutional dialogue.‖ Louis Fisher, ―Constitutional 
Interpretation by Members of Congress,‖ 708. 
52





 Unfortunately, ―Congress has not enjoyed great public esteem and is 
more likely to be seen as a threat to constitutional values than an embodiment of them.      
. . . Scholars and citizens alike perceive Congress as an arena of partisan conflict and 
electoral pandering, hardly as a bulwark of constitutional principles.‖
54
 As noted earlier 
by Judge Mikva, in conjunction with greater party polarization, we also know that ―[t]he 
relentless demands of constituents, lobbyists, and campaigns are likely to crowd out or at 




While many would agree that individuals like members of Congress are not 
reductionistic ―gases or pistons,‖
56
 congressional scholarship has noted the presence of 
the ―electoral connection,‖
57
 the multiplicity of goals pursued by legislators,
58
 their 
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involvement by the courts and less understanding by members of Congress on what their legislative 
prerogatives are and how the structure of government is meant to protect individual rights and liberties. 
That was all supposed to come out of a rejection of monarchy an acceptance of small r, republican form of 
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as well as the importance of ―veto points.‖
60
 As 
previously mentioned, the sheer number of members often inhibits precision in 
delineating congressional action or inaction. As one scholar has asked, ―[d]oes Congress 
have a collective mind? Is there a congressional psyche to be analyzed? Or are there 
simply 535 individual politicians, with conflicting values and interests, inclined to vote 
them, but not always doing so in a consistent fashion?‖
61
 
Reflecting on the popularity of a particular measure might lead some members to 
neglect constitutional dimensions,
62
 an overabundance of information given limited time 
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 ed. (Ann Arbor: University of 
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―Perhaps, however, irresponsibility is structural. Political scientists have noted how many veto 
points there are in the legislative process. That is, for Congress to take what I have called a completed 
action, many individual members of Congress, acting on their own rather than through some version of 
majority rule, must refuse to exercise a power to halt the action‘s advance. Consider the meaning of a 
failure to exercise an effective veto by a member situated at a veto point and empowered by his or her 
constituents to act according to the member‘s sense of constitutional responsibility. When the action 
proceeds through the veto point, it receives real constitutional consideration and thereby gains some 
constitutional respectability. With many veto points and some members of Congress free to act on their 
sense of constitutional responsibility, completed actions may frequently be constitutionally responsible as 
well. . . . When members exercise their vetoes sequentially, though, a problem of irresponsibility may arise. 
The difficulty is that the completed action we are looking for turns out to be inaction as soon as a veto is 
exercised, even by a member who is personally acting in a constitutionally responsible manner. Were the 
Constitution to require action on some matter, inaction as an outcome would be irresponsible. Yet the 
occasions on which the Constitution uncontroversially requires action are rare indeed – although exercising 
the power to declare war may be one of them. And yet, of course, precisely when the Constitution requires 
a declaration of war as a predicate for military action is itself a matter of substantial constitutional 
controversy. . . . More problematically, the presence of many veto points at which individual members can 
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Constitutional Deliberation, 65. 
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constraints often hinders members,
63
 and the place of members of Congress within social 
science itself has often made the modern Congress difficult to study.
64
 Despite these 




DELIBERATION & DIALOGUES 
 
As already highlighted, there have been many important works on congressional 
constitutional deliberation,
66
 and as Paul J. Quirk has written, ―[t]o perform effectively as 
                                                 
63
Quirk and Binder write, ―[a]cquiring information and deliberating intelligently is perhaps the 
most critical capacity of an independent legislature. Congress‘s difficulty in this regard is certainly not lack 
of information. Instead, the key challenges for Congress in achieving sound deliberation are the 
superabundance of information, the difficulties of assessing the validity and significance of the information 
it acquires, the obstacles to reflecting thoughtfully in a charged, competitive environment, and the 
temptation to employ facts and arguments as tools for manipulation.‖ Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder, 
―Introduction: Congress and American Democracy: Institutions and Performance,‖ in Paul J. Quirk and 
Sarah A. Binder, eds. The Legislative Branch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), xxvi. 
64
Mayhew writes, ―the actions of members of Congress . . . do not enjoy much of a place in social 
science, even if they rate high with journalists, traditional historians, and alert citizens. As a theoretical 
matter, social scientists tend to see Congress as a place where externally determined views or interests – 
that is, those of the society‘s classes, interest groups, electorates, and the like – are registered. Causal 
arrows are aimed at Capitol Hill, and they hit. This is virtually all that happens.‖ Mayhew adds in a citation, 
―[a]genda manipulation is said to make a difference. But in theory, that ordinarily takes place in a context 
of ready-made, exogenously determined distributions of ideal points.‖ ―Also, as a conceptual matter, the 
making of laws tends to be the only activity worth addressing. And as an empirical matter, roll call voting 
in the service of lawmaking is virtually the only evidence worth examining.‖ David R. Mayhew, ―Actions 
in the Public Sphere,‖ in Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder, eds. The Legislative Branch (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 100, 69. Mayhew adds, ―To array members of Congress from most liberal to most 
conservative on a summary roll call measure, a popular simplifying device, is to say little about the 
substantive content of that dimension. The ingredients of the content need to be invented day after day, year 
after year, generation after generation, by enterprising politicians and others. They do not exist ‗naturally.‘‖ 
David R. Mayhew, ―Actions in the Public Sphere,‖ in Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder, eds. The 
Legislative Branch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 70. 
65
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they must, for purely instrumental reasons, take into account the constitutionality of the legislation they 
pass. Furthermore, to the extent that the congressional legislative process promotes fact finding and 
deliberation and thereby the making of good public policy, Congress has as good a claim as the Court to 
determine constitutionality in domains where its policy and political expertise are key.‖ Barbara Sinclair, 
―Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures,‖ in Congress 
and the Constitution, 294. 
66
For just a few examples in chronological content order, see, Charles Hyneman and George 
Carey, A Second Federalist: Congress Creates a Government (1967); David P. Currie, The Constitution in 
Congress, 4 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997-2005); William Lee Miller, Arguing About 
Slavery: John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle in the United States Congress (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995); David P. Currie, ―The Civil War Congress,‖ The University of Chicago Law Review 73, no. 
4 (autumn 2006): 1131-1226; James Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition (Chicago: Henry 
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a policymaking institution, Congress cannot simply identify the policy preferences of 
various constituencies, form coalitions among their supporters, and count up the votes. 
Rather, a key part of Congress‘s task is [to] develop alternatives, collect and evaluate 
information, and weigh consequences – in short to deliberate about public policy.‖
67
 This 
has both beneficial and non-beneficial potential. As Fearon, Garrett and Vermeuele note: 
Deliberation also provides institutional and process benefits, however. It 
exploits the collective character of legislatures in ways that can in 
principle improve Congress‘s constitutional performance. Among the 
concrete benefits of deliberation are its tendencies to encourage the 
revelation of private information, to expose extreme, polarized viewpoints 
to the moderating effect of diverse arguments, to make outcomes more 
legitimate by providing reasons to defeated parties, and to require the 




To be sure, deliberation also suffers pathologies, quite apart from 
opportunity costs: it can reduce candor, encourage posturing, trigger herd 
behavior, and silence dissenters. Yet the alternative to deliberation is 
simply voting without discussion, a procedure that no modern legislature, 
and few if any collective bodies generally, would ever adopt. It seems 
indisputable that on balance, some congressional deliberation on 




In regard to the specificity of necessary terminology, ―deliberation‖ can be 
difficult to define. Is it merely constitutional ―discourse‖ in Congress: the rhetoric, 
language, arguments, assertions, and interpretations of and about the Constitution used by 
members of Congress? Is it the mere vote tallies on constitutional amendments or 
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resolutions and bills that are clearly constitutional in nature? Pickerill correlates 
―‗deliberation‘ with ‗reflection‘ and debate over the scope of federal powers under the 
Constitution in the context of legislation‖
70
 and argues that ―deliberation motivated by the 
threat of judicial review is better than no deliberation, or deliberation motivated only by 
public policy or public opinion.‖
71
 
As has been mentioned, members of Congress often have competing and more 
importantly, self-serving goals. For example, ―granting the courts‘ power over 
constitutional questions often serves legislative interests by allowing lawmakers to cede 
divisive, volatile political issues to another branch.‖
72
 Furthermore, ―we might speculate 
that members of Congress, whether generally favoring deferential or independent 
attitudes, would express the greatest interest in constitutional issues likely to affect their 
constituents‘ or their institutional interests directly, such as constitutional questions 
related to the scope of congressional authority or the balance of power between the 
legislative and executive branches.‖
73
 Tushnet argues that deliberation has to be 




It is trivially easy to compile a list of constitutionally irresponsible or 
thoughtless proposals made by members of Congress. A member will 
shoot out a press release responding to some local outrage, or put a bill in 
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Whittington comments that ―‗reflection‘ and ‗debate‘ seem a bit strong given the evidence 
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the hopper without taking any time to consider its constitutionality. Often 
these proposals result from the member‘s desire to grandstand, to do 
something that gets his or her name in the nightly news in the district.75 
They are not serious proposals for legislation, and the member has no real 
expectation that they will be enacted. . . . Noting grandstanding actions of 
this sort provides no basis for evaluating Congress‘s behavior. What we 
need to examine are institutional actions, those that represent the outcome 
of a completed congressional process. Institutional actions can of course 
be inaction as well. Grandstanding proposals may count against assertions 
that members of Congress act in a constitutionally responsible manner, but 
the failure of such proposals to move through the legislative process 
should count in favor of such assertions. Institutional actions have 
proceeded through a complex set of organization structures. Those 
structures, designed for other purposes, may sometimes serve (imperfectly 
and as a byproduct) to screen out constitutionally irresponsible actions. . . . 
Judges write opinions when they decide what the Constitution means. 
Congress does not. Enacted statutes typically become effective without an 
accompanying statement of the constitutional rationale on which Congress 
relied. . . . Determining the constitutional basis for a completed action by 
Congress requires us to examine a range of materials, such as committee 
reports, floor debate, and even newspaper stories, from which we can infer 
the constitutional basis on which Congress acted. Inferences of this sort 
will inevitably be open to question.‖76 
 
In relation to those collective enterprises, given the curtness of much floor debate 
and the brevity of newspaper and journalist-inspired stories, committee hearings often 
provide the most content with which to work.  In fact, ―[m]uch of the important work of 
Congress is done in committees.‖
77
 Nevertheless, ―[c]ongressional committees are 
nonetheless largely unchartered territory for constitutional scholars. The new scholarly 
interest in extrajudicial constitutional interpretation has been more likely to focus on floor 
debates or committee activities of extraordinary interest, such as the hearings of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, 
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than on the congressional committee system generally and its routine work.‖
78
 Be that as 
it may, if ―the Constitution is broadly relevant to American governance, it might be 
hoped that the Constitution would make an appearance before a variety of committees 
with a variety of policy concerns.‖
79
 Given his findings after analyzing only hearing 
titles, Whittington states that given these findings, ―[t]hose interested in the ‗Constitution 
outside the courts‘ should look to committee hearings to gain an understanding of how 
the Constitution is used in legislative and electoral politics. It now seems clear that the 
Constitution often makes an appearance in congressional deliberations.‖
80
 
Drawing off of Whittington‘s delineation of deliberation in committees and 
Tushnet‘s delineation of deliberation in Congress, deliberation was defined as legislative 
action, engaged in by Congress, considered as an institution, that has ―proceeded through 
[the] complex set of organization structures‖ within Congress which make ―substantive 
reference to the U.S. Constitution‖ as well as floor statements and interviews which are 
also substantive, not ones that are merely perfunctory.
81
 In this research, the three cases, 
and all legislative action related to them, cannot help but meet such criteria because there 
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are constitutional, and not merely statutory, issues at stake in each respective piece of 
legislative, two of which are now public laws. 
The relationship among the branches of government is also an important part of 
this discussion. In 1962, Walter F. Murphy wrote that ―[t]he observation that Supreme 
Court decisions are political in effect is commonplace, yet there is relatively little 
literature which actually explores the reactions of other branches of government to Court 
decisions.‖
82
 Congress cannot help but have interaction with the other branches of our 
government. In his seminal work, The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel 
referred to a ―continuing colloquy‖ between the Supreme Court, political institutions, and 
society at large.
83
 Donald G. Morgan found that since 1890, there had been ―an alarming 
increase in congressional abdication of its proper role in such matters, coupled with a 
proportionate increase in legislative acquiescence in judicial determination.‖
84
 Pickerill 
posits eras of ―judicial dualism‖ and ―judicial deference,‖ where the Court has oscillated 
between having a mixed view of federalism in relation to Congress and a view that 
completely defers to Congress in matters involving federalism.
85
 C. Herman Pritchett 
concluded in his study of Congress‘s reaction to the Supreme Court‘s decisions in the late 
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1950s in the area of freedom of speech and association, ―[i]n essence, all that the Court 
can do with its great power is to enforce a waiting period during which its doctrines are 




This research builds on the literature mentioned previously discussing the 
interaction between Congress and the Constitution. However, as Devins and Whittington 
have recently stated, ―the engagement of political actors with the constitutional text is 
largely terra incognita. Scholars have only begun to explore the nature, extent, and 
consequence of constitutional discourse beyond the courtroom.‖
87
 Bruce Peabody writes, 
―[f]or those interested in the relationship between Congress and the Constitution and, 
more specifically, the suitability and feasibility of greater legislative participation in 
constitutional lawmaking, current scholarship largely overlooks vital questions about 
lawmakers‘ subjective understanding of our supreme law.‖
88
 
Given ―the fact that the study of Congress and the Constitution is still nascent,‖ 




[t]here has been little sustained attention to congressional treatment of the 
Constitution and constitutional issues. It has simply not been part of the 
research agenda of congressional scholars, who unsurprisingly have been 
preoccupied with other concerns that are perceived to be closer to the heart 
of legislative politics and more amenable to systemic study. Constitutional 
scholars have generally turned a blind eye to Congress as well. The study 
of the Constitution has largely been defined within the academy as the 
study of constitutional law as produced by the courts. From this 
                                                 
86
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perspective, Congress is a target of constitutional law, not a producer of it. 
. . . After long neglect, the time is ripe for more sustained study of 
Congress as a constitutional interpreter and responsible constitutional 
agent. Recent Supreme Court decisions have focused attention on the 
constitutional powers and responsibilities of Congress, and the sustained 
judicial inquiry into the relationship between Congress and the 
Constitution has encouraged a heightened awareness of Congress in 
constitutional scholars as well. At the same time, a somewhat independent 
scholarly turn to the ‗Constitution outside the courts‘ has opened up space 
for considering extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and the 
relationship between nonjudicial political actors and the Constitution. 
Now that constitutional scholars have begun to look beyond the courts, we 
believe a more careful examination of the Congress as an institution and a 
political entity will be needed in order to fully understand, appreciate, and 




Despite an apparent lack of specialization, this ―recent literature has important 
antecedents, produced by political scientists, which often did focus on Congress as a 
constitutional interpreter.‖
91
 For example, Donald Morgan, ―examin[ed] a wide range of 
cases that traced congressional responsibility for constitutional interpretation over the 
course of American history.‖ He argued that Congress changed during the New Deal and 
he was ―particularly distressed to find a decline in the acceptance of such congressional 
responsibility and the rise of ‗judicial monopolism‘ by which the ‗legislative function 
could receive definition solely in relation to policy‘ while the Constitution was 
                                                 
90
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understood to be ‗technical, and too abstruse for any but lawyers in the courtroom and 
judges on the bench to discuss with sense.‖
92
 
More recently, J. Mitchell Pickerill has ―investigate[d] how Congress reacts to the 
judicial invalidation of federal statutes‖ by analyzing all federal legislation related to 
federalism declared unconstitutional from 1953 through the 1996-97 term of the 
Rehnquist Court.
93
 He found that ―members of Congress do sometimes engage in 
constitutional deliberation, but that deliberation is often motivated and shaped by the 
Court‘s judicial review decisions.‖
94
 Congress is occasionally motivated by Supreme 
Court opinions when writing legislation, but usually legislators are inattentive to such 
matters preferring to focus on public policy results and constituent demands. While many 
believe when the Court wields the judicial veto, Congress is thwarted outright, Pickerill 
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found that ―while judicial review can be a roadblock to legislation, it is often more of a 
speed bump or detour.‖
95
 
In addition, Pickerill found that Congress amends ―legislation in a manner that 
makes clear concessions to the Court‘s decision.‖
96
 Generally speaking, Congress and the 
Supreme Court operate on different policy dimensions, constitutional policy and public 
policy, the fact of which allows a ―win-win‖ situation to take place.
97
 The ―Court is able 
to announce the constitutional law it wants, but Congress is usually able to work within 
those doctrinal constraints to achieve most of the public policy results it wants.‖
98
 He 
―posits that congressional deliberation on constitutional issues will be more likely when 
the Court is relatively active in reviewing the legislature‘s handiwork and when the bill is 
controversial enough that there will be a mobilized opposition to raise constitutional 
objections.‖
99
 Given the incentives facing legislators, ―constitutional issues are not an 
automatic item on the legislator‘s checklist when drafting and considering bills‖
100
 and in 
terms of ―low-salience bills that generate little controversy, no one on Capitol Hill is 
likely to take the time to vet their constitutionality.‖
101
 
 Furthermore, Pickerill adds 
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constitutional issues are not priorities in Congress. Politics and policy 
dominate congressional decision making, and members of Congress do not 
systematically consider the constitutional authority for their actions. Much 
of the time, there is no need to consider constitutional issues, but there is 
always a need to consider the policy and political implications of proposed 
legislation.
102
 . . . The constitutional deliberation that does take place can 
do so on two dimensions: a more philosophical one over specific 
constitutional values or principles, or a more instrumental one over 
satisfying the Supreme Court‘s doctrine in a given area.
103
 . . . At best, 
judicial review forces Congress to craft constitutional statutes, and at a 





Keith Whittington has hypothesized that in the 1990s Congress choose not to 
respond more aggressively to Supreme Court invalidations of congressional statutes 
simply because the majority power in Congress was not opposed to such limitations upon 
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 Whittington found Congress responds not to Supreme Court decisions 
that challenge the abstract institutional power of Congress, but to those of substantive 
concern to the current Congress. Committees did hold hearings about several Court 
decisions on matters of constitutional power in the 1990s, such as those involving 
religious liberty and local control over waste disposal, but did not question the rulings 
which were more focused on limiting national power. In contrast to Pickerill, Tushnet 
found Congress has been ―responsible‖ in interpreting the Constitution in areas where the 
court is reluctant to intervene: impeachment and war powers.
106
 
 More importantly, while keeping the definition of constitutional deliberation in 
mind,
107
 modes of analysis centered on ―political time‖ and ―political regimes‖ provide 
the best means by which to understand these cases. The notion of political regimes 
―incorporates not only electorally dominant partisan coalitions, but also a set of dominant 
policy concerns and legitimating ideologies. A regime in this sense overarches 
contending policy orientations at lower levels such that even electorally successful 
oppositional figures can be forced to sustain the commitments of the dominant 
regime.‖
108
 Within this framework, the Court plays an important part and ―[f]or at least 
fifty years, prominent political scientists have traced the decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
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Court to the policy and political commitments of governing partisan regimes.‖ They have 
found that ―justices have almost always acted in alliance with the governing coalition of 
which they themselves are generally members.‖
109
 During these ―ordinary‖ times, as 
Pickerill and Clayton write, ―one expects the Court‘s decisions to reflect broader regime 
values,‖
110
 while, ―[u]nder some circumstances, the Court may stray quite far from some 




 Furthermore, while in 1957 Dahl ―argued that the Court rarely exercises the 
power of judicial review in a way that is contrary to the interests of the governing 
coalition in the national political system,‖
112
 the era encompassing these three cases has 
been dominated by a relatively divided, or competing, governing coalition(s) and partisan 
environment.
113
 This is evident in the partisan compositions of Congress over the past 
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twenty to thirty years in which these cases and their antecedents inhabit.
114
 During times 
of divided government: 
‗regime‘ values will be less stable and more conflicted, since neither party 
enjoys consistent control over legislative institutions. It is true that even 
when a single party dominates the electoral system, regime values may 
conflict, as for instance in the conflict between blue-collar labor interests 
and the civil rights movement within the Democratic coalition of the 
1960s. But such conflicts are more prevalent when the regime lacks a 
unifying party structure to harmonize those competing interests. Even 
modest alterations to existing legal doctrines may induce dire warnings 
from politicians as the parties become ideologically more polarized and 
face a growing incentive to exaggerate the importance of change in an 
effort to lure independent voters. Third, the electorate is unlikely to 
mobilize against the Court's positions. To some extent, the polarization 
within the elected branches reflects polarization within the electorate 
itself. Indeed, the 2000 election saw the highest level of straight party 
voting in fifty years of National Elections Studies surveys, and, according 
to public opinion polls, marked the high point of a thirty-year trend of 
partisan and ideological polarization. During such periods of division, the 
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Thus, due to the divided nature of the regime, the Court has more latitude to rule 
independently, possibly even on issues they would have not ruled on otherwise. Dahl 
wrote, ―[i]t is to be expected, then, that the Court is least likely to be successful in 
blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a major policy and most 
likely to succeed against a ‗weak‘ majority; e.g., a dead one, a transient one, a fragile one,  
or one weakly united upon a policy of subordinate importance.‖
116
 While it may be true 
that, ―[t]he influence of regime politics ensures that federal judges, especially at the top 
of the judicial hierarchy, will have concerns and preferences that are usually in sync with 
other national power holders,‖
117
 if those other national power holders are divided, so 




 It is important to keep in mind, that this correlation says nothing about the very 
personal nature of judicial decision-making and its relationship to institutional, legal, and 
normative commitments.
119
 ―From Dahl forward, the chief weakness in the regime 
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politics literature has been a tendency to overstate the influence of external political 
pressure in a way that implies that the justices‘ actual decisions were inevitable and 
neglects the possibility of relatively independent institutional action by the Court.‖
120
 As 
Keck points out, ―legal institutions and political values cannot be conceptually separated, 
and the ‗political regimes‘ insight that the values and attitudes found within the judiciary 
are shaped by (but in turn can also shape) the existing configuration of political 
institutions and power across the regime.‖
121
 As Clayton and May posit, there are 
simultaneous interactions and interdependent relationships taking place between 
changing social values and attitudes, elections, legal positions by key actors, litigation, 
Court decisions and articulations of the law, application of the law.
122
 
These cases will affirm that members of Congress operate in an extremely 
political environment. They often ―only have fifteen minutes to decide an issue‖
123
 and it 
is important to keep in mind what we already understand about members of Congress 
from previous studies. As Pickerill reminds us: 
[w]e should not expect members of Congress to routinely or 
systematically consider, of their own volition, constitutional issues raised 
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by legislation. . . . [M]embers of Congress are primarily motivated by the 
‗electoral connection,‘ notions of representation, and the desire to make 
good public policy, and the institution of Congress is designed to help 
achieve these goals efficiently. However, Congress does not operate in a 
vacuum, and it may sometimes need to consider the actions of the 
judiciary, the presidency, or other institutions. Likewise, the Court‘s 
actions may be viewed as having important effects on other institutions of 
government and on the broader lawmaking process. . . . Constitutional 





Given the increase in party polarization and the divided nature of the national governing 
majority and the characteristics it brings, within a regime structure of fundamental and 
secondary values, we would expect the deliberations to elicit predictable partisan 
divisions and responses.  
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Again, these divisions highlight the presence of and the importance thereto of 
dueling governing coalitions that have been battling over the definition of the regime. 
Instead of one national governing coalition being dominant, there have been competing 
coalitions, and while at various times and in various circumstances each has been 
successful to some extent, one has not been able to dominate the political landscape. 
Thus, as Pickerill and Clayton describe: 
[w]ithout taking a position in this debate, we simply note that in contrast 
to earlier periods of American history and previous constitutional regimes, 
the post-1960s American political system has been characterized by 
electoral dealignment, divided government, and a rise in partisan 
polarization. [] Indeed, divided government has become the norm during 
this period; between 1968 and 2002, the same party controlled both the 
White House and both houses of Congress during only seven years. . . . 
The consequences of this political system for the role of the Court and 
judicial review are at least threefold. First, during extended periods of 
divided government, a stronger form of judicial review becomes possible. 
Without a stable coalition controlling the elected branches, both parties 
have an incentive to turn to the courts to resolve political issues, while 
judges are less afraid of institutional retaliation if they make unpopular 
decisions. Unlike under unified government, presidents and legislators are 
unwilling or unable to coordinate an assault on judicial independence, and 





In conjunction with the political regime underlying the political environment, in 
this case particularly marked by divided government or divided national coalitions, the 
entire era of these case studies can best be understood in ―political time‖ as an affiliated 
era, encompassed by ―affiliated‖ presidents.
126
 If ―reconstructive‖ presidents are able to 
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fundamentally re-set long-standing assumptions and norms in the nation‘s political life, 
then ―affiliated‖ presidents ―arise during a period of regime stability and are in concert 




While ―[r]econstructive presidents are relatively rare,‖ since ―[f]ew presidents 
have the desire or authority to challenge inherited constitutional and ideological norms 
and to attempt construction of a new political regime,‖ ―[f]ar more common are affiliated 
leaders, who rise to power within an assumed framework of goals, possibilities, and 
resources. . . . who are ―primarily concerned with continuing, extending, or more 
creatively reconceptualizing the fundamental commitments made by an earlier 
reconstructive leader. They are second-order interpreters.‖ ‖
128
 Affiliated leaders, by 
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As Robert Dahl has argued, ―[e]xcept for short-lived transitional periods . . . the 
Supreme Court is inevitably part of the dominant national alliance,‖
130
 of which the 
affiliated president and affiliated Court will be a part. In political ―time‖ and in a view 
from regime analysis, this will mean two things. First, there will be fundamental regime 
commitments supported by a large if not overwhelming segment of not just the political 
class but also the electorate at large. Thus, we would expect to see the Supreme Court 
supporting, upholding, affirming, and extending those fundamental regime commitments. 
Secondly, while, as Dahl argues, the Court may be part of the ―dominant national 
alliance‖, that alliance may not be veto or opposition-proof, and thus, from issue to issue, 
the ―dominant‖ aspect may range from a slim majority to temporally tenuous. It would be 
expect to have divided sects between partisanly nominated majority justices, as for 
example between the nominees of Republican presidents on the Court.
131
 As Whittington 
writes: 
―The Court must compete with other political actors for the authority to 
define the terms of the Constitution. For the Court to compete 
successfully, other political actors must have reasons for allowing the 
Court to ‗win.‘ The president, among others, must see some political value 
in deferring to the Court and helping to construct a space for judicial 
autonomy. . . . For affiliated leaders who enjoy political dominance in the 
government and the electorate, problems of coalitional maintenance 
dictate maintaining a prominent place for the Court. An unelected 
judiciary can independently advance regime commitments, while 
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protecting other government officials from potential electoral fallout. An 
autonomous judiciary can be politically more valuable than a judicial 
puppet. Moreover, a general acceptance of the virtue of constitutional 
interpretation empowers the Court by providing it with a real political 






For this comparative case study on constitutional deliberation in Congress, I was 
trying to understand the deliberative process (what kind of deliberation goes on, by 
whom, when) and deliberative quality of the three bills in particular as well as delineate 
whether certain issue domains are more likely to receive greater deliberation than others. 
I operated under the following definition of constitutional deliberation:  
constitutional debate among members or other relevant policy-makers and 
lawmakers, committee hearings that focus at some length on constitutional 
issues, language in a bill or a statute that reflects constitutional principles 
or judicial doctrines, or some other indication that constitutional issues 





I examined a set of contemporaneous cases cutting across policy areas with the specific 
intention of describing, explaining, and assessing the scope and character of 
constitutional discourse in Congress. I agree with Tushnet: ―[c]onducting an empirical 
inquiry into Congress‘s performance in constitutional matters is not simple, though. In 
particular, cases need to be selected with some care if the goal is to evaluate Congress‘s 
performance.‖
134
 Therefore, for this approach to be viable several basic criteria had to be 
met. 
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Tushnet, ―Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation,‖ 269. Although I here agree 
with Tushnet‘s statement, his subsequent criteria seem much too pinched, in effect, because of their 
system-wide isolation, leaving only war-powers and impeachment as suitable issues for study in relation to 
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First, while it is obvious that constitutional discourse and discussion can take 
place anytime in Congress, in order to understand the extended process of deliberation it 
was important for Congress in its legislative endeavors to have proceeded through several 
organizational layers (i.e. a bill has gone through hearings, floor debate, and has been 
passed or at least introduced on the floor).
135
 While the authenticity of such member 
remarks and responses can always be questioned, institutionally, deliberation has to 
require normal institutional procedure in relation to the issue at hand. Secondly, also in 
the interest of understanding deliberation as an iterative and lengthy process, the Supreme 
Court had to have issued at least one ruling in relation to each issue. This verifies the 
Court and Congress have had an interactive relationship. Congress did not simply pass 
something the Court was able to ignore nor did the Court ruling simply guide policy 
behavior in the country while it was ignored in the halls of Congress. Thirdly, cases 
needed to be relatively contemporaneous in order to facilitate the conduction of 
interviews from those involved in such deliberation and interaction. Fourthly, cases had 
to involve important constitutional issues. Statutory issues may be involved but 
constitutional issues are an obvious prerequisite for studying constitutional deliberation in 
Congress. Finally, cases had to cut across policy domains in order to ensure acceptable 
variable diversification so that findings are not specific to one particular policy domain, 
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in which case it would become impossible to employ generalization. To meet these 
criteria, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, and the 
Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007 were chosen. They each respectively meet all the 
above criteria and in relation to the final two criteria situate themselves within policy and 




SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Operating within this regime construct and in an era of divided government, these 
cases demonstrate that Congress is a highly political institution functioning within a 
highly political environment encompassing both fundamental ―settled‖ values and 
secondary ―unsettled‖ values. In the three cases studied here, despite competing 
governing coalitions, there were these fundamental ―core‖ values, policy concerns, and 
legitimating ideologies that went unchallenged and virtually unspoken by both coalitions. 
They were reluctant to touch them until future elections or political factors change the 
regime dynamics so that the current underlying consensus is less secure or a new 
consensus has emerged. 
 Given they are operating within a political regime context, combined with the fact 
that they are unable and unwilling to directly address the values of the fundamental 
regime, we see members of Congress being very willing to try and influence their body, 
the other branches, and the political context by influencing perceptions, facts, and 
outcomes at a secondary regime value level. National coalition members are willing to 
fight over these secondary values. These include the demarcation between racial intents 
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and racial effects in public policy, the exact contours of the right to privacy, and the 
limits of habeas corpus itself. These issues are not settled, either because of their 
controversial nature, or because they simply are not as well-known, as may have been the 
case with habeas. 
Thus, its deliberation is for the most part symbolic and derivative in nature, acting 
under an umbrella of judicial supremacy and attempting to exert influence primarily on 
unsettled values reflecting members‘ regime preferences, by which fundamental regime 
shifts are sought. These cases belie the notion of ―settled‖ law and a ―settled‖ regime, yet, 
despite these deviations from an undiluted ―republic of reasons,‖
137
 Congress plays an 
important representational role by acting, and, further still, continues and perpetuates an 
ongoing dialogue with the other branches which would not take place without their 
agency. 
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If the Senator can find in Title VII . . . any language which provides that an employer will have to 
hire on the basis of percentage or quota related to color, race, religion, or national origin, I will 
start eating the pages one after another, because it is not in there. . . . Nothing contained in [Title 
VII] . . . shall be interpreted to require any employer to grant preferential treatment to any 
individual or to any group because of race . . . on account of an imbalance which may exist with 





The Civil Rights Act of 1991 had a history dating back twenty years. In 1971, the 
Supreme Court upheld busing.
139
 More importantly, they issued Griggs v. Duke Power 
Company,
140
 initiating ―disparate impact‖ analysis, whereby an employer would have to 
justify business practices shown to result in disproportional minority employment 
representation. The unanimous decision interpreted the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prohibit 
not only overt discrimination but also ―practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation.‖
141
 Seven years later, University of California Regents v. Bakke was 
decided, allowing race to be a factor in educational entrance requirements.
142
 The Court 
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 sess., 1964, 110, 12723; 
7420 (9 April 1964). 
139
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
140
401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
141
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (8-0 decision; Justice Brennan recused himself). This ―‗disparate 
impact analysis,‘ is a statistical method for determining employers' compliance with Title VII. Essentially, 
the court said plaintiffs in discrimination suits could use the racial composition of the surrounding 
community as evidence of their compliance. Opponents believe that more and more employers adopted 
quota policies to bring their work force into balance with the surrounding community and thus ensure Title 
VII compliance.‖ Mary H. Cooper, ―Racial Quotas,‖ CQ Researcher Online 1 (17 May 1991): 277-300. 
library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1991051700 (accessed August 22, 2008). Katherine Naff writes 
that ―[t]he importance of this case . . . was that it recognized that discrimination could occur, even if 
unintentionally, and gave employers an incentive to hire underrepresented minorities so as to avoid a 
potential charge of disparate impact.‖ Katherine C. Naff, ―From Bakke to Grutter to Gratz: The Supreme 
Court as a Policymaking Institution,‖ Review of Policy Research 21, no. 3 (2004): 406. 
142
438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
41 
 




With the election of a new president in 1980, and under the leadership of new 
personnel in the Department of Justice, civil rights-related issues received additional 
scrutiny, given that the three branches were often in sharp disagreement.
144
 Eight months 
into the new presidency the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights told a House 
subcommittee the Justice Department would ―no longer . . . insist upon or in any respect 
support the use of quotas or any other numerical or statistical formulae designed to 
provide to non-victims of discrimination preferential treatment based on race, sex, 
national origin or religion.‖
145
 For its part, Congress ―enacted [legislation] to overturn 
decisions of the Supreme Court misinterpreting the procedural requirements and 
substantive protections of federal civil rights laws and to restore interpretations of laws 
that had been accepted prior to such decisions.‖
146
 In 1982, Congress‘ amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act ―explicitly vitiated‖ City of Mobile v. Bolden,
147
 the Civil Rights 
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Restoration Act of 1987 overturned Grove City College v. Bell,
148
 and in 1988 Congress 
amended the Fair Housing Act. 
During the second half of the decade the Court would issue rulings giving 
inconclusive explication of appropriate affirmative action policies. In Library of 
Congress v. Shaw
149
 and Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
150
 the Court restricted the 
reach of affirmative action programs, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa 
Clara County
151
 the Court endorsed a limited affirmative action plan for women, and in 
United States v. Paradise
152
 the Court upheld a temporary and ―narrowly tailored‖ quota 
system to bring about job promotion for black state troopers in Alabama, where the 
state‘s affirmative action plan imposed a ―one black-for-one-white‖ promotion quota and 
was justified by the ―long and shameful record of delay and resistance‖ to employment 
opportunities for African-Americans in the Alabama state police force. Two years later, 
the Court struck down a Richmond, Virginia affirmative-action plan whereby 30% of 
municipal contracts were awarded on a ―racially preferential basis.‖
153
 Thus, according to 
one interpretation: 
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[i]n sum Congress spent the decade of the 1980s debating and resolving a 
wide variety of federal civil rights issues. Congress overturned no fewer 
than six erroneous Supreme Court interpretations of one or another federal 
civil rights statutes; enacted legislation strengthening the enforcement 
provisions of equal employment, voting rights, fair housing and equal 
educational opportunity statutes; and refused to consent to the 
appointment of numerous persons to leadership positions in federal civil 
rights enforcement agencies and to the federal bench because of their 
records on civil rights issues. Congress‘s ultimate response to the series of 
decisions during the 1988-89 Term of the Supreme Court interpreting Title 
VII and § 1981 merely continued the struggle of the 1970s and 1980s to 
enact legislation to strengthen enforcement mechanisms and, when 




Not only was the 1991 Civil Rights Act an extremely important legislative 
endeavor,
155
 it was also ―one of the most controversial pieces of legislation in recent 
history.‖
156
 Fought over for two years, the legislation was the result of numerous 
controversial and ―stunning‖ rulings issued in less than an eight week span during the 
fifth and sixth months of 1989 by the Supreme Court.
157
 The rulings allegedly ―made it 
harder to prove job discrimination and easier to challenge affirmative action 
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 Thus, some referred to these rulings as a ―fusillade‖
159
 or (more 
pejoratively) the ―civil rights massacre of 1989.‖
160
 
As briefly described, after the Civil War legislative endeavors concerning civil 
rights had to do with segregation, public accommodations, and voting rights. The 1989 
cases had to do with the right to hold a job and advance through promotion, as well as the 
responsibility of government and private employers to redress the past exclusion of 
blacks and other groups from large segments of the labor market. Plaintiffs included bank 
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Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (decided June 15, 1989) (5-4 decision); Independent Federation of Flight 
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (decided June 22, 1989) (6-2 decision) (Justice Stevens took no 
part in the consideration or decision of the case). Two other cases were eventually involved in the final bill: 
West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (decided March 19, 1991) (6-3 decision); 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. and Aramco Services Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991) (decided March 26, 1991) (6-3 decision). Each of these cases involved statutory 
interpretation, which, as William Eskridge describes, ―is an inherently dynamic process: the text evolves as 
it is interpreted.‖ William N. Eskridge, Jr., ―Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President 
Civil Rights Game,‖ California Law Review 79, no. 3 Symposium: Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s 
(May 1991): 616. In statutory cases, Congress has often ―overruled decisions of the Court, most of which 
have innocent, constitutionally unexceptional, explanations.‖ Abner J. Mikva and Jeff Bleich, ―When 
Congress Overrules the Court.‖ California Law Review 79, no. 3 Symposium: Civil Rights Legislation in 
the 1990s (May 1991): 729. 
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 The first ruling, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, was a ―mixed motive‖ case. The 
Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covering discrimination in 
employment was not violated even when a particular employer admits to discriminatory 
purposes in their decision-making, so long as there were also other reasons for the 
decision. In the words of one critic, the decision ―let employers escape liability for ‗overt 
sexism or racism . . . as long as it was not the only thing on the employer‘s mind.‘‖
162
 
 Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio involved a challenge to hiring practices under Title 
VII at an Alaskan cannery. The Court ruled employers need only offer, rather than prove, 
a business justification for employment practices that had a disproportionate impact on 
minorities, stating, ―the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a 
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.‖
163
 It also made it 
more difficult for employees to prove that an employer's personnel practices had an 
unlawful disparate impact on them by requiring that they identify the specific policy or 
requirement that allegedly produced inequalities in the workplace and demonstrate it 
alone had this effect. Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White stated, ―[t]he ultimate 
burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a 
specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.‖
164
 White continued 
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Reginald C. Govan, ―Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict 
between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ Rutgers Law Review 46, no. 1 (fall 
1993): 18, citing, Statement of Judith Litchman, President, Women‘s Legal Defense Fund, Hearings Before 
the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 




 sess., 20 and 27 
Feb. 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 243. 
163
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). As Fisher and Adler state, the Court ―shifted the burden to employees 
to prove that racial disparities in the work force result from employment practices and are not justified by 
business needs. This new test conflicted with the Griggs ruling in 1971, which appeared to require an 
employee to demonstrate disparate results, not intent. Since this decision was a statutory interpretation of 
Title VII, Congress could rewrite the statute and overturn the Court.‖ Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, 
American Constitutional Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 810. 
164
Justice White is quoting verbatim from Justice O‘Connor‘s plurality opinion in Watson v. Forth 
Worth Bank & Trust Co. (1988). 
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[w]e acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as 
shifting the burden to employers to prove a business necessity for 
challenged practices. But from now on . . . it is up to a plaintiff to prove 
that he was denied employment opportunities because of unlawful 
discrimination. . . . The proper comparison is between the racial 
composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified 




Martin v. Wilks dealt with ―impermissible collateral attack‖ and allowed white 
firefighters in the Birmingham, Alabama Fire Department who had not been party to 
litigation establishing a consent decree governing the hiring and promotion of a group of 
African-American firefighters to bring suit challenging the decree. The majority 
interpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ―give white men new authority to 
challenge consent decrees that embody court-approved affirmative action plans. To avoid 
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Joan Biskupic, ―Congress May Seek to Reverse Narrow Civil Rights Ruling,‖ CQ Weekly 
Online (June 10, 1989): 1404-1406. library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR101406485 (accessed April 30, 
2009). In dissent, Justice Stevens replied that he could not ―‗join this latest sojourn into judicial activism.‘ 
The majority was ‗turning a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII.‘ ‗This casual – almost 
summary – rejection of the statutory construction that developed in the wake of Griggs is most disturbing.‘ 
‗I have always believed that the Griggs opinion correctly reflected the intent of the Congress that enacted 
Title VII. Even if I were not so persuaded, I could not join a rejection of a consistent interpretation of a 
federal statute. Congress frequently revisits this statutory scheme and can readily correct our mistakes if we 
misread its meaning.‘‖ Supreme Court Rulings on Civil Rights Laws.‖ CQ Electronic Library, CQ Historic 
Documents Series Online Edition, library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc89-0001181410. Originally 
published in Historic Documents of 1989 (Washington: CQ Press, 1990); available at library.cqpress.com 
/historicdocuments/hsdc89-0001181410 (accessed October 23, 2007). In a separate dissent joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote, ―[o]ne wonders whether the majority still 
believes that race discrimination – or more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites – is a 
problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.‖ ―Supreme Court Rulings on Civil Rights 
Laws.‖ CQ Electronic Library, CQ Historic Documents Series Online Edition, hsdc89-0001181410. 
Originally published in Historic Documents of 1989 (Washington: CQ Press, 1990); available at 
library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc89-0001181410 (accessed October 23, 2007). 
166
490 U.S. 755 (1989). See Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American Constitutional Law, 
Vol. 2 Constitutional Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 810. The trial court ―had barred the suit, 
holding that the ‗impermissible collateral attack‘ doctrine immunizes parties to a consent decree from 
discrimination charges by nonparties to the decree for actions taken pursuant to it. [The] . . . Court . . . held 
that white firefighters could not be barred from challenging the deal struck at their expense between the 
local governments and the black firefighters. ‗This . . . is part of our ‗deep-rooted historic tradition that 
everyone should have his own day in court.‘‖ Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A 
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Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. restricted the Title VII statute of limitations 
involving seniority systems.
167
 It ―held that the statute of limitations period for 
challenging an alleged[] discriminatory and unfavorable change in an employee‘s 
contractual seniority rights – which were not discriminatory on their face or as currently 
applied – began when the new system was adopted, rather than when the employee was 
actually demoted pursuant to the seniority system.‖
168
 
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union overturned a 1976 ruling which had held that 
an 1866 statute could be used by individuals to challenge a private school‘s racially 
discriminatory admissions process and as the basis for lawsuits seeking monetary 
damages.
169
 The 1866 statute gave ―all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States‖ the same rights as ―white citizens‖ to make and enforce contracts and allowed 
courts to award monetary damages to those who prevail in discrimination suits.
170
 In 
response to the African-American plaintiff, Brenda Patterson, who claimed she had been 
harassed, denied promotion, and fired because of her race, the Court ruled that § 1981 ―is 
limited to prohibiting discriminatory actions before someone is hired, not after, and 
advised Patterson that she should have acted under Title VII.‖
171
 Justice Kennedy argued 
that ―the right to make contracts does not extend to conduct by the employer after the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Symposium (1993-1994): 1461, citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 762, 109 S. Ct. at 2185 (quoting 18 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, at 417 (1981)). 
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Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American Constitutional Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional 
Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 810. 
168
Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.‖ 
Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1461. 
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Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
170
S. 1981 of Title 42 read ―All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and 
to the full and equal benefit of all laws for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other.‖ Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,‖ Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1461. 
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Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American Constitutional Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional 
Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 810. 
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contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or 
imposition of discriminatory working conditions.‖
172
 
Finally, in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, the Court ―held 
losing intervenors (i.e., a collective-bargaining agent for a whole group, in this case all 
Trans World Airlines‘ flight attendants, as opposed to the specific class, in this case a 
group of female flight attendants, seeking damages) could be required to pay the 
prevailing party‘s attorney fees only if their position had been frivolous, unreasonable, or 




 This was the landscape during the summer of 1989. To some, the Court had 
―provoke[ed] . . . Congress‖
174
 and by early the next year, an ―enormously ambitious‖ bill 
was introduced in Congress to send ―the Court a resounding message that it was out of 
touch with Congress‘s views on employment discrimination.‖
175
 Debate between the 
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In dissent, Justice Brennan denounced the Court‘s ―pinched reading‖ of the 1866 statute: 
―[w]hen it comes to deciding whether a civil-rights statute should be construed to further our nation‘s 
commitment to the eradication of racial discrimination, the Court adopts a formalistic method of 
interpretation antithetical to Congress‘ vision of a society in which contractual opportunities are equal.‖ 
―Supreme Court Rulings on Civil Rights Laws,‖ CQ Electronic Library, CQ Historic Documents Series 
Online Edition, hsdc89-0001181410. Originally published in Historic Documents of 1989 (Washington: 
CQ Press, 1990); available at library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc89-0001181410 (accessed 
October 23, 2007). See also Joan Biskupic, ―Rights Bill Is Almost Ready After Long Delay, Debate,‖ CQ 
Weekly Online (November 11, 1989): 3055, available at library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR101407818 
(accessed October 23, 2007). 
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Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ 
Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1462-63. 
Stated another way, ―the Court held that prevailing plaintiffs who successfully defend the relief they 
received from challenge in subsequent proceedings cannot recover attorney‘s fees from the 
intervenor/challenger unless the ‗intervenor‘s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.‘‖ 
Reginald C. Govan, ―Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict between the 
Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ Rutgers Law Review 46, no. 1 (fall 1993): 19. 
491 U.S. 754, 760-61 (1989). This case was not addressed in the final legislation but nevertheless 
contributed to the climate that existed in conjunction with the other controversial cases. 
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Jack M. Beermann, ―The Supreme Court‘s Narrow View on Civil Rights,‖ The Supreme Court 
Review 1993 (1993): 201, n.10. 
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Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ 
Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1463. Clegg 
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branches would encompass the next two years.
176
 The original bill was introduced in both 
chambers on February 7, 1990.
177
 In October it was vetoed by President Bush and fell 
                                                                                                                                                 
argues, ―This decision – to ask for essentially every civil rights reform on their wish list – was the most 
important strategic call made by the civil rights groups during the whole debate, and it turned out to be the 
correct one.‖ Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ 
Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1463, 
emphasis in original. Jack M. Beermann, ―The Supreme Court‘s Narrow View on Civil Rights,‖ The 
Supreme Court Review 1993 (1993): 243. See also Reginald C. Govan, ―Honorable Compromises and the 
Moral High Ground: The Conflict between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ 
Rutgers Law Review 46, no. 1 (fall 1993): 24-25. The Senate Report on the 1990 bill stated: The impact of 
each of the Supreme Court decisions addressed by the legislation is described below. In many respects, 
however, the overall effect of the Courts decisions is more devastating than the sum of the parts. For more 
than thirty-five years, since Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has played a critical role in 
the nation‘s efforts to wipe out discrimination. This role was demonstrated through conscientious 
application of the Constitution‘s guarantee to all persons of the ‗equal protection of the laws,‘ and through 
generous interpretation of federal civil rights statutes in a manner consistent with their remedial purpose. . . 
. In its recent decisions construing these civil rights laws, however, the Court has adopted crabbed, narrow 
interpretations, signalling [sic] an apparent retreat from the Court‘s historic vigilance for the rights of those 
who have been victims of prejudice.‖ Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Report 101-315, 
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st
 Congress, ―Civil Rights Act of 1990,‖ 8 June 1990, 13. 
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―From April 3, 1990, less than two months after the legislation was first introduced, to October 
23, 1991, two days before the announcement of a compromise agreement, the Bush administration 
steadfastly claimed that it would veto this behemoth package of civil rights reforms. During this period, the 
President . . . on at least two dozen occasions publicly discussed this matter.‖ Neal Devins, ―Reagan Redux: 
Civil Rights Under Bush,‖ Notre Dame Law Review 68, no. 5 Symposium: The Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
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Biskupic and Christine C. Lawrence, ―Civil Rights Bill Advancing Despite GOP Objections,‖ CQ Weekly 
Online (5 May 1990): 1352-1353. library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR101409192 (accessed April 30, 2009); 
.Joan Biskupic, ―Senate Ready To Begin Debate On Omnibus Civil Rights Bill,‖ CQ Weekly Online (30 
June 1990): 2070-2070. library.cqpress.com/ cqweekly/WR101409753 (accessed April 30, 2009); Joan 
Biskupic, ―Deal on Civil Rights Measure Stymied by 'Quota' Issue,‖ CQ Weekly Online (14 July 1990): 
2225-2226. library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR101409867 (accessed April 30, 2009); Joan Biskupic, 
―Partisan Rancor Marks Vote On Civil Rights Measure,‖ CQ Weekly Online (21 July 1990): 2312-2316. 
library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR101409913 (accessed April 30, 2009); Joan Biskupic, ―New Struggle 
Over Civil Rights Brings Shift in Strategy,‖ CQ Weekly Online (9 February 1991): 366-373. 
library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102402503 (accessed May 1, 2009); ―Job Discrimination Legislation 
Roils Business Community,‖ CQ Weekly Online (20 April 1991): 989-991. library.cq 
press.com/cqweekly/WR102402966 (accessed May 1, 2009); Joan Biskupic, ―Son of 'Quotas',‖ CQ Weekly 
Online (18 May 1991): 1287. library.cq press.com/cqweekly/WR102403173 (accessed May 1, 2009); Joan 
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one vote shy of being overridden by the Senate.
178
 It was reintroduced the beginning of 
the next Congress, on January 3, 1991.
179
 After a year of wrangling, the Act passed the 
Senate on October 30, 1991 by a vote of 93-5
180
 and the House of Representatives on 
November 7, 1991 by a vote of 381-38.
181
 It was signed into law by President George H. 
W. Bush on November 21, 1991.
182
 Standing in the Rose Garden, he made clear ―[i]t 
d[id] not resort to quotas‖
183
 and that ―[t]his administration is committed to action that is 




                                                                                                                                                 
Conferees Attempt To Rescue Imperiled Civil Rights Bill,‖ CQ Weekly Online (13 October 1990): 3428-
3428. Library.cq press.com/cqweekly/WR101401673 (accessed May 1, 2009); Joan Biskupic, ―PROV 
ISIONS: Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ CQ Weekly Online (7 December 1991): 3620-3622. 
library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102405603 (accessed May 1, 2009). 
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S. 2104/H.R. 4000. Initial reaction to these decisions was ―predictable and typified the later 
debate: shrill condemnation by the civil rights groups, followed with a tentative defense by the Bush 
administration. After a few weeks, however, the public debate for the most part lapsed into a silence lasting 
over half a year. During this time, the groups drafted the bill they would introduce and lined up a long list 
of sponsors for it. The administration began preparing its response to that bill, based on the rumors of what 
it would entail.‖ Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ 
Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1463. 
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11 Republicans joined 55 Democrats to fall one vote short on of a presidential override of S. 
2104/H.R. 4000. 
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H.R. 1. Also see Neal Devins, ―Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush,‖ Notre Dame Law 
Review 68, no. 5 Symposium: The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Theory and Practice (1993): 955-1001. 
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Democrats voted 55-0. Republicans voted 38-5. 
181
Democrats voted 252-5. Republicans voted 128-33. 
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Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
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―‗After extraordinary debate and negotiation, we have reached an agreement with Senate 
Republican and Democratic leaders on a civil rights bill that will be a source of pride for all Americans. It 
does not resort to quotas, and it strengthens the cause of equality in the workplace. Both the administration 
and the Congress can present this legislation to the people of America as a new standard against 
discrimination and for equal opportunity. This agreement was reached last night in marathon negotiations, 
shepherded by Sen. John Danforth, (R-Mo.), nurtured by Sen. (Bob) Dole (R-Kan.) and other leaders of 
both parties. It was a proud accomplishment for the Congress and the administration. And now we can go 
forward together in progress on civil rights in this country. I remember standing out there in the Rose 
Garden with Attorney General (Dick) Thornburgh more than a year and a half ago to make an unshakable 
commitment to the nation‘s civil rights leaders that I wanted a non-quota civil rights bill that I could sign. 
And assuming there are no changes in the bill as agreed to last night, we now have such a bill. And my 
promise will be kept, and I will enthusiastically sign this bill.‘ President Bush used the word ‗quota‘ at least 
six times in his brief statement and answers to reporters.‖ ―PRESIDENTIAL NEWS CONFERENCE: Bush 
Hails Civil Rights Accord, Sees ‗Joyous Day‘ for Nation,‖ CQ Weekly Online (October 26, 1991): 3149-
3150, available at library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR 102405149 (accessed October 23, 2007). 
184
Joan Biskupic, ―PROVISIONS: Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ CQ Weekly Online (7 Dec. 1991): 
3620-3622. library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102405603 (accessed October 19, 2007); ―Bush on Job 
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The Act ―[s]tate[d] that Congress finds that additional remedies are needed to 
deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace‖ and ―[s]ingles 
out the Supreme Court‘s 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, saying it 
weakened the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections.‖
185
 Technically, 
the bill ―reverse[d] or modif[ied] [the] six Supreme Court decisions from the 1988-89 
term and four other high court decisions since 1985 involving awards and attorneys‘ fees 
for plaintiff-employees‖ by amending Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Specifically, in addition to Wards Cove it reversed Patterson v. McLean by explicitly 
broadened the language of the 1866 statute concerning contracts. It also reversed Martin 
v. Wilks by narrowing the opportunities to challenge affirmative action policies in court. 
It allowed plaintiffs to ask for a jury trial and for victims of harassment and other 
intentional discrimination based on sex, religion or disability to sue for both 
compensatory and punitive damages up to a limit of $300,000, as opposed to the status 
quo ante which was that only lost pay and lawyer‘s fees were recoverable under Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
186
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rights Bill,‖ CQ Electronic Library, CQ Historic Documents Series Online Edition, 
library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc91-0000911038. Originally published in Historic Documents of 
1991 (Washington: CQ Press, 1992). library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc91-0000911038 (accessed 
October 23, 2007). 
185
Joan Biskupic, ―PROVISIONS: Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ CQ Weekly Online (December 7, 
1991): 3620-3622, available at library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102405603 (accessed October 19, 2007). 
186
Joan Biskupic, ―Civil Rights Act Poised To Clear, But Bush Veto Looks Certain,” CQ Weekly 
Online (September 29, 1990): 3128-3129. http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR101401448 (accessed 
May 1, 2009). Other related cases were Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1985) which stated that 
Title VII‘s allowance of reasonable attorney‘s fees to prevailing party does not provide for recovery of 
interest from government; Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) which limited 
reimbursement by losing party of prevailing party‘s expert witness fees; and Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 
(1986) which ruled that Civil Rights Attorney‘s Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not prohibit waiver of 
attorney‘s fees in exchange for settlement of case on the merits. Biskupic described the legislation‘s 
purpose as seeking ―to provide appropriate remedies for discrimination, to codify the concepts of ‗business 
necessity‘ and ‗job related‘ offered by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in 1971, and in 
related Supreme Court decisions before Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, to provide statutory guidelines 
for disparate-impact lawsuits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to respond to recent court 
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However, Congress, using ―vague, open-ended language to settle the most 
controversial questions. . . . [which were] left to federal courts interpreting the law,‖
187
 
passed a bill called by some a ―classic, convoluted legislative deal‖
188
 and ―little more 
than a truce designed to get some sort of deal passed.‖
189
 It ―did not fully define standards 
for justifying work practices, such as achievement tests, that appear fair but have a 
disproportionately adverse effect on women, blacks or other minorities.‖
190
 The bill also 
did not decide the issue of retroactivity,
191
 it excluded the two thousand Asian-American 




                                                                                                                                                 
decisions by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes to provide adequate protection to victims 
of discrimination.‖ Joan Biskupic, ―PROVISIONS: Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ CQ Weekly Online 
(December 7, 1991): 3620-3622. library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102405603 (accessed October 19, 
2007). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission describes the bill as: ―The 1991 Act amended 
several of the statutes enforced by EEOC, both substantively and procedurally. Previously, jury trials were 
possible only in cases brought under the EPA (Equal Pay Act of 1963) or the ADEA (Age Discrimination 
in Employment of 1967). Under the provisions of the 1991 Act, parties could now obtain jury trials, and 
recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII and ADA lawsuits involving intentional 
discrimination. The Act placed statutory caps on the amount of damages that could be awarded for future 
pecuniary losses, pain and suffering, and punitive damages, based on employer size. The maximum award 
of compensatory and punitive damages combined was set at $300,000 for the largest employers (more than 
500 employees). . . . In addition, the 1991 Act added a new subsection to Title VII, codifying the disparate 
impact theory of discrimination, essentially putting the law back as it had been prior to Wards Cove. And in 
response to Price-Waterhouse, the Act provided that where the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a 
motivating factor for an employment decision, the employer is liable for injunctive relief, attorney's fees, 
and costs (but not individual monetary or affirmative relief) even though it proves it would have made the 
same decision in the absence of a discriminatory motive. The Act also provided employment discrimination 
protection to employees of Congress and some high-level political appointees. Lastly, Title VII and ADA 
coverage was extended to include American and American-controlled employers operating abroad.‖ 
http://www.eeoc.gov /abouteeoc/35th/1990s/civilrights.html. See also Douglas S. McDowell, ed. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative History, Volume I (Employment Policy Foundation, 1992), i-ii. 
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Douglas S. McDowell, ed. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative History, Volume I 
(Employment Policy Foundation, 1992), ii. 
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Ronald D. Rotunda, ―The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the 
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Griggs ―used seven different formulations to describe the concept of ‗business necessity.‘ In six 
of these, the Court described ‗business necessity‘ as requiring an employer to show that its practices 
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How such an agreement was reached ―is itself an unresolved mystery.‖
193
 Some 
believed the final bill was the result of a ―backroom deal‖ with little input from most 
members of the Senate.
194
 There were also other external political issues possibly 
affecting the political environment. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was 
signed into law July 26, 1990.
195
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 Judge Clarence Thomas was nominated for the Supreme Court on 
July 1, 1991 with the hearings involving the testimony of Anita Hill occurring in October. 
Thomas was confirmed October 15
th
 and some believe compromise on the Act was 





IMPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
 
VALUES, FIGURES, & FRAMERS 
 
Members on both sides of the issues often appealed to generic values like fairness, 
equality, and justice. Some said that ―[f]reedom and justice are not achieved by statistical 
balance of employees,‖
199
 while others stated that ―[t]he real issues at stake here are 
issues of integrity, issues of justice, issues of fairness.‖
200
 ―There is no higher moral 
principle in a democracy than ensuring equal rights. That is the very principle that we 
                                                 
197
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that, ―[f]or the particular justices on that Court, there was nothing 
greatly remarkable about their narrow construction in those cases. . . . The Court‘s methodology was 
emblematic of ordinary statutory construction: hew closely to statutory plain meaning without undue 
intrusion into common law rights and obligations. What the majority justices did not sufficiently appreciate 
was that the political process did not regard these as ordinary cases. The decisions triggered a public 
normative alarm that a bedrock statute was being undermined, and large majorities in Congress approved 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reaffirmed Griggs (explicitly) and Weber (implicitly). This normative 
feedback had some effect on the Rehnquist Court, even though its membership became more conservative. 
The continuing and indeed strengthened popular support for a strong anti-discrimination – and pro-
integration – principle has swept the field.‖ William N. Eskridge Jr. and John Ferejohn, ―Quasi-
Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, eds. Devins and 
Whittington (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 206. 
198
Joan Biskupic, ―PROVISIONS: Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ CQ Weekly Online (December 7, 
1991): 3620-3622, available at library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102405603 (accessed October 19, 2007). 
See also Pamela Fessler, Joan Biskupic, and Phil Kuntz, ―Rights Bill Rises From the Ashes Of Senate's 
Thomas Fight,‖ CQ Weekly Online (October 26, 1991): 3124-3126, available at library.cqpress.com 
/cqweekly/WR102405172 (accessed May 1, 2009); Joan Biskupic, ―CIVIL RIGHTS: Bush Signs Anti-Job 
Bias Bill Amid Furor Over Preferences,‖ CQ Weekly Online (November 23, 1991): 3463, available at 
library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR102405422 (accessed May 1, 2009); Roger Clegg, ―Introduction: A Brief 
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ Louisiana Law Review 54, no. 6 The Civil Rights Act 
of 1991: A Symposium (1993-1994): 1469; Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American Constitutional 
Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 7
th
 edition (Carolina Academic Press: 
Durham, North Carolina, 2007): 811; Joan Biskupic, ―Senate passes sweeping measure to overturn court 
rulings,‖ CQ Weekly (2 Nov. 1991): 3200. 
199




 sess., 1990, H6751 (3 
Aug. 1990). 
200




 sess., 1990, S15334 
(16 Oct. 1990). 
55 
 
seek to strengthen today.‖
201
 ―There is unanimous support in Congress for the basic 
principle of equal employment opportunity for all Americans without regard to race, 
ethnicity, religion, or gender, as required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 




Mr. Chairman, during this debate all of us have said that we adhere to the 
fundamental principle this Nation was founded upon, that we are all 
created equal. But there is also a fundamental reality in this Nation that we 
do not always do what we say. Indeed the history of civil rights is really 
the history of that double standard. Our forefathers declared in this 
founding of this Nation that we were all equal under God, but accepted 
slavery. This Nation bled in a civil rights way, the Civil War, to basically 
free the slaves, but yet a few years later reinstituted slavery under the 
guise of ‗separate but equal‘ in the Plessy versus Ferguson decision. And 
when the Supreme Court in the Brown decision declared that ‗separate‘ is 





[A]s a layman I have found the discussion, this very technical discussion, 
back and forth among the lawyers quite interesting. I am going to take a 
different approach. I do think what I have to say is germane, however, 
because I think that the quest for justice and the quest for a higher morality 
is very important here. Sometimes, as I listened, I wondered, about that 
statement that law often has nothing to do with justice, is not concerned 
with morality. . . . I think that the Supreme Court certainly has provided 
some bad leadership in making certain recent decisions without taking into 
consideration history and background, and the fact that, we are talking 
basically about a condition that was created by an institution called 
slavery, then after slavery, Jim Crow and discrimination for many years. 
Two hundred and some years of slavery and after that about a hundred 
years of intense oppressive second-class citizenship. People were not even 
allowed until very recently, relatively recently, to apply for jobs on the fire 
department or the police department in Birmingham or other southern 
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cities. . . . Blacks were not allowed to get licenses to be plumbers or to be 





Invocations to authoritative figures and references were also common. Appeals 
were made to Martin Luther King, Jr.,
205












and the Gettysburg Address.
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 Justice William O. 
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 sess., 13 and 20 March 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 386-388. 
205




 sess., 1990, 136, no. 86 
S9339 (Tuesday 10 July 1990). 
206




 sess., 1991, H3904 (4 June 
1991). 
207
Rep. Matthew G. Martinez (D-CA), Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 





sess., 25 April 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 59. 
208
Rep. Jose E. Serrano (D-NY), Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education 




 sess., 27 February 
and 5 March 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 29. 
209
Rep. Jose E. Serrano (D-NY), Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education 




 sess., 27 February 
and 5 March 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 29. 
210
Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL), Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 




 sess., 23 and 27 February and 1 and 7 March 1990 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 57. 
211




 sess., 1991, H3894 (4 
June 1991). 
212




 sess., 1991, H3906 (4 




 sess., 1991, H3956 (5 
June 1991). 
213




 sess., 1991, S8560 (25 June 

























1990, 136, no. 86 S9339 (Tuesday 10 July 1990). 
214




 sess., 1991, S8560 (25 June 
1991). 
215




 sess., 1991, S8562 (25 June 




 sess., 1990, 136, no. 86 







 F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela,
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 and Andrew Johnson.
221
 
Members also made explicit appeals to the founding era and our founding 
documents, most frequently the Declaration of Independence.
222
 ―Let us vote no on H.R. 
1 and, thus, reaffirm our Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.‖
223
 ―In addressing 
redress for discriminatory employment practices, we implement the ‗equal protection of 
the law‘ clause of our Constitution. Surely discriminating employment practices without 
redress is a denial of equal protection.‖
224
 
I ask my colleagues, what is our fundamental purpose here in Congress? Is 
it not to preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to Americans by our 
Constitution and legislate accordingly? So how can we allow the strength 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be slowly eroded away by an indifferent 
Supreme Court? Today it is our moral imperative to restore by statute the 
full spirit of civil rights and equality to our laws. We have been through 
this debate before. In 1964, we provided stronger protection for rights 
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―Mr. Chairman, my problem is I believed in the Constitution. My problem is I believed in 
the Declaration of Independence.‖
226
 ―This bill sets our Nation forth once again on the 




You see, my problem is that even though I am 49 years old, I am still 
impatient. I think that when I read the Constitution that I love so much and 
I look at the Declaration of Independence and all of those things that those 
great people wrote down years ago, I believe them. My problem is I 
believe that those words were promises that were made to all of us, not 
black or white or brown or rich or poor or old or young, but those words 
were great because this is a great country. . . . We need to show the entire 
world that looks to us for direction and guidance that although we have 
many cultures, many religions, various kinds of people, we can live 
together in this country as one people, and that what we wrote down in our 
Declaration of Independence and what we wrote down in our Constitution 




That is what we are about today, justice and equality. . . . We hear so often 
the words that our Founding Fathers left with us, that there are certain 
unalienable rights bestowed upon us by the Creator of the human beings. 
This is but another step in the never-ending process of trying to achieve 
the ultimate in that vow, and that promise and that challenge of the 
Founding Fathers. . . . I would say, and I have heard all of the arguments, 
that there is not that much difference. But should there be difference, 





And so we speak to five Supreme Court cases, and we speak in a way that 
says we meant what we said in 1964 and we expect people in America to 
honor the civil rights commitment that this Nation really made in 1776 and 
in 1787 and in the 1860‘s in the adoption of significant amendments to our 
Constitution, but which we know and which was said so eloquently in 
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1963, that we have still not lived out the promises of those documents, and 




EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE(?) 
 
INTENT, EFFECTS, & QUOTAS 
Many members engaged in deliberation over the intention of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, Griggs v. Duke Power Company, Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, and the use 
of ―quotas.‖ The Act ―represented a significant step forward in our pursuit of equal 
justice for all.‖
231
 ―[T]here is a wide disparity between nondiscriminatory purposes of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it was originally enacted and the color-conscious perversion 
which some judges derived from it.‖
232




Mr. President, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 -- which the current legislation 
would irreparably alter -- did not purport to establish racial classifications. 
It outlawed discrimination on all fronts. In matters of employment, title 
VII of the act declared that no employer shall be permitted to ―fail or 
refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, 




―What we want to accomplish today is to restore the degree of civil rights protection 
provided by the . . . 1964 act[].
235
 ―Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 is vital if we 
are to reaffirm the original intent of civil rights laws, and protect the future from the 
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forces that would divide us, not unite us.‖
236
 The bill was ―a reaffirmation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.‖
237
 ―The Civil Rights Act that we meet on today, passed in 1964, 
changed America. . . . I say to my colleagues . . . Stand up for the values of this country 
and our Constitution, and, if you will, will reaffirm the acts of courage of 1964.‖
238
 After 
President Bush‘s veto, Sen. Hatch exclaimed, ―Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
promised colorblind treatment of all Americans in the workplace, where every citizen 
should be treated on the basis of his or her talents and merit.‖
239
 ―What we need is a 
color-blind society with equal opportunity for all Americans, and not a color-conscious 
society with equal results for all.‖
240
 
I would advise all employers to abandon the outdated claim, ‗An Equal 
Opportunity Employer,‘ for the more accurate claim, ‗A Statistically 
Proportional Employer‘ and I would recommend all help wanted signs 
revert to the old ‗Irish need not apply‘ signs in 19
th
 century Boston, and 
perhaps advertisements can specify: ‗Help Wanted, four women, two 
African-American males, and one Hispanic required. . . . My old-









On July 2 1964 - the day the 1964 Act became law - Sen. Humphrey 
inserted into the record ‗A concise explanation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.‘ – ‗to provide Americans with a short and understandable 
explanation of the civil rights bill. . . . that the American people may find 
useful.‘ – [Title VII] does not provide that any preferential treatment shall 
be given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups. It does not provide 
that any quota systems may be established to maintain racial balance in 
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―[T]his Senator believes it is high time we as a Nation return to the notion of civil 
rights as being the province of individuals, as the Constitution requires, not as a booty for 
specific groups.‖
243
 ―And that is the reason we have this quota bill before us – quota bill, 
not civil rights bill. It is a quota bill.‖
244
 
We all abhor quotas. The legislation we are considering explicitly rejects 
quotas. Hiring pay and promotion decisions must be based on individual 
qualifications. I have lived my life sharing with most Americans a 
commitment to the basic principle that the opportunity to get ahead should 
be based on individual effort and merit. I will not yield in that 
commitment The fruits of our labor on H.R. 1 must sustain that 




Mr. Chairman, ironically, the quota argument was raised in 1964 when 
title VII was being debated. As a result, Section 703(j) was added to title 
VII saying, ―[title VII] does not require preferential treatment . . . on 
account of imbalance . . .‖ between an employer‘s work force and the 
general population. This means an employer is not required to grant 
preferential treatment to correct any perceived racial gender or ethnic 
imbalance in his/her work force.
246
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of utmost concern to many civil rights advocates – from Hubert Humphrey on – and that is the imposition 
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 sess., 1990, H6809 (2 Aug. 
1990). Law Professor Douglas W. Kmiec points to Section 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). ―Senator 
Humphrey said the bill ‗does not provide that any quota systems may be established to maintain racial 
balance in employment. In fact, the title [Title VII] . . . prohibit[s] preferential treatment for any particular 





 sess., 1964, 110, S11848 (1964). To further emphasize the point, it was explicitly provided in 




This bill is designed to and will result in the establishment of quotas, the 
abandonment of merit as the principal reason for hiring and for 
promotions, and the abandonment of a system in America in which hard 




Mr. President, the decision before us is not about restoring prior 
antidiscrimination law. It is about whether the Senate wishes to lead this 
country down a short road to quota hiring and promotion. It is about 
whether the Senate wants to slam the courthouse door on some Americans 
who wish to assert claims of a denial of their civil rights, and it is about 




Some denied quotas were a result of Griggs. ―Two decades of experience are clear: The 
Griggs rule does not lead to quotas, and never has. It is a mockery of civil rights and the 
fundamental principle of equal justice under law for opponents of this legislation to raise 
the false hue and cry of quotas.‖
249
 Others denied the 1964 Act was ever meant to 
encompass statistical disparities. ―[W]e have to remember that we‘re talking about 
something the legislature never in its wisdom created – unintentional discrimination.‖
250
 
―You cannot use statistics, for all practical purposes, as a result of the Wards Cove case. 
That really ultimately is going to have a devastating effect on seeing to it that justice and 
opportunity are part of our society.‖
251
 
                                                                                                                                                 
race.‖ Douglas W. Kmiec, ―Foreword: The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional, Statutory, and 
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Witnesses did try and draw members into a deeper discussion involving many of 
the historical issues and case law previously touched upon but their statements went 
singularly into the record. Former Secretary Coleman stated that ―the great steps taken by 
this Congress after the Civil War were subsequently nullified by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which misconstrued the 13
th
 Amendment, the 14
th





 century civil rights laws.‖
252
 Another witness said 
I would remind this panel – and if we would want to read, I‘d be happy to 
send you the Civil rights Act of 1875, that dealt with public 
accommodations. A Post-Reconstruction Supreme Court struck that down. 
It was not until 1964 that we passed again what we had done in 1875. If I 
could recount the agony, the injustice, the suffering, the shame, the 
indignity, the inhumanity, of years and years of this country having to live 
under ‗separate but equal‘ because the Supreme Court refused to obey the 
mandates of Congress and Congress would not set the Supreme Court 
straight. . . . We have suffered so much in this country because we tried 





 The Fourteenth Amendment was mentioned but not specifically correlated to a 
justification for criticizing the Court‘s decisions.
254
 Rep. Hyde mentioned it in mocking 
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―Every American citizen who has bothered to spend any time examining the Constitution of the 
United States, if not familiar with those words [the 14
th
 Amendment] exactly, understands that, if they have 
lived any life at all here, that fundamental principle is something we all share, live by, and under. . . . In 
fact, anyone who might try to detract from that fundamental statement of principle would be considered, I 
think, by most to be in fundamental violation of our values and principles embraced in our Constitution. To 
be protected and not to be denied the equal protection of the laws of this country is as fundamental as 
anything. . . . The decisions, these five decisions, represent, in my view, an unprecedented retreat on the 
part of the Court from the enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws in our Nation.‖ Sen. Christopher 
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the legislative tilt toward upholding disparate analysis.
255
 One representative went so far 
as to accuse the previous administration of attacking the Bill of Rights and not enforcing 
the 13
th
 Amendment banning slavery.
256
 One member did point out important amendment 
language: 
The framers of the 14
th
 amendment understood the difference between 
merely granting a right and providing a legal remedy. That‘s why they 
specifically included a section that simply reads: ‗The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.‘ 
They understood that it would take real laws establishing legal remedies to 
make the rights granted in the 14
th








The Supreme Court was frequently criticized throughout deliberations regarding 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
258
 Congress needed to ―rectify several Supreme Court 
decisions,‖
259
 ―halt the erosion of Title VII,‖
260
 and ―reverse‖ the Court.
261
 ―What we are 




 amendment, and I need not tell you scholars that, and the 14
th
 amendment, I need 
not tell you that, guarantees to every person equal protection of the laws. Now, I know everyone is equal, 
some are just more equal than others. And this bill moves in that direction. . . . But I would just like to 
recall to your mind the ideal as set forth in our Constitution: equal protection of the law.‖ Rep. Henry Hyde 
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―Mr. Chairman, in the last 11 years we have witnessed 3 significant points in civil rights. The 
first was the wholesale political program by the Reagan administration to attack the Bill of Rights and the 
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proposing here is to try to restore the damage that was done in some of the recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court.‖
262
 Opponents argued that the Court ―destroyed [a] 
balanced system‖
263
 and did not recognize the history of slavery and discrimination.
264
 
The Court had ―served as a retreat in the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.‖
265
 The 
Court lost sight of ―the full meaning of the United States Constitution‖ and Congress 
should be focused on ―the restoration of the rights that we all have come to understand 
and believe were within the full meaning of the Constitution.‖
266
 The Court ―destroyed 
                                                                                                                                                 
March 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 32. ―The Civil Rights Act of 1991 seeks to halt the erosion of 
Title VII of past civil rights legislation and address recent interpretations of such laws.‖ 
261
Rep. William J. Jefferson (D-LA), Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 




 sess., 27 
February and 5 March 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 378-79. 
262
Rep. Charles A. Hayes (D-IL), Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings before the 





 sess., 25 April 21 May 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 168. 
263
William C. Burns, Pacific Gas & Electric, Congress, House of Representatives, Joint Hearings 
before the Committee on Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 





 sess., 13 and 20 March 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 79. 
264
Rep. Major R. Owens (D-NY), Congress, House of Representatives, Joint Hearings before the 
Committee on Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 





 sess., 13 and 20 March 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 387. Sometimes, as I listened, I 
wondered, about that statement that law often has nothing to do with justice, is not concerned with 
morality. . . . I think that the Supreme Court certainly has provided some bad leadership in making certain 
recent decisions without taking into consideration history and background, and the fact, we are talking 
basically about a condition that was created by an institution called slavery, then after slavery, Jim Crowe 
and discrimination for many years. Two hundred and some years of slavery and after that about a hundred 
years of intense oppressive second-class citizenship. People were not even allowed until very recently, 
relatively recently, to apply for jobs on the fire department or the police department in Birmingham or other 
southern cities. . . . Blacks were not allowed to get licenses to be plumbers or to be carpenters or be 
electricians. The fallout of that still exists. On and on we go.‖ 
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the credibility of the effectiveness of Title VII as a[n] antidiscrimination law that is able 
to be enforceable generally.‖
267
 
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger, for the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in 
Griggs, recognized that title VII requires the removal of artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers 
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other 
impermissible classification. . . . Some 18 years later, the new U.S. 
Supreme Court majority, in Wards Cove, held that such discriminatory 
barriers may remain in place. . . . Worse, the new majority, led by three 
Reagan appointees, sent a clear signal that new barriers may be erected 
with impunity. . . . The Civil Rights Act of 1990 sends a completely 
different signal. The bill stands for the simple proposition that all barriers 





The Supreme Court had ―cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of 
civil rights protections.‖
269
 They ―broke ranks with Congress and the consensus of the 
American people on our march toward the goal of equal justice and equal employment 
opportunity for all regardless of race, gender, religion, and national origin.‖
270
 They 
―signal[ed] a swift retreat from the principles we hold dearly. The list is long, but the 
result is clear: victims are being thrown out of court without a remedy at an alarming 
rate.‖
271
 The Court had ―shirked‖ their ―responsibility‖ ―in protecting the rights of other 
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 The Court was not doing their ―job‖ to ―defend[] minorities.‖
273
 The Court 
wanted to ―turn back the clock‖ and ―restrict racial progress.‖
274
 The rulings were a 
―retreat from the Court‘s historic vigilance for the rights of those who have been victims 
of prejudice.‖
275
 ―[T]he Act‘s purposes are both to respond to the Court‘s recent decisions 
by restoring the civil rights protections that were so dramatically limited.‖
276
 This was an 
example of ―some of the most extreme form of judicial activism . . . in reversing 
progress.‖
277
 The Court had ―turned against the victims of discrimination.‖
278
 ―In an 
earlier time, the Supreme Court set the moral tone of our Nation‘s commitment to 
equality. Not it endeavors to resurrect the barriers that most folks thought were knocked 
down years ago.‖
279
 They had ―erode[d] basic civil rights.‖
280
 The Court was losing its 
status as a defender of minority rights.
281
 Congress must be the ―watchdog‖ for civil 
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280
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―Mr. President, we stand today at a historic juncture. For more than 35 years, the U.S. Supreme 
Court led the way as America struggled to free itself from the legacy of discrimination that has stained the 
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rights if the Court would not.
282
 The Court had become ―out of touch with the mainstream 
of American thinking.‖
283
 ―Congress must take an active role, indeed the leadership, to 
end . . . discrimination.‖
284
 ―Where we once turned towards the Court to safeguard our 
basic rights and freedoms, we must now turn to Congress.‖
285
 ―Mr. Chairman, if the 
President and his advisers persist in their myopia, Congress must not fail to stand up for 
fairness and the spirit of our Constitution.‖
286
 
The inter-branch environment is helpful in terms of understanding the context of 
the bill negotiations. That environment was one of mistrust toward the Administration on 
the part of bill supporters. These critics did not shy away from criticizing the former and 
current administrations for their perceived lack of support for civil rights. Sen. 
Metzenbaum was particularly enraged. 
Over the last 9 years we have seen a marked increase in the tolerance for 
racism and sexism. The Reagan administration launched a campaign 
against civil rights. Ronald Reagan did more to set back the clock on civil 
rights than any President in this century. His administration consistently 
turned a deaf ear to the complaints of the victims of discrimination. . . . It 
is no wonder, then, that the U.S. Supreme Court, with the three Reagan 
                                                                                                                                                 
fabric of this land. But in 1989, the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions that significantly 
undermined the struggle to end prejudice in the workplace. They were ominous steps backward, away from 
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―Mr. President, I close by saying that we must look upon our country not as a peerless example 
of democracy and equality in action, but as a country constantly perfecting its own search and journey 
toward true equal rights for all. With this reality in mind, Congress must be aggressive in its dedication to 
the perfecting of our civil rights movement. As long as discrimination in the workplace exists, there must 
be a watchdog. If the Supreme Court refuses to assume this role then Congress must.‖ Sen. Alan Cranston 
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 sess., 1990, S15379 (16 Oct. 
1990). 
286













Rep. Edwards believed the Bush Administration was ―very hostile‖ to ―civil rights 
legislation.‖
288
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 sess., 23 and 27 February and 1 and 7 March 
1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 238. In July, Sen. Metzenbaum would exclaim, ―[t]oday we have 
civil rights laws in this country but, unfortunately, the Supreme Court has turned the clock back. The 
Reagan-Bush administration led an aggressive assault on civil rights that was unprecedented in this century. 
The culmination of the assault was the wholesale retreat of the civil rights protection by the Supreme Court 
in a series of decisions announced 1 year ago. . . . What has happened to America? What has happened to 
the Supreme Court? What kind of leadership did we get from the President and the Vice President in trying 
to move backward on civil rights and indeed doing just that? Make no mistake about it, the Reagan 
appointees to the Supreme Court lived up to their advanced billing and turned back the clock on civil rights 
protection. . . . With the lone exception of Justice O'Connor's support for the victim of sex discrimination in 
the Price Waterhouse case last spring, the Justices appointed by the Reagan-Bush administration uniformly 
and consistently voted against protecting the civil rights of women and minorities. We, here in the 
Congress, are called upon to undo that wrong. . . . We are at a crossroads in the history of civil rights in this 
country. We can reject the legislation and continue the policy of the Reagan-Bush years by turning our 
backs on women and minorities who seek equal opportunity. That policy has fueled intolerance and bigotry 
and frustration. That policy has led to a dramatic increase in hate crimes, like the ugly incidents in 
Bensonnhurst and Howard Beach. That policy has created an audience for the venom of a David Duke or a 
Lewis Farrakhan. . . . Unfortunately, Mr. President, we stand here today while the White House is playing 
Tweedledee-Tweedledum with the language. They want some specific language to take care of this 
‗problem‘ or that ‗problem‘ because some employers are worried about its impact. . . . Let us ring the bell 
here on the floor of the U.S. Senate. We welcome the support of the President of the United States. Let us 
quit playing Tweedledee-Tweedledum with civil rights in this country. Let us stand up for civil rights as 
they were once in this country before the Reagan-Bush appointees on the Supreme Court turned back the 
clock. Let us quit twiddling with the language, and let us move forward. . . . We can stand together to send 
a message to restore the moral climate of this Nation by enacting this bill. We can announce that America 
will not retreat on civil rights, that America will reject bigotry and prejudice, and that America still stands 
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 sess., 20 and 27 Feb. 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 383. Rep. Edwards‘ entire statement 
was the following: ―[o]n all of the civil rights bills in the 1980s, the Administration was just generally 
opposed to all of them. On the 1981Voting Rights Extension, the Attorney General refused to testify. We 
never did get him to testify. On the Fair Housing bill, we couldn‘t get any assistance at all. Of course, on 
the Civil Rights Restoration Act, the President vetoed the bill and the bill was enacted over his veto. So we 
have generally a very hostile Administration to civil rights legislation.‖ 
289








There were a few references to judicial supremacy, even though the Court was 
being so heavily criticized. 
Mr. President, there are many reasons why Wards Cove ought to be 
repudiated. It ought to be repudiated on the merits because it is a major 
step backward on civil rights. But it also ought to be repudiated because it 
is a flagrant example of judicial usurpation where the Supreme Court has 
stepped into what is a legislative prerogative on legislative intent on the 
statute which we have passed. . . . Let me explain why. If you have a 
constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the 
Constitution. If you have a statute which is passed and you have a question 
as to what is the intent of the Congress, that is up to the Congress. When 
the Supreme Court of the United States, by a unanimous court, in an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, who is not known to be a flaming 
liberal, hands down the Griggs decision and Congress lets it stand for 18 
years, that establishes conclusively the congressional stamp of approval 
that that definition of business necessity and that definition of the Civil 
Rights Act is what Congress intended. . . . Now, what happens in 1989? 
Five Supreme Court Justices, by a 5-to-4 vote, come along and say ‗Never 
mind what Congress has approved. We know better; we are going to 
interpret the Civil Rights Act of 1964 differently from what is the 
conclusive congressional intent on the subject.‘ . . . It is more than judicial 




Sen. Packwood believed that ―[i]f we pass this bill and this goes to the courts and it goes 
to the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court says this is unconstitutional, there 
is nothing we can do about that short of amending the Constitution. There is nothing we 
can do about that.‖
291
 
 A few members did defend the Court as in institution, without going so far as to 
endorse supremacy. Rep. Goodling thought that ―[p]erhaps we should spend less time 
looking over the shoulders of the Supreme Court and more time on these very pressing 
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 sess., 1990, S15372 (16 Oct. 
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 Rep. Fawell invoked President Roosevelt‘s Court-packing effort in 
questioning the bill and Congress‘ attempt to ―silence‖ the Court. 
has there ever been – and I don‘t know the answer to this question – but 
has there ever been such a rush to silence the Supreme Court, and indeed, 
to do it retroactively? I don‘t know of any. Perhaps not since FDR tried to 
pack the Court many years ago, and maybe these are not perfect analogies. 
But how many of us have read the decisions? I have, but I must confess I 
have many questions in my mind. But more important, having read them, 
how many of us understand them within the historical context of civil 
rights law decisions since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. . . . 
Mr. Chairman, those who would eradicate in one bill the writings of these 
many Supreme Court decisions, which to my knowledge is new in the 
history of this Congress, it seems to me are . . . asking a lot of this 





 Civil rights issues obviously continued to remain in the forefront of the nation‘s 
political life throughout the 1990s. However, the first statistical study of the 1991 Act 
was not published until 2003. It concluded that fears of ―quotas‖ had been unfounded, but 
that the Act negatively impacted the employment opportunities of minorities and 
females.
294
 Employers were extremely hesitant to hire because of the enlarged monetary 
awards for firing-based discrimination lawsuits contained in the Act. Other researches 
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 sess., 20 and 27 Feb. 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 24. Rep. Fawell also asked, ―[d]o 
any of the gentlemen at the table remember a similar undertaking by Congress, where in one fell swoop we 
are to eradicate the writings of five or six Supreme Court decisions? Maybe it‘s good. Maybe that‘s what 
we should be doing. But I don‘t recall it ever having been done. . . . [It was a] tremendous never before 
undertaking of Congress.‖ Rep. Harris W. Fawell (R-IL), Congress, House of Representatives, Joint 
Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 
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had discovered a trend prior to the Act‘s passage that focused on the shift away from 
hiring-based employment lawsuits toward firing-based lawsuits.
295
 Nevertheless, 
disparate impact analysis and broad-based class-action type employment issues remain 
controversial in our political life as administrations differed on whether to focus on 
individual or group-based discrimination suits.
296
 
 This case and its aftermath affirm the insights of political regime and political 
time analysis, as well as what we know about the contemporary Congress within those 
constructs. While President Reagan may have been, as Skowronek argues, a 
reconstructive president, even he did not attain all he sought in the area of civil rights, 
much less an affiliated president like his predecessor, the first President Bush. Affiliated 
presidents may have a national coalition largely instituted by the reconstructive leader 
before them, but coalitions are nevertheless often fragile and temporary.
297
 Even though 
there was a fundamental ―settled‖ norm in relation to a broad, nation-encompassing, 
understanding of civil rights and its enforcement by the federal government, on the 
secondary level of ―unsettled‖ values and how far either a color-blind constitutional, or 
affirmative-action supporting, paradigm would venture was left uncertain.
298
  Thus, 
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affiliated presidents, while having power, but limited power, are often susceptible to the 
limited strength of their coalition and to challenges from within their own coalition,
299
 
and unsure whether to embrace or distance themselves from an aligned-Court‘s rulings 
extending or cementing, in their mind, the reconstructive leader‘s legacy.
300
 In addition, 
we then see members of Congress attempting to shift public opinion by framing, often in 
dire and extreme terms, their opponents as outside the mainstream and unworthy of a 
respectable audience. 
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 The issue of and discussions related to ―partial-birth‖ abortion can elicit technical 
terminology, definitional disagreements, and emotively controversial statements. 
Abortion itself has been defined as ―the termination of a pregnancy after, accompanied 
by, resulting in, or closely followed by the death of the embryo or fetus [through the] 
spontaneous expulsion of a human fetus during the first 12 weeks of gestation [or the] 
induced expulsion of a human fetus.‖
302
 According to the American Pregnancy 
Association ―medical‖ and ―surgical‖ are the two types of abortion procedures used 
during particular trimesters.
303
 Specifically in relation to this case study, Dilation and 
Extraction, ―also known as D&X, Intact D&X, Intrauterine Cranial Decompression and 
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Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. ___, 28 (2007) (Justice Kennedy, majority opinion). 
302
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. ―abortion,‖ available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary. 
303
During the first trimester, the following procedures are available: Methotrexate & Misoprostol 
(MTX) (medical), Mifepristone and Misoprostol (i.e. RU-486) (medical), and Suction Aspiration (surgical). 
During the second trimester, the following procedures are available: Dilation & Curettage (D&C) 
(surgical), Dilation & Evacuation (D&E) (surgical), and Induction Abortion (surgical). D&E is ―the most 
common form of legal abortions performed in the second trimester of pregnancy. . . . [It] accounts for 95 
percent of second-trimester abortions [and] the fetus is terminated inside the womb.‖ Jeffrey Rosen, 
―Partial Solution: John Roberts, centrist?,‖ The New Republic, 11 Dec. 2006, 8. During the third trimester, 
the following procedures are available: Induction Abortion (surgical), Dilation and Extraction (surgical). 
See the American Pregnancy Association, found at www.american pregnancy.org. The Association is ―a 
national health organization committed to promoting reproductive and pregnancy wellness through 
education, research, advocacy, and community awareness.‖ Also see Sarah Glazer, ―Roe v. Wade At 25: 
Will the landmark abortion ruling stand?,‖ CQ Researcher 7, no. 44 (28 Nov. 1997): 1033-1056, available 
at http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1997112800 (accessed April 22, 2009) and Jon O. 
Shimabukuro and Karen J. Lewis, Legislative Attorneys, American Law Division, ―Abortion Law 
Development: A Brief Overview,‖ CRS Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of 
Congress, Updated January 14, 2008, available from the Congressional Research Service. 
75 
 
Partial Birth Abortion,‖ is a ―surgical abortion procedure used to terminate a pregnancy 




Abortion-related legislation and jurisprudence has a over forty year long 
history.
305
 Initially, the focus was on the state of Connecticut. There, in the 1960s, due to 
an 1879 statute which ―made it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to 
prevent conception,‖ the Executive and Medical Directors of the Planned Parenthood 
League were ―convicted for giving married persons information on how to prevent 
conception‖ and ―for giving medical advice on conception and for prescribing a 
contraceptive device for a married woman.‖
306
 
Resulting litigation eventually led to the Supreme Court where on June 7
th
, 1965 
the Supreme Court issued Griswold v. Connecticut in which Justice William O. Douglas 
recognized a ―zone of privacy‖ and said ―specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help given them life and 
substance.‖
307
 Seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended Griswold‘s 
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Further description is given by the American Pregnancy Association: ―[t]wo days before the 
procedure, laminaria is inserted . . . to dilate the cervix. [After a woman‘s] water . . . break[s] on the third 
day [she] return[s] to the clinic. The fetus is rotated and forceps are used to grasp and pull the legs, 
shoulders and arms through the birth canal. A small incision is made at the base of the skull to allow a 
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 Amendments. In 
dissent, Justice Hugo Black wrote, ―[t]he Court talks about a constitutional ‗right to privacy‘ as though 
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might 
abridge the ‗privacy‘ of individuals. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific 
76 
 
holding to include the right of unmarried people to obtain birth control. In the words of 
Justice Brennan, ―[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.‖
308
 
Ten months after Eisenstadt, the twin cases that would define a subsequent era 
were issued. In Doe v. Bolton, a case regarding the Model Penal Code law recently 
adopted in the state of Georgia, ―the Court held . . . a state may not unduly burden a 
woman‘s fundamental right to abortion by prohibiting or substantially limiting accesses 
to the means of effectuating her decision. . . . the Fourteenth Amendment[‘s] right of 
personal privacy encompassed a woman‘s decision whether to carry a pregnancy to 
term.‖
309
 In Roe v. Wade, a case challenging a Texas life-of-the-mother statute, the Court 
―determined that the Constitution protects a woman‘s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.‖
310
 Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the same 7-2 majority 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places with 
respect to certain activities. . . . I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled 
to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional 
provision.‖ 381 U.S. 479, 508, 510 (1965). The initial challenge to the Connecticut statute was Poe v. 
Ullman. In it, Justice John M. Harlan, foreshadowing the language of Griswold, dissented by writing, 
―[T]his . . . legislation . . . violates the Fourteenth Amendment. I believe that a statute making it a criminal 
offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in 
the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual‘s personal life.‖ 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961). For a 
brief synopsis of the history of Griswold v. Connecticut, see Laura Kalman, ―The Promise and Peril of 
Privacy,‖ Review of Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade, by David 
Garrow Reviews in American History 22, no. 4 (Dec. 1994): 725-731. 
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as in Doe, said they need ―not resolve the difficult question of when life begins‖ in order 
to adjudicate the issue. 
The right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action as we feel it is or as the District Court determined in the Ninth 
Amendment‘s reservation of rights to the people is broad enough to 
encompass a woman‘s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 





 This right, however, was ostensibly not absolute. Within the newly created 
trimester framework of pregnancy, where the state could show a compelling state interest 
in limiting abortion the Court would approve such limitations. Thus, in the first trimester, 
―the abortion decision . . . must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman‘s 
attending physician.‖ In the second, the state could ―regulate the abortion procedure in 
ways . . . reasonably related to maternal health.‖
312
 Finally, ―subsequent to viability‖ 
abortion could be ―proscribed‖ ―except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.‖
313
 
Since these important precedents, abortion has been central in our political 
debates within all levels of state and federal governments. One reason for this 
significance being that much was still unclear. The Court  
did not address a number of important abortion-related issues which 
[were] raised subsequently by state actions seeking to restrict the scope of 
the Court‘s rulings. These include[d] the issues of informed consent, 
spousal consent, parental consent, and reporting requirements [as well as] 
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Thus, Congress passed the Hyde Amendment barring the federal funding of abortion in 
1976 which was upheld by the Court in 1980.
315
 Human Life Amendment hearings were 
held in Congress in 1981
316
 and two years later Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor would 
famously cast doubt upon the trimester framework of Roe and foreshadow its 
abandonment nine years later. 
[N]either sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide cases based 
on the application of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical 
framework that varies according to the ‗stages‘ of pregnancy, where those 
stages, and their concomitant standards of review, differ according to the 




The Roe framework . . . is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the 
medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which 
the state may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further 
forward to actual childbirth. As medical science becomes better able to 
provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is 
moved further back toward conception.
317
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Three years after Thornburgh, the Court ―indicated . . . it was willing to apply a less 
stringent standard of review to state restrictions respecting a woman‘s right to an 
abortion‖ and invited states to revisit the issue of abortion restrictions.
318
 In doing so, the 
Court said that ―[w]hen the constitutional invalidity of a State‘s abortion statute actually 
turns upon the constitutional validity of Roe, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. 
And to do so carefully.‖
319
 
That time would come in the summer of 1992. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey a 
5-4 majority upheld ―all of Pennsylvania‘s contested restrictions but one (a requirement 
for spousal notification) and affirm[ed] the right of states to restrict abortions.‖ More 
importantly, however, the Court, appealing to a ―common mandate rooted in the 
Constitution‖ and the value of and correlation between stare decisis and regime stability, 
upheld ―Roe‘s essential holding,‖ which was ―a recognition of the right of the woman to 
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference 
                                                                                                                                                 
surprising, however, since the Court is not suited to the expansive role it has claimed for itself in the series 
of cases that began with Roe v. Wade.‖ 476 U.S. 747, 816 (1986) (Citations omitted). 
318
Shimabukuro and Lewis, ―CRS Report for Congress. Abortion Law Development: A Brief 
Overview,‖ Summary. 
319
Webster v. Reproductive Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). As W. John Moore explains more fully, 
―[m]any thought this would be done soon enough and that Roe was on the path to being overruled. During 
the 1970s and early 1980s, it appeared that courts were sympathetic to the arguments of those who were 
pro-choice on the issue of abortion. Consequently, the pro-choice community concentrated on litigation 
while the pro-life group appealed to the legislatures, the President, and governors. By the end of the 1980s, 
as a result of appointments by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush, the Supreme Court indicated that 
it would give less protection to the interests sought by the pro-choice organizations. Consequently, they 
now turned to Congress for support. [I]n June . . . 1991 . . . NARAL, which had relied on the courts in the 
past, now stated: ‗Clearly Congress is our Court of Last Resort. All hopes of protecting our constitutional 
right to choose depends upon our elected representatives in Congress responding to the will of the 
American people.‘ The American Civil Liberties Union, which had also depended heavily on litigation, 
sounded a similar theme: ‗Congress is increasingly asked to look at these issues because there is nobody 
else. It is now the court of last resort.‘‖ W. John Moore, ―In Whose Court?,‖ National Journal, 5 Oct. 1991, 
2400, quoted in Fisher and Gray, American Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 Constitutional Structures: Separated 





 Finally, the majority also jettisoned the Roe-created strict scrutiny 
standard and ruled post-viability restrictions should be upheld unless they placed ―undue 




Abortion did not cease to be an issue after Casey. In the halls of Congress, 
―partial-birth abortion‖ took center stage. In fact, throughout the 1990s, Congress ―tried 
four times to enact a law banning the procedure.‖ In the 104
th
 Congress, H.R. 1833 
passed the House 288-139, November 1
st
, 1995. On December 7
th
, an amended version 
passed the Senate 54-44. The House passed the Senate‘s version 286-129 the following 
March. President Clinton vetoed the bill April 10
th
, 1996. On September 19
th
, the House 
voted 285-137 to override the veto. Six days later the Senate fell nine votes. In the 105
th
 
Congress, H.R. 1122 passed the House 295-136 on March 20
th
, 1997. On May 20
th
, an 
amended version passed the Senate 64-36. The House passed the Senate‘s version 296-
                                                 
320
505 U.S. 833 (1992). Peter J. Boyer, ―The Right to Choose: Why the Democrats are moving 
toward compromise,‖ The New Yorker (14 Nov. 2005). More specifically, the ―[f]ive provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act required that a woman give her informed consent, receive certain 
information at least 24 hours before the abortion, required a minor to receive the informed consent of one 
parent (subject to a judicial bypass procedure), required women to first notify their husband (with some 
exceptions), and imposed certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.‖ Fisher 
and Adler, American Constitutional Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional Rights: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
922. 
321
505 U.S. 833, 867, 846 (1992). ―Undue burden‖ had a long history in the jurisprudential thought 
of Justice O‘Connor. As Stern explains, ―[i]t was an idea she had advanced almost as long as she had been 
on the court. In a 1983 case, she first laid out her undue burden test as a high bar that would strike down 
regulations only ‗in situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision.‘ 
She offered it in dissent after dissent throughout the 1980s without winning any converts among fellow 
justices. But the undue standard really found its power in . . . Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, in 
which a divided Supreme Court abandoned Roe‘s ‗trimester formula‘ governing abortion regulations in 
considering whether abortion regulations in the state of Missouri were constitutional. In Webster, the court 
splintered; some justices wanted to uphold Roe and others wanted to uphold the regulations. But among the 
nine, the only justice who wanted to uphold both the regulations and the precedent of Roe was O‘Connor. 
She was thus pivotal in the case, and so was her opinion. The Missouri law, she said, did not constitute an 
‗undue burden on women‘ seeking an abortion.‖ Seth Stern, ―The Legacy of ‗Undue Burden,‘‖ CQ Weekly 
Online (7 Nov. 2005): 2960-2961, available at http://library. cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport109-
000001950657 (accessed October 19, 2007). See also Boyer, ―The Right to Choose: Why the Democrats 
are moving toward compromise‖ and Shimabukuro and Lewis, ―CRS Report for Congress. Abortion Law 
Development: A Brief Overview,‖ Summary. 
81 
 
132 on October 8
th
 and President Clinton vetoed the bill two days later. The House 
overrode the veto 296-132 on July 23
rd
, 1998 but two months later the Senate fell three 
votes short. In the 106
th
 Congress, the Senate passed S. 1692 63-34 on October 21
st
, 
1999. The House passed H.R. 3660 287-141 on April 5
th
, 2000. In the 107
th
 Congress, the 
House passed H.R. 4965 274-151 on July 24
th






 was written in response to the Supreme Court decision three 
years prior, Stenberg v. Carhart.
324
 That decision struck down a Nebraska state ban on 
the late-term abortion procedure. The 5-4 majority ruled the statute was overly vague, 
given, it was argued, it could encompass more abortion procedures than the dilation and 
extraction procedure, and was an ―undue burden‖ on women seeking abortions because it 
lacked a health exception.
325
 Rebuked, supporters of a ban tried to again legislatively act 
by introducing this Act, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. 
S. 3, ―A bill to prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth 
abortion,‖
326
 was sponsored by Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) and had forty-five Senate co-
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sponsors. H.R. 760 was sponsored by Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH) and had one-hundred 
sixty-one House co-sponsors. On February 13
th
, 2003 introductory remarks were made 
and the bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, where the Constitution 
Subcommittee and full committee both held hearings and mark-ups. In the Senate, the bill 
was introduced and read February 14
th
, 2003. On February 24
th
 it was read a second time 
and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. March 10
th
 the measure was laid before 




 it was considered by the Senate 
and on the latter a motion by Senator Boxer (D-CA) to commit it to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee with instructions was rejected 42-56. On the 13
th
 it was again considered by 
the Senate, passed with an amendment (affirming Roe), 64-33, and held at the desk in 
House. The House debated and passed the bill June 4
th
 by a vote of 282-139. Four months 
later, on October 2nd, 2003, the House passed conference report 281-142 and on the 21st 
the Senate agreed to the conference report 64-34. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was 
now public law. 
DELIBERATION 
 
IMPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
 
VALUES . . .  
 
During debate, there was an intense battle to define the terms of the debate. 
Throughout the course of the deliberation, opponents of the ban referred to the ―so-called 
partial-birth abortion‖
327
 and ―the language of propaganda rather than the language of 
medical science.‖
328
 It was ―simply . . . a procedure that doctors were using to save the 
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 sess., 2001, vol. 147, no. 
158, E2101 (15 Nov. 2001). 
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 sess., 2002, vol. 148, no. 
102, H5357 (24 Jul. 2002). 
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lives of mothers who wanted to have children‖
329
 and the ban was ridiculed as ―extreme . 
. . vicious, mean-spirited, antiwoman, and . . . unconstitutional.‖
330
 
Conversely, supporters of the ban used many terms to indicate their disapproval 
of the procedure. It was a ―devious and evil practice,‖
331
 a ―deplorable. . . . violent and 
crude procedure,‖
332





 ―barbarous, to say the least,‖
335
 ―[a] a horrific procedure that is 
tantamount to murder,‖
336
 ―a most horrible procedure,‖
337
 ―a death sentence. . . . [and a] 
repulsive procedure,‖
338
 ―a fringe procedure,‖
339
 and ―cruel and unusual punishment.‖
340
 
The House sponsor of the ban labeled the practice 
the termination of the life of a living baby just seconds before it takes its 
first breath outside the womb. The procedure is violent. It is gruesome. It 
is infanticide. . . . A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the 
practice of performing a partial-birth abortion is a gruesome and inhumane 
procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited. . . . 
[It is a] national tragedy.
341
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. . . & MORE VALUES 
 
Members on both sides of the issue also appealed to other values and authoritative 





 the medical issues involved,
344
 the interconnectedness of international and 
domestic human rights,
345
 the societal impact of partial-birth abortion,
346
 and about 
respect and civility.
347
 There were also references to engaging the larger abortion 
debate,
348
 personhood and conception,
349
 the virtue of autonomy,
350
 and about women‘s 
rights.
351
 The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was invoked.
352
 The 
fundamental tension between the competing values of ―the liberty of a woman‖ and ―the 
life of a baby‖ was mentioned but not elaborated upon.
353
 Also mentioned were 
Prohibition, the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans, and the system of Jim 
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 the three-fifths clause
355
 and the Declaration of Independence.
356
 The Senate 
sponsor of the ban was particularly active in recurrently referencing and discussing Dred 
Scott v. Sanford, the difference between liberty ―rights‖ and life ―rights,‖ as well as the 




EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE(?) 
 
A PASSING GLANCE 
 
Sometimes members appealed to the Constitution as an obvious source of 
authority without elaborating on the content or consequences of such an appeal. Other 
times they made constitutional comparisons without drawing out the specific 
constitutional implications for this particular bill. 
For example, Sen. Santorum said he believed ―it is important to define when a 
child is protected by the Constitution‖
358
 and that previous justices had ―found a right that 
was not written in this Constitution. I don't think anyone will make the comment that the 
right to an abortion is written in the black letters of the Constitution. It is not.‖
359
 Sen. 
Boxer stated that she did not ―see it in the Constitution that I should outlaw a medical 
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procedure that doctors are saying to me is necessary to save the life and health of a 
woman.‖
360
 Rep. Schakowsky simply said ―[a]bortion is a constitutionally protected 
medical procedure in this country‖
361
 and that ―[f]or us to be true to the Constitution, to 
be true to the sentiments of equality and freedom, women must have control over their 
bodies. Instead, proponents of this bill, including the Bush administration, are using this 
bill as part of a broader agenda to take away a woman's constitutionally guaranteed right 
to choose.‖
362
 Sen. Feingold said he would ―oppose S. 3 . . . and instead w[ould] support 
a constitutionally sound alternative.‖
363
 Rep. Nadler hoped ―the Constitution still serves 
as a bulwark against such efforts [to restrict abortion].‖
364
 Sen. Durbin said the ban 
―violates a woman's constitutional right to have her health protected.‖
365
 
Sen. Mikulski believed a particular amendment ―offers the Senate a sensible 
alternative, one that would prohibit post-viability abortions while respecting the 
Constitution and protecting women's lives.‖
366
 Sen. Murray argued the bill ―shows that 
nothing[,] not war, not the stagnant economy[,] will stop hardliners in Congress from 
trying to appease their political base by pushing an unconstitutional, deceptive, extreme 
agenda on American women.‖
367
 Rep. Lee described at length that: 
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Pregnancy and childbirth are among the most intimate and the most 
personal experiences of a woman's life. . . . Our freedom to choose is 
every woman's fundamental right. This should be a medical decision made 
between a woman, her family, and her doctor and her clergy. Government 




Similarly, Rep. Johnson, while appropriately raising the issue of ―conflicting rights,‖ did 
not explain the constitutional foundations of nor solutions to this dilemma. 
This is a very important issue because it involves the balancing of 
conflicting rights, the right of the fetus and the right of the mother; and it 
is because balancing rights is the very hardest thing a democracy has to do 
that this is a constitutional issue. It ought to matter to the proponents that 
every single State law has been found wanting and been overturned 
because it does not balance these rights fairly. It does not allow the 
mother, the woman, to consider her health; but the system can only 







 Occasionally and to varying degrees, members did invoke the constitutional text 
specifically, usually in relation to the 14
th
 Amendment. For example, Rep. Hyde asked, 
―at what point does that tiny member of the human family get protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause and due process of our Constitution? No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, nor shall any person be deprived of equal 
protection of the law.‖
370
 Sen. Feinstein stated ―[t]he Senator has talked about the liberty 
clause. And Roe v. Wade . . . did come from the liberty clause of the due process clause 
of the 14th amendment and other parts of the Constitution.‖
371
 Rep. Jackson-Lee said that 
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―[i]n Roe v. Wade, the court held that women had a privacy interest in electing to have an 
abortion, based on the 5th and 14th Amendments' concept of personal liberty.‖
372
 
Likewise, Sen. Santorum, acknowledged, ―[s]o where did this right spring from? 
Where did this right emerge from? It emerged from the liberty clause of the 14th 
amendment.‖
373
 Rep. Kucinich also invoked the equal protection clause to make his case: 
―[t]his bill likely will not prevent a single abortion, but it does defeat the rights of 
women. I believe that equal protection under the law and the right to privacy should be 
freedoms enjoyed by women as well as men, but women will not be equal to men if this 
constitutionally protected right is denied. This bill infringes on those rights for 
women.‖
374
 Finally, in this perplexing example, Sen. Landrieu offers numerous and 
seemingly conflicting perspectives on the 14
th
 Amendment. 
Let me read, for the pro-life community, from this decision [Roe v. Wade], 
which was delicately crafted to address a very complex constitutional 
provision that was framed initially in the Bill of Rights, supported by the 
Constitution, and those principles are the principles of life, liberty, and 
happiness, not just for the fetus, for the unborn, for young children, but 
life, liberty, and happiness for people of all ages and all conditions in life, 
male and female, slave and free. . . . For the pro-life community, let me 
read what the Justices said: A State criminal abortion statute of the current 
Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on 
behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without 
recognition of the other interests involved . . . is violative of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . I suggest unless there 
are a majority of Senators willing to change the Constitution and remove 
the 14th amendment, this debate is going nowhere. The fact is that the 
Constitution supports a framework in which life and liberty for everyone, 
including the unborn, have to be taken into consideration.
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ROE, ROE, & ROE 
Members often invoked prior cases or the words of former justices to buttress or 
stand in the place of their own original arguments. Such examples included Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,
376
 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
377





 and Stenberg v. Carhart.
380
 
More importantly and as one would expect, both supporters and opponents of the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 discussed Roe v. Wade at great length. Roe was 
described as a ―moderate decision, a moderate mainstream decision,‖
381
 ―the most 
difficult and contentious social issue of our day. . . . one of those elephants in the living 
room,‖
382
 and ―a decision that recognized [that] the fundamental right to privacy extends 
to a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion with freedom from government 
                                                                                                                                                 
aspirational principle or a mistaken textual belief that the equality language from the Declaration is actually 
in the Bill of Rights and the possibly elsewhere in the Constitution. The latter part of the statement seems to 
be arguing that embedded in the Constitution is a contradiction: the 14
th
 Amendment allows for an abortion 
license but the Constitution ―supports a framework‖ in which the life of the unborn ―have to be taken into 
consideration.‖ Whatever the truth of this statement, no further explication was given. 
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intrusion. Roe transformed women's experiences in many ways: saved their lives, 
protected their health, fostered equality and paved the way for greater partnership with 
men in all aspects of our nation's life.‖
383
 The bill ―undermine[d the] basic tenets of Roe 
v. Wade‖
384
 and was an attempt ―to get somebody new on the Supreme Court and to turn 
the clock back completely, to overrule Roe v. Wade.‖
385
 
Roe was considered equivalent with the Constitution or at least precedentially 
sacrosanct. Sen. Boxer stated to a colleague, ―[y]ou thought [Stenberg] met the Roe v. 
Wade requirements as well. You were wrong and you were faulty. . . . it is really about 
meeting the constitutional requirements of Roe,
386
 and that ―[i]n [Roe] the Court found 
that a woman's reproductive decisions are a privacy right guaranteed by the 
Constitution.‖
387
 Rep. Davis said, ―[t]his ban is also unconstitutional because it is in 
blatant violation of Roe v. Wade.‖
388
 Sen. Jeffords commented that ―[e]nactment of this 
legislation, if upheld, would erode the Roe decision by banning an abortion procedure 
that is used previability of the fetus. Thus, this legislation can be clearly seen as an 
attempt to undermine the legal underpinnings of the Roe decision.‖
389
 Sen. Cantwell said 
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Roe ―was carefully crafted to be balanced and responsible while holding the rights of 
women in America paramount in reproductive decisions.‖
390
 
Some members disagreed as to whether Roe allowed a complete abortion license 
or allowed significant limitations in the second and third trimesters,
391
 or if Roe was even 
an issue, given the focus on this one particular method.
392
 Others emphasized Roe‘s 
distinction between pre-viability and post-viability abortions.
393
 In the Senate only, 
members also voted on a resolution offered by Sen. Harkin affirming the rightness of Roe 
v. Wade: ―I want to make sure with all of this going on that we send a strong signal to the 
women of this country that Roe v. Wade is appropriate, it was a good decision, and it is 
not going to be overturned.
394
 
 Finally, Roe was discussed as an issue involving representation, legislatures, and 
judicial power,
395
 as a reminder the abortion license was not absolute,
396
 as relating to 
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philosophical beliefs about the ―the legal status of a young human,‖
397
 and about the 





While it obviously overlaps with previous discussions, it is worth pointing out 
that Supreme Court precedent was also frequently discussed. This could be seen as 
entirely predictable given that any discussion of an issue that has been debated within the 
three branches of government, especially in the Courts, for the last thirty years is bound 
to include discussions of precedent, if for no other reason than to understand the terms of 
the debate and the issue. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the nature of this behavior 
and the implications. 
 The health exception mentioned in Doe v. Bolton and emphasized in Stenberg v. 
Carhart was frequently cited, although usually in terms of merely mentioning its 
necessity for perceived constitutionality rather than discussing its normative context.
399
 
Rep. Edwards said, ―if there is one frivolous late-term abortion in America, in my book 
that is one too many. But this bill is a false promise. . . . it is clearly unconstitutional, 
since it has no health exception.‖
400
 Sen. Durbin and Sen. Boxer exchanged comments 
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had a Supreme Court that argues that the Stenberg case, the legally identical bill to this, is unconstitutional 
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over Stenberg and a health exception, in which Sen. Durbin asked: ―why are we now 
considering S. 3, this bill, which defies the Supreme Court and says to them, we know 
better, we are going to change your mind, we are going to send you something that 
doesn't meet the test [a health exception] in light of the Nebraska statute?‖
401
 
Sen. Cantwell agreed, arguing that ―[d]espite the Supreme Court's very clear 
mandate, the legislation before us today does not provide an exception for the health of 
the mother. For this reason, this legislation, like the one struck down in Stenberg, is 
unconstitutional.‖
402
 Defending his amendment to the bill, Sen. Durbin argued it had ―a 
health exception not contained in S. 3 . . . [and therefore] more likely to withstand the 
constitutional challenge and scrutiny across the street at the Supreme Court.‖
403
 Sens. 
DeWine and Santorum disagreed with this emphasis, arguing that medical judgment is a 
―loophole[] so big that abortion providers would be able to continue to perform virtually 
all the partial-birth abortions they perform today‖
404
 and that 
‗medical judgment‘ has, of course, a great deal of built-in flexibility. 
Specifically, under the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1973, 
in the Doe v. Bolton case: Medical judgment may be exercised in the light 
of all factors_physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the 
woman's age_relevant to the well being of the patient. All these factors 
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COOPERATION & COMMUNICATION 
As has been shown, sometimes members simply made comments merely 
acknowledging the existence of the other branches of government (in this case primarily 
the Court), or stating the basic belief that branches of government have worked together 
or should work together in some particular fashion. 
One way this occurred during deliberation over this bill was through debate over 
congressional fact finding. This was extremely important because supporters of the ban 
inserted findings of fact they claimed demonstrated the lack of need for a health 
exception, thus making the bill constitutionally adequate given current Court 
precedents.
406
 Others argued the findings were evidentially insufficient.
407
 Sen. Feinstein 
stated: 
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend that Congress be able to 
evade Supreme Court precedent and effectively amend the Constitution 
just by holding a hearing and generating questionable testimony from 
handpicked witnesses. In fact, the Supreme Court has made crystal clear 
that Congress cannot simply ignore a constitutional ruling they dislike by 
adopting a contrary legislative finding and telling the Court that they have 
to defer to it. That is just what is being done here. . . . So make no mistake 
about it. You can say anything you want in the findings, and it isn't going 
to be dispositive as to whether the statute meets the test of the Constitution 




Sen. Jeffords agreed: 
 
The proponents of this legislation will point to the pages of findings 
contained in the legislation as to why it is unnecessary to have an 
exception for the health of the mother. There are two problems with this 
                                                 
406
Sen. Santorum (R-PA), stated, ―[c]learly, we believe we have addressed the issue of health.‖ 
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rationale, first the Supreme Court has shown an unwillingness to consider 
Congressional findings of fact in recent decisions, such as Morrison, 
VAWA, and Kimmel, ADEA. Second, during the debate on the Carhart 
decision, the Supreme Court had knowledge of these findings, yet still 
ruled that because the Nebraska statute did not have an explicit health 




 Supporters of the ban offered arguments why congressional fact finding was 
appropriate. Rep. Pence said, ―[w]e have changed the bill, adding findings of fact to 
overcome constitutional barriers, and I am confident that it will survive judicial 
review.‖
410
 Rep. Sensenbrenner cited numerous quotations from previous Court decisions 
supporting the efficacy of congressional fact finding.
411
 Also citing Turner Broadcasting 
System, Rep. Chabot stated: 
the United States Congress is entitled to reach its own factual findings, 
findings that the Supreme Court consistently relies upon and accords great 
deference, and to enact legislation based upon these findings so long as it 
seeks to pursue a legitimate interest that is within the scope of the 





In the Senate, Sen. Santorum agreed: 
 
Congress has, on repeated occasions, made findings of fact in preparation 
for review by the courts, and in a vast number of these cases, the courts 
have been very deferential to Congress, as a body, that gets into much 
more detail through the process of hearings. We have had numerous 
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CHECKS & BALANCES 
 
Other statements reflected the belief by members that they were participating in a 
system of checks and balances, particularly with the Court. Sometimes members 
recognized that rather than acting completely independently, they were responding to the 
Court, or even giving implicit or explicit deferential acknowledgment to it. This makes 
rational sense if, rather than seeking merely symbolic votes or gestures, legislation which 
would not instantly be ruled unconstitutional by the perceived preference of Court 
judgment was the goal. 
For example, Sen. Mikulski said, ―[t]he Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the 
fundamental ‗right to privacy‘ in our Constitution gave every woman the right to decide 
what to do with her own body.‖
414
 Sen. Murray stated, ―this ban is unconstitutional. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that this very type of restriction violates the 
Constitution.‖
415
 Rep. Brown commented that ―[t]he Supreme Court agrees that medical 
decisions should be made by the patient and her doctor and not by a bunch of politicians 
in Washington and their special interests.‖
416
 In support of the bill, Rep. Ryun said, 
―[a]lthough language banning this procedure has been struck down in the past by the 
Supreme Court, this new legislation has been tailored to address the Court‘s concerns.‖
417
 
Others backers of the ban echoed this belief that the bill rectified the health and 
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definitional deficiencies in the Nebraska statute.
418
 Sen. Santorum argued for his bill by 
explaining: 
The Senator from California said: We meant to cover more than one 
procedure with this language. . . . Why would we want to do that? The 
Supreme Court said: The reason we are striking down your language is 
that we believe it covers more than one procedure. So we are going to 
craft language so the Supreme Court can come back and say, well, it 
covers more than one procedure? . . . Maybe my colleagues think we are 
not serious about banning this procedure. Let me assure them, I am serious 
as a heart attack about banning this procedure, and we have crafted 
language to do just that, and only that. . . . The language is different. It is 




I am simply trying, to the best of my ability, to adequately and sufficiently 
describe a procedure to include that procedure and exclude all others. 
Because that is what the Court asked us to do[,] to define this procedure so 
specifically as to exclude others. . . . The Court went through great detail, 
talking about other procedures where a child could still be alive and 
portions of that child could be outside the mother. They could be doing 
another form of abortion and an arm or a leg or some portion of the body 
could go outside of the mother in the process of killing the child in the 




 On the other hand, numerous members justified their opposition by highlighting 
the unconstitutionality of the bill, usually through the paradigm of judicial primacy. Sen. 
Mikulski asserted that ―[t]he Santorum bill before us [.] . . . is unconstitutional. . . . The 
Santorum bill is unconstitutional. . . . The Santorum bill violates the key principles of Roe 
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v. Wade and other Court decisions.‖
421
 Sen. Feinstein agreed, saying, ―The bill violates 
Roe and other Supreme Court opinions because it doesn't protect the health of the 
woman. . . My amendment follows the Constitution. It is constitutional.‖
422
 Rep. 
Tauscher asked, ―are we just wasting everybody's time and beating our chests just to pass 
something that we know will be overturned by the Supreme Court?‖
423
 Rep. Kirk stated 
that ―[u]nlike H.R. 760, the Greenwood substitute bans late-term abortions in a way the 
Supreme Court will sustain. Passage of the Greenwood substitute would mean a quick 
end to litigation and a rapid change in U.S. law. . . . Failure to pass the substitute means 
continuing litigation and defeat at the hands of the Supreme Court.‖
424
 Rep. Lee thought 
that ―[m]eddling in these intensely personal private affairs violates our Constitution. . . . 
This bill is . . . reckless and it is unconstitutional. . . . Otherwise, the Supreme Court will 




As has already been mentioned in the previous section, many members of 
Congress offered the ban‘s unconstitutionality as a reason or the reason for their 
opposition. While this consideration can easily be understood within a system of checks 
and balances, as just discussed, it can also be understood as deference to the Court in 
matters of constitutional interpretation. 
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 Many members expressed their perspective that because there was no health 
exception in the bill, and because the Court had ruled in Stenberg the need for one in the 
Nebraska statute, this ban would be found unconstitutional.
426
 Rep. DeGette asked, ―[i]f 
this bill were passed into law, the Supreme Court would find it unconstitutional. Why on 
Earth would we pass a bill we know for a fact is unconstitutional?‖
427
 Rep. Holmes 
Norton stated: 
The bill tries to simply hop over Roe versus Wade with 15 pages of 
congressional findings. But congressional findings cannot overrule a 
Supreme Court decision. Congressional findings cannot nullify a woman's 
constitutional right. Congressional findings cannot defeat a woman's right 





Two months later, she added: 
 
I want to speak to the constitutional issues. . . . because each and every 
time this and similar bills have been overturned. Worse, there is no health 
exception. It is as if Roe versus Wade never said that in order to be 
constitutional there always had to be a health exception. . . . It was 
unconstitutional 3 years ago, my friends. It is unconstitutional today, even 




Sen. Daschle exclaimed: 
 
The Supreme Court has struck down what many experts claim is a ‗legally 
identical‘ bill, the Nebraska law banning this procedure. In previous 
Congresses, I have expressed my concern that this legislation may not 
withstand an inevitable constitutional challenge. . . . Now that the Court 
has ruled in the Nebraska case, that concern is even greater. But the 
sponsors of this bill have chosen to take that gamble, claiming their ‗20 
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word changes‘ have resolved the constitutional concerns. Those 20 words, 
by the way, are allegedly powerful enough to change the outcome in the 
Supreme Court, but not significant enough to merit a hearing in the 
Judiciary Committee. . . . At this point, it is my hope that this Senate bill 
will go quickly to the President so that the Supreme Court can rule on it. If 
the Court strikes it down, then I hope people on both sides of this issue 
will be willing to work together to stop all post-viability abortions except 




Rep. Conyers declared, ―[e]ven if it passes the House and the Senate, the Supreme Court 
still will tell us the same thing; that we must have an exception for the life and health and 
safety of the mother, or this provision is not valid. . . . there is no chance of this ever 
becoming law.‖
431
 Sen. Murray agreed, stating, ―[o]ne of the reasons I oppose S. 3, the 
so-called Partial Birth Abortion Act, was because I know this legislation is 
unconstitutional. It simply does not meet the constitutional test that requires providing 
some consideration for the health of the woman. . . . The Court has been extremely clear 
on this point.‖
432
 Other members equated Court precedent with the Constitution‘s 
apparently clear meaning. Rep. Hoyer said, ―[w]e ought to protect those lives. But we 
have to balance it. That is what the Court says, that is what the Constitution of the United 
States says.‖
433
 Sen. Rockefeller felt the same: 
The comprehensive ban I supported[,] offered as an amendment by 
Senator Durbin[,] would have put an end to all late-term post-viability 
abortions . . . . [and would have] included a very narrow exception for the 
rare case when a woman's life or health is threatened by a troubled 
pregnancy, as required by the United States Supreme Court and the 
Constitution. . . . I want to emphasize that if we are serious about ending 
the practice of late-term abortions then we must pass a law that will be 
upheld by our courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has been quite clear that to 
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be deemed constitutional, any law banning late-term abortions must be 
narrowly focused and must include an exception for the health of the 
mother. Several previous bans ignored these tests and were struck down, 
and consequently there has been no end to this troubling practice. Senator 
Santorum's bill does not adequately meet the Court's requirements for 
constitutionality and will almost surely meet the same fate. . . . The Durbin 
amendment, on the other hand, was a clear and comprehensive ban that 
does comply with the constitutionality tests set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. . . .  I continue to hope that in the end we will find a way to enact a 
comprehensive ban on late-term abortions that meets the demands of the 
U.S. Supreme Court and Constitution by protecting the life and physical 




THE FINAL ARBITER? 
In combination with using Court precedent to justify their opposition to the bill, 
many members also expressed outright beliefs in judicial supremacy during this 
deliberation. For example, Rep. Maloney said, ――[t]he writers of this bill are trying to be 
both the Supreme Court and every woman's doctor. They are making a mockery of the 
separation of powers and are stealing decisions from women and their doctors.‖
435
 Rep. 
Van Hollen stated, ―[m]oreover, we cannot exert a power we do not have. The Supreme 
Court, in Roe v. Wade, has determined that a woman has a constitutional right to choose a 
safe and legal abortion during the pre-viability period.‖
436
 Sen. Feingold argued, ―I feel 
very strongly that Congress should seek to regulate abortions only within the 
constitutional parameters set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. That is why I supported 
the inclusion of language in S. 3 reaffirming the Senate's commitment to Roe and its 
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belief that Roe should not be overturned.‖
437
 According to Sen. Murray, this was an issue 
that ―was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court years ago.‖
438
 Sen. Durbin wondered, ―[i]f 
the Supreme Court has reached the conclusion that this language fails to meet the test of 
Roe v. Wade, why in the world are we going through this exercise again? . . . The 
Santorum approach, S. 3, violates a woman's constitutional right to choose under Roe v. 
Wade. Don't take my word, take the word of the Supreme Court.‖
439
 Rep. Jackson-Lee 
said, ―[t]he drafters of H.R. 760 are clearly wrong in asserting that they can overrule 
Carhart through legislation. Prior attempts by Congress to undo disfavored Supreme 
Court rulings . . . have been soundly rejected by the Supreme Court.‖
440
 Rep. Slaughter 
told her colleagues that: 
S. 3 brazenly seeks to sidestep the Constitution. . . . But the Court has 
squarely said that ‗the power to interpret the Constitution in a case of 
controversy remains in the judiciary.‘ And the Court has said that simply 
because Congress makes a conclusion does not necessarily make it so. Just 
because the findings in the bill assert that there is no medical reason for a 
health exception does not make that true, and it does not change the 




Other members utilized other arguments. Rep. Kind even equated his oath of 
office to Supreme Court precedent: 
As a Member of the U.S. Congress, I took an oath to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States. I will not betray that oath. Now that the 
Supreme Court has determined the constitutional parameters for a partial-
birth abortion ban in the Stenberg case, I must adhere to that decision and 
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cannot vote for a bill that is blatantly unconstitutional. H.R. 760 does not 




Sen. Kennedy did likewise. 
 
The Republican leadership has chosen to make as its top priority a flatly 
unconstitutional piece of legislation. . . . From the time of the 1973 
decision in Roe v. Wade through the Stenberg v. Carhart decision in 2000, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that the 
Constitution allows states to restrict post-viability abortions as long as 
[there is a health exception]. . . . The role of the United States Senate is to 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. Each of us in this 
body has taken that oath of office. And that oath of office and the 
Constitution require me to oppose this legislation. . . . This bill 
unconstitutionally seeks to restrict abortions in cases before viability and it 





Warning against congressional interpretive assertions against the Court, Rep. Nadler 
stated: 
Members should know better than to believe that this activist conservative 
Supreme Court that we now have, we should know that they do not feel 
any particular need to defer to Congress. Members should know what 
comes of Congress ignoring the will of the Supreme Court. Whatever 
power Congress had under section 5 of the 14th amendment to effectuate 
the purposes of 14th amendment as a result of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
which was cited by the proponents of the bill, and is cited copiously in the 
bill's findings, I think the more recent Boerne decision of the Supreme 
Court vastly undercuts those powers. And even if Katzenbach was still 
fully good law, as I personally wish it were for other reasons, that case 
empowered Congress only to expand rights under the 14th amendment, 
not to curtail rights under the 14th amendment. . . . The Supreme Court 
has held that the right to choose to have an abortion is a woman's right 
under the 14th amendment, with some limits that the Supreme Court has 
recognized; and the Katzenbach decision says those rights can be 
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Several members invoked Marbury v. Madison, claiming that it was the foundation for 
Roe v. Wade and for judicial supremacy. Rep. Lowey proclaimed that: 
The supporters of H.R. 760 disagree with the Court's reflection of our 
society and reject the principles embodied in its decisions. Holding their 
opinion is their right. Disregarding the Constitution is wrong. . . . The 
Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Stenberg v. Carhart rested 
on precedent, including Marbury v. Madison, decided 200 years ago this 
year. Marbury was critically important to the development of our 
democracy because it established the Supreme Court as the final and 
ultimate authority on what the Constitution means. . . . In 1803, the 
Supreme Court became in fact, not just on paper, an equal partner in 
government, co-equal with the executive and the legislature. But in 2003, 




Rep. Nadler declared: 
 
Mr. Speaker, we are told that the Supreme Court must defer to 
congressional fact-finding even if Congress' so-called facts conflict with 
the preponderance of evidence in litigation before the Court. But the 
drafters of this bill are wrong. First, it is one of the fundamental tenets of 
our constitutional structure which establishes three separate branches of 
the Federal Government that Congress can enact laws, but it cannot decide 
whether those laws are constitutional. That is exclusively the Supreme 
Court's role. . . . I realize that one of the members of the Committee on the 
Judiciary said that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Marbury v. 




Rep. Jackson-Lee agreed: 
 
That is the basis of this Nation, three distinct branches of government; the 
Marbury decision suggesting that the Supreme Court is the supreme law 
of the land. . . . Justice Breyer says that this court, in the course of a 
generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution 
offers basic protection to the woman's right to choose, and we shall not 
revisit those legal principles. We shall not revisit these legal principles. 
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 There were statements of varying emphasis made by members reflecting an inter-
branch view of departmentalism, wherein each branch posses the power and duty to 
explicate their own interpretation of the Constitution. For example, Rep. Jackson-Lee 
acknowledged that ―Congress has in its past overridden the United States Supreme Court; 
but at the same time, the Supreme Court can come back and say it is unconstitutional. It 
is the highest law of the land, and so we can keep going back and forth and back and 
forth.‖
448
 Rep. Miller commented that ―[i]n response to the Supreme Court's split 
decision in the Stenberg-Carhart ruling, this will help give clear guidelines to what is 
considered constitutional and prohibited.‖
449
 
Others were more direct. Rep. Davis said, ―[b]ut even if it were certain that this 
legislation as soon as it was passed would be struck down by an imperial judiciary, we 
must, as Members of Congress, discharge our duties to at least attempt to protect the civil 
rights of the most vulnerable, those least able to protect themselves.‖
450
 Rep. Hyde asked, 
―[a]s far as the Supreme Court, we can keep trying to have them get it right, can we not? 
You would not be satisfied with Dred Scott, would you?‖
451
 Rep. Toomey stated, ―[t]he 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to have abortions. A few Supreme Court Justices 
on the other hand, decided that they would rather be legislators than Justices and so they 
invented this right. They wrote it in a decision. . . . It is a terrible misreading of the 
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 Rep. Linder asserted Congress‘ prerogative by declaiming: ―Although I 
certainly respect the Supreme Court exercising its article III duties, I believe the Congress 
has its own duty to create and pass laws that protect the people of this country.‖
453
 Sen. 
Santorum agreed: ―The reason we are back is not just to say the Court was wrong or that 
we disagree with the Court's judgment on constitutionality, although I do.‖
454
 The next 
day he added, ―I guess I am saying something . . . about the decision of Roe v. Wade 
because I think it gets it wrong. The Supreme Court got it wrong.‖
455
 At length he argued: 
They have proscribed in elected representatives the right to have any 
impact on that. . . . The courts have completely trumped the legislature. 
They have decided to take an entire body of law away from us and the 
State legislatures. I believe the Senator was in the State legislature at one 
point. That is my recollection. They have taken it away from the State 
legislatures, taken it away from the Congress, taken it away from people in 
our democracy, in our Republic, and decided to hold it up across the street 
where nine, at the time men, decided to take the law into their own hands 




Rep. Delay asserted: 
 
I did not come to the House to make a decision for the courts. I came to 
the House to pass very strong, important legislation and then to fight in the 
courts for my position. I do not let the courts decide what direction I go. I 
do not make those decisions in this Chamber. If Members want to make 
decisions for the courts, then go down to the White House and get a 
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Rep. Paul stated that ―[p]artial-birth abortion . . . clearly demonstrates how close we are 
to legalizing infanticide. This problem should be dealt with by the States and without the 
Federal courts or the U.S. Congress[‘] involvement.‖
458
 Two months later, he argued: 
while it is the independent duty of each branch of the Federal Government 
to act Constitutionally, Congress will likely continue to ignore . . . its 
Constitutional limits. . . . by expanding the class of victims to which 
unconstitutional (but already-existing) Federal murder and assault statutes 
apply, the Federal Government moves yet another step closer to a national 
police state. . . . Of course, it is much easier to ride the current wave of 
federalizing every human misdeed in the name of saving the world from 
some evil than to uphold a Constitutional oath which prescribes a 
procedural structure by which the nation is protected from what is perhaps 
the worst evil, totalitarianism. Who, after all, wants to be amongst those 
members of Congress who are portrayed as soft on violent crimes initiated 
against the unborn? . . . Protection of life (born or unborn) against 
initiations of violence is of vital importance. So vitally important, in fact, 
it must be left to the States‘ criminal justice systems. We have seen what a 
legal, constitutional, and philosophical mess results from attempts to 
federalize such an issue. Numerous States have adequately protected the 
unborn against assault and murder and done so prior to the Federal 
Government‘s unconstitutional sanctioning of violence in the Roe v. Wade 
decision. Unfortunately, H.R. 503 ignores the danger of further 
federalizing that which is properly reserved to State governments and, in 
so doing, throws legal philosophy, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, . . . 




Later, he would discuss the commerce clause, the general welfare clause, and the proper 
authorial dimension in which criminal law should normatively be dealt under a proper 
understanding of the Constitution.
460
 
The legal problems of protecting life stem from the ill-advised Roe v. 
Wade ruling, a ruling that constitutionally should never have occurred. . . . 
The best solution, of course, is not now available to us. That would be a 
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Supreme Court that recognizes that for all criminal laws, the several states 
retain jurisdiction. Something that Congress can do is remove the issue 
from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, so that states can deal 
with the problems surrounding abortion, thus helping to reverse some of 
the impact of Roe v. Wade. . . . Another problem with this bill is its 
citation of the interstate commerce clause as a justification for a federal 
law banning partial-birth abortion. This greatly stretches the definition of 
interstate commerce. The abuse of both the interstate commerce clause 
and the general welfare clause is precisely the reason our Federal 
Government no longer conforms to constitutional dictates but, instead, 
balloons out of control in its growth and scope. H.R. 760 inadvertently 
justifies federal government intervention into every medical procedure 





On November 5th, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act into public law.
462
 Several lower courts, in response to three legal 
challenges filed immediately after the Ban Act was passed, all quickly ruled that it was 
unconstitutional. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales appealed a ruling of the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of LeRoy Carhart.
463
 The Supreme Court upheld the 
Ban on April 18th, 2007 in Gonzales v. Carhart.
464
 In it, Justice Kennedy discussed the 
state‘s interest in the promotion of life as well as the ambiguous medical testimony 
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surrounding the issue. Drawing on his own language from fifteen years prior, wrote that 
the ban did not impose an 
undue burden on a woman‘s right to abortion based on its overbreadth or 
lack of a health exception. . . . It is self-evident that a mother who comes 
to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and 
sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she 
once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and 





In dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote ―[t]he court‘s hostility to the right Roe and Casey 
secured is not concealed.‖ ―In candor, the act, and the court‘s defense of it, cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and 




According to one observer, ―[t]he decision marks the first time the court has 
upheld a ban on a specific type of abortion. It is also the first time since the court‘s 
landmark 1973 abortion decision in Roe v. Wade that the court has upheld a restriction on 
abortion services that does not include an exception for procedures deemed necessary to 
preserve a woman‘s health.‖
467
 While some felt the decision was ―a faithful application of 
existing Supreme Court precedent,‖
468
 others disagreed, believing that ―the Roberts Court 
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has begun its march on abortion rights‖
469
 and that the case was ―a dramatic change in the 
law of abortion.‖
470
 Thus, participants in this debate may have helped stake out new 
constitutional ground in abortion jurisprudence. 
Congress may have helped to ―construct‖ new areas of abortion jurisprudence 
through its participation in this legislation. If Dawn Johnsen‘s fears are realized, it may 
be that while Roe is left intact, due to the developments in Gonzales, other means are 
found to restrict abortion procedures while leaving the actual constitutional right alone. If 
may also mean that supporters of abortion in Congress use the example of Gonzales to 
buttress the abortion right by clarifying their own language in potential legislation.
471
 
Given the relevant political regime and presence of an affiliated age, first, in 
addition to extreme amounts of symbolic speech and partisan behavior, we see an 
underlying ―settled‖ value in which members were not eager to mention, much less even 
discuss, important precedents in the history of abortion jurisprudence, the most important 
being the initial cases in 1965 and more prominently 1973. Instead, members of Congress 
and their affiliated president, trying to satisfy their coalition without alienating any 
                                                 
469
Professor Susan Estrich. ―If you can dream of a way to limit abortion rights, and get it enacted, 
they‘ll uphold it.‖ Primary source for this quote cannot be found. Professor John C. Eastman quotes it in his 
article, ―Justice Kennedy‘s Partial Birth Abortion Decision Invites Long-Overdue Dialogue,‖ available at 
claremont.org. The Los Angeles Daily Journal requires subscription and Professor Estrich does not list an 
editorial to the Daily Journal available on her curriculum vitae, available online. 
470
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky. The quote can be found at The Federalist Society Online Debate 
Series, ―Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,‖ available at http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:j4RMHnBId 
IUJ:www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.3/default.asp+Cherminsky+dramatic+change+in+the+law+of+abortion 
&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. Page 4 of the pdf file has Professor Chemerinsky‘s remark. 
471
As George Thomas writes, [g]iven the persistent conflict over abortion rights, it would be 
difficult to call Roe ‗authoritatively settled.‘ The Court‘s own opinions have evolved on the matter, with the 
justices themselves squabbling over the meaning of precedents [Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
See especially the exchange between Justices O‘Connor (at 947) and Kennedy (at 957) over the meaning of 
Casey]. If there is a consensus that women ought to have a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy in 
the early months, the evidence suggests this is based on social and political understandings and not derived 
from the Court‘s constitutional reasoning.‖ George Thomas, ―Recovering the Political Constitution: The 
Madisonian Vision,‖ The Review of Politics 66, no. 2 (spring 2004): 254. See Jeffrey Rosen, ―Worst 
Choice: Why We‘d be Better off Without Roe,‖ The New Republic, February 24, 2003. 
111 
 
within, or close to joining, that coalition, chose to work with their perceived Court 
majority, which we would expect if the majority of the justices were aligned with the 
previous reconstructive president, and ignore the more fundamental issue and instead 
focus on a new, somewhat separate, narrower issue, by which, no doubt, they sought to 
shift public opinion.
472
 Also, in non-reconstructive eras, elected leaders are willing to 
give the Court room to express their supremacy since the members seek to avoid an 
accountability-trail back to them. We see both sides deferring to the Court and using the 
Court as their non-arbitrary anchor or what is or is not constitutional and proper in a 
system of checks-and-balances, a deference that has not always been a reality. 
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I believe in a strong, robust executive authority, and I think that the world we live in demands it. . 




Much took place between the events of September 11, 2001 and Congress‘ debate 
over the Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007. More than 600 suspected terrorists were 
detained after the initial attacks and the issue of habeas was immediately controversial.
474
 
In fact, according to Jonathan Alter 
[w]hen Attorney General John Ashcroft sent the secret first draft of the 
antiterrorism bill to Capitol Hill in October, it contained a section 
explicitly titled: ‗Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.‘ . . . GOP Rep. 
James Sensenbrenner, who chair[ed] the House Judiciary Committee, 





That bill, the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 





 and on October 30
th 
new Department of Justice rules limiting the attorney-client 
privilege for certain criminal defendants were issued. Fourteen days later, rather than 
relying on civilian courts, President Bush issued an Executive Military Order authorizing 
military tribunals or military commissions by ―executive fiat‖ to try suspected 
terrorists.
477
 In his announcement, he stated, ―[t]hese are extraordinary times. And I 
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would remind those who don‘t understand the decision I made that Franklin Roosevelt 
made the same decision in World War II. Those were extraordinary times, as well.‖
478
 
In January of the following year, the first detainees were sent to the U.S. Naval 
Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, which, ―[u]nlike, say, Afghanistan or Iraq . . . was 
completely secure. . . . [A] 1903 treaty with Cuba gives the U.S. total, permanent 
jurisdiction and control. But because Cuba technically retains ‗sovereignty,‘ Guantánamo 
-- unlike prisons in the U.S. -- seemed beyond the reach of any court.‖
479
 In February, 
Sen. Arlen Specter (PA) introduced the Military Commission Procedures Act. It had a 
sole co-sponsor and was legislatively inert.
480
 Also early in 2002, President Bush said 
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During these first several years post-9/11 individuals transported to and held at 
Guantánamo quickly began to challenge their detentions in court, several of which 
reached the Supreme Court. On June 28
th
, 2004, the Supreme Court issued three 
momentous rulings in response, stipulating that legal challenges to detainee detentions 
were acceptable, detainees had access to federal courts, and that habeas corpus does 
extend to Guantánamo. In Rasul v. Bush, ―the U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. courts 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear legal challenges on behalf of 
persons, including non-citizens, detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism.‖
482
 Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice 
John Paul Stevens quoted from Justice Jackson: ―[e]xecutive imprisonment has been 
considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man 
should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his 
peers or by the law of the land. The judges of England developed the writ of habeas 
corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint.‖
483
 The majority 




Rasul‘s lawyers did not argue and the Court did not rule on whether Rasul 
had a constitutional right to habeas – that particular issue was deferred for 
the moment. The Court relied on the fact the habeas statute did not specify 
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that it was limited to citizens. So, reasoned the Court, the statute applies to 
alien enemy combatants picked up in Afghanistan and held in 
Guantánamo. The Court further held the habeas statute extended to aliens 
held at Guantánamo because, although the detainees themselves were 
beyond the Court‘s jurisdiction, the Court had jurisdiction over the 
detainees‘ custodians, i.e., the U.S. Government, and that was sufficient 




In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court ruled that Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen 
(Hamdi was born in the United States but had lived most of his life in Saudi Arabia) 
captured in Afghanistan allegedly taking part in hostile action against U.S. forces, must 
be tried and could not be held indefinitely.
486
 The ―Court ruled . . . the president had the 
authority to detain him under the law, enacted just after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, that 
authorized the use of military force in Afghanistan, but that he was entitled to challenge 
the basis of his detention before ‗a neutral decision-maker.‘‖
487
 Justice O‘Connor stated 
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for 
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation‘s citizens. . . . 
Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations 
in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three 
branches when individual liberties are at stake. . . . Absent suspension [of 
habeas corpus] by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is 
entitled to this process.
488
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because the Secretary of Defense was not Jose Padilla‘s ―immediate custodian‖ the habeas corpus petition 
had been improperly filed (542 U.S. 426 (2004)). See Freedman, ―Different Circumstances, Different 




Nine days after these rulings, the Department of Defense issued new guidelines creating 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals to identify more precisely ―enemy combatants.‖ 
In October of the next year, after almost four years and initial resistance from the 
Administration, Congress took substantive action by passing the Detainee Treatment 
Act.
489
 It was designed to overrule Rasul by eliminating statutory habeas jurisdiction for 
detainees at Guantánamo in federal courts. It stipulated that ―no court, justice or judge 
shall have jurisdiction‖ to consider habeas petitions from detainees. The Act only allowed 
for limited review of final tribunal decisions by the D.C. Circuit Court.
490
 
Nine months later, on the 29
th
 of June 2006, the Supreme Court issued their ruling 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a military tribunal case. Hamdan, a Yemeni national fighting in 
Afghanistan, had been captured in November 2001 after allegedly having worked for 
Osama Bin Laden as a bodyguard and driver.
491
 He was transported to Guantánamo in 
June 2002 and in July of the next year President Bush declared Hamdan eligible for trial 
by military commission. After over two-and-a-half years of detention, Hamdan was 
formally charged with conspiracy in July 2004 but the District of Columbia District Court 
determined Hamdan could not be tried by a military commission not specifically 
approved by Congress and that the commission procedures were inconsistent with the 
                                                 
489
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Uniform Code of Military Justice. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
reversed the decision of the District Court, concluding Congress had authorized the 
military commissions and Hamdan was required to exhaust the military remedies 
available. 
In June 2006, the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 vote, reversed the Court of Appeals, 
finding that the procedures and structure of the military commissions in fact violated the 
Geneva Conventions, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and remanded the case ―for 
further proceedings.‖
492
 The Court held the stripping provision of the Detainee Treatment 
Act was not retroactive and thus it had jurisdiction to hear the pending habeas 
petitions.
493
 In addition, ―[w]ith respect to the authority to create the military 
commissions, the Court held that any power to create them must flow from the 
Constitution and must be among those ‗powers granted jointly to the President and 
Congress in time of war.‘‖
494
 
 Four months later, Congress responded to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld by passing the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006.
495
 After debate on September 27th and 28th, the bill 
passed the Senate 65-34. It passed the House 250-170 the very next day and President 
Bush signed it into law on October 17, 2006.
496
 The Act repudiated Hamdan by 
specifically authorizing military commissions to try those who engage in or materially 
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At least one member of the Senate felt the vote on the Military Commissions Act was 





 sess., 2007, vol. 153, no. 1, S180 (4 Jan. 2007). 
118 
 
support hostilities against the United States or its allies, allowed for more relaxed rules 
for bringing detainees to trial, created a new appellate body, the Court of Military 
Commission Review, and explicitly said there was no right of habeas corpus for 
Guantánamo detainees within federal court jurisdiction, including pending cases. Only a 
D.C. Circuit Court review was allowed.
497
 An amendment sponsored by Sens. Arlen 
Specter and Patrick Leahy to preserve habeas corpus was defeated by three votes. At the 
very end of the 109
th
 Congress, S. 4081, the Habeas Corpus Restoration Act symbolically 




At the beginning of the 110
th
 Congress, S. 185, ―A bill to restore habeas corpus 
for those detained by the United States,‖ was introduced again by Sen. Specter, this time 
with 31 other co-sponsors.
499
 Specter again made introductory remarks, the bill was read 
twice, and then referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill language stipulated 
that it 
[r]epeals provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 that 
eliminated the jurisdiction of any court to hear or consider applications for 
a writ of habeas corpus filed by aliens who have been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as enemy combatants (or 
who are awaiting such determination) and actions against the United 
States relating to the detention of such aliens and to military commissions 
(thus restoring habeas corpus rights existing prior to the enactment of such 
Act). Allows courts to hear or consider legal challenges to military 
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th
, 2007. Five different House bills were also listed as being 
related to S. 185 by THOMAS: H.R. 267, H.R. 1189, H.R. 1416, H.R. 2543, and H.R. 2826. All but one 









In February, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the Military Commission Act‘s 
restrictions on habeas for detainees.
501
 On June 7
th
, 2007, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
ordered the Habeas bill to be reported favorably without amendment and on June 26
th 
the 
bill was reported without amendment with written report No. 110-90 and additional 
majority and minority views filed. Sen. Specter was the only Republican to vote for the 
bill and in the report, ―five of the panel‘s GOP members said the legislation could force 
the government to choose between revealing secret intelligence sources and methods and 
releasing committed terrorists.‖
502
 That same day, the bill was placed on the Senate 
Legislative Calendar (Calendar No. 220) under General Orders. Finally, the bill was 
placed as an amendment to the fiscal 2008 defense authorization bill, considered in July. 




IMPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
 In 2001, the Patriot Act passed Congress virtually unopposed.
504
 At that time, one 
member of the Senate said he did not ―believe there [was] anything in the 
administration‘s bill that the Supreme Court would conclude violates the Constitution of 
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 Another said the Act ―raises none of the great constitutional issues 
that have confronted the country in prior wars.‖
506
 While these statements were made 
solely in relation to that specific piece of legislation, that view would soon change as it 
applied to detainees in the ―war on terror.‖ 
GENERIC EXPRESSION 
 
 Surrounding the 2007 Act, members sometimes made an appeal to authority 
through an expression of, acknowledgement to, or belief about, the Constitution, the 
constitutional text, or their constitutional prerogative with no citation to text or 
constitutional reasoning. For example, during debate over the Detainee Treatment Act, a 
senator remarked, ―[s]o I am pleased to support the amendment. . . . I hope the military 
will . . . continue to gather intelligence in dealing with these terrorist networks . . . but do 
it in a way that is consistent with the intent, the principle, and the philosophy of our 
Constitution.‖
507
 After passage of that same bill, another simply stated a refrain that 
would often be repeated: ―[t]here has never been a constitutional right for that [granting 
habeas to enemy combatants].‖
508
 During debate over the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, one member asserted: 
This is a constitutional issue. The debate today will undoubtedly go down 
in the annals of our country as being one that stands out as a study in 
constitutional law and duty thereunder. Our duty as Members of Congress 
is to uphold the Constitution. That is what I intend to do in my speech and 
in my vote. . . . But also it is our duty to pass legislation that is 
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Another declared: ―[e]very one of us has sworn an oath to uphold the 
Constitution. In order to uphold that oath, I believe we have a duty to vote . . . against this 
irresponsible and flagrantly unconstitutional bill. That is what I will do. . . . Th[is] 
Senator . . . answers to the Constitution and to his conscience. . . . not . . . to political 
pressure.‖
510
 While another followed by stating, ―[h]abeas, which is also known as the 
Great Writ, is one of the most fundamental protections against arbitrary governmental 
power. This right dates back to the Magna Carta of 1215, and is enshrined in Article I, 
section 9, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution.‖
511
 
Members also frequently expressed that restricting habeas was wrong but not 
articulate the basis for that judgment: ―[t]here are numerous constitutional challenges 
regarding this legislation. . . . [one being] [t]he provisions that strip the Federal courts of 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus.‖
512
 Or, as was most common, they might simply state 
their belief about the issue in non-constitutional rhetoric. The following argument was 
emblematic of many used by those opposed to granting habeas to detainees: 
What is going on here is our body politic, the people, are under attack 
from foreigners, a different people. They are trying to impose their will on 
us and kill us. In that situation, the very notion of the judiciary backing off 
and playing some role as a neutral arbiter between the people of the 
United States and a foreign adversary is ludicrous and perverse. The idea 
that we can fight a war with the same degree of perfection we try to 
impose on our law enforcement system, which is to say we will not 
tolerate any collateral damage in law enforcement and we have to be 
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absolutely mistake-free—to try to use those rules and impose them on a 
war-fighting machine, to say it has to be absolutely perfect and we can‘t 
hold anyone in detention and they have all kinds of due process—the idea 
that a foreign person that our troops believe is a combatant is going to be 
held, you know, and we are going to turn the earth upside down and turn 
our army into detectives to figure out whether it is true or not is ridiculous. 





Other times, instead of stating simple declaratory views on the Constitution, a 
specific piece of legislation, or event related to habeas, members proclaimed all of the 
important ―values‖ that would be either harmed or strengthened by pertinent behavior and 
action related to habeas corpus. 
The writ of habeas corpus was described as ―a critical tenet of our justice system. 
. . . [a] basic tenet[,] . . . [a] critical individual right against arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment.
514
 It was ―a cornerstone of American liberty since the founding of this 
Nation,‖
515
 a ―fundamental protection‖ and part of the then-necessary ―revitaliz[ation of] 
our tradition of checks and balances.‖
516
 Habeas was part of ―the very foundation upon 
which our Nation was established.‖
517
 Habeas rights were ―fundamental rights‖
518
 and 
vital if we wish ―to uphold our commitments to the rule of law.‖
519
 It was argued that 
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―the Constitution doesn‘t protect just our citizens, it protects people‖
520
 and that ―[w]e‘re 
losing the larger battle for ideas, which is, as I like to put it, means that somehow we 
found a way to lose a PR war to Osama bin Laden. This is a piece of it, okay?‖
521
 
A refusal to grant habeas to detainees would be a failure to ―uphold American 
values and the rule of law.‖
522
 Habeas restrictions would be ―repugnant to our Nation's 
values‖
523
 and would ―set back basic rights by some 900 years.‖
524
 Thus, Congress 
should ―work to preserve the principles of human rights and the rule of law upon which 
this Nation was founded.‖
525
 Efforts to strip habeas were ―wrong . . . . unconstitutional . . 
. . and un-American.‖
526
 To restrict habeas would be to ―lower[] our moral standards in 
how we treat prisoners of war, [and to] . . . encourage other countries to do the same.
527
 
During debate over the Military Commissions Act, Rep. Jerry Nadler summed up this 
position: 
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 sess., 26 July 2007 (Federal News 
Service, Inc., 2007), 11. This statements echoes Jefferson‘s earlier quote (―The Habeas Corpus secures 
every man here, alien or citizen, against everything which is not law, whatever shape it may assume‖) and 
it is surprising those in favor of granting habeas to detainees didn‘t use it more frequently. Jefferson does 
insert the word ―here‖, but nevertheless, it‘s employable historical rhetoric since one could argue, using 
Jefferson‘s statement, that habeas was not prohibited from aliens. 
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Mr. Speaker, this is how a nation loses its moral compass, its identity, its 
values, and ultimately its freedom to fear. . . . We rebelled against King 
George III for far less infringements on liberty than this 200 years ago, but 
we seem to have forgotten. This bill makes the President a dictator – for 
when someone can order people jailed forever without subject to any 
judicial review. That is dictatorial power. The President wants to exist in a 
law-free zone. He does not want to be bound by the law of war or by our 
treaty obligations. He does not want to answer to our Constitution, to the 




Sen. Leahy was especially aggrieved. He said: 
 
We have eliminated basic legal and human rights for the 12 million lawful 
permanent residents who live and work among us. . . . We have removed a 
vital check that our legal system provides against the government 
arbitrarily detaining people for life without charge. . . . We have removed 
the mechanism the Constitution provides to check government 
overreaching and lawlessness. . . . We should not outsource our moral, 
legal and constitutional responsibility to the courts. Congress must be 
accountable for its actions and we should act to right this wrong. . . . It is 
from strength that America should defend our values and our Constitution. 
. . . In standing up for American values and security, I will keep working 
on this issue until we restore the checks and balances that are fundamental 
to preserving the liberties that define us as a nation. We can ensure our 




In March of that same year, Leahy would again take to the floor: ―Abolishing habeas 
corpus for anyone who the Government thinks might have assisted enemies of the United 
States is unnecessary and morally wrong. It is a betrayal of the most basic values of 
freedom for which America stands. It makes a mockery of the administration's lofty 
rhetoric about exporting freedom across the globe.
530
 In July 2007, Sen. Feinstein would 
echo these themes in debate over the proposed Habeas Restoration bill. 
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The simple fact remains that Guantanamo violates our values and our 
traditions, including respect for the rule of law and for human rights. . . . 
We will fight terror with vigor and drive and purpose, but we must not 
forget who we are. We are a nation of laws. We are a nation of value and 
tradition. These values have been admired throughout the decades all over 
the world. . . . The world has looked at Guantanamo and made the 
judgment that it is wrong. I think it is time for the Senate to do something 
about it. The Senate has borne the burden of Guantanamo for too long. 




In September, Leahy concluded by saying: 
 
I hope all Senators will now join with us in restoring basic American 
values and the rule of law, while making our Nation stronger. . . . It is 
from strength that America should defend our values and our way of life. 
It is from the strength of our freedoms, our Constitution, and the rule of 
law that we shall prevail. I hope all in the Senate, Republicans and 
Democrats, will join us in standing up for a stronger America, for the 





Conversely, to affirmatively grant habeas to detainees would be to depart ―from 
longstanding principles in our Anglo-American legal tradition‖ and to do ―something . . . 
fundamentally drastic . . . [and] different from anything that has ever been done in the 
history of this Nation.‖ 533 Sen. Graham summarized this view during debate over the 
Detainee Treatment Act. He said: 
If you want to give a Guantanamo Bay detainee habeas corpus rights as a 
U.S. citizen, not only have you changed the law of armed conflict like no 
one else in the history of the world, I think you are undermining our 
national security because the habeas petitions are flowing out of that place 
like crazy. There are 500-some people down there, and there are 160 
habeas corpus petitions in Federal courts throughout the United States. 
Three hundred of them have lawyers in Federal court and more to follow. 
We cannot run the place. . . . I want to end with this thought. Never in the 
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history of military commissions where we have tried enemy combatants 




EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE(?) 
 
ARTICLE I SECTION 8 
 
 Despite these aforementioned common and generic references, many members 
were more specific about Congress‘s specific constitutional powers, because, while the 
President has important Commander-in-Chief powers, by definition Congress cannot help 




 As early as two months after the attacks, some members believed Congress 
should take the initiative and constitute proper constitutional ―rules‖ for handling this 
new terrorism-focused situation. During discussion of his proposed Military Commission 
Procedures Act of 2002, Sen. Specter said: 
it is a matter that I believe ought to be considered by the Congress, 
because under the Constitution the Congress has the authority to establish 
military courts and tribunals dealing with international law. . . . The 
Constitution provides that the Congress is empowered to define and 
punish violations of international law, as well as to establish courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction over military offenses. Under articles of war, 
enacted by Congress, and statutes, the President does have the authority to 
convene military commissions to try offenses against the law of war. 
Military commissions could be convened to try offenses, whether 
committed by U.S. service members, civilian U.S. citizens, or enemy 
aliens, and a state of war need not exist. So there has been a delegation of 
authority by the Congress. But under the Constitution it is the Congress 
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Sen. Durbin agreed, stating, ―[u]nder the Constitution Congress must also accept 
responsibility, and under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it is my belief that 
Congress has the sole authority to declare war.‖
537
 Sen. Leahy also agreed, maintaining 
―[t]he Constitution entrusts the Congress with the power to ‗define and punish . . . 
offenses against the laws of nations.‖
538
 Sen. Specter referred to their attempt years later 
when he would again reference these powers: 
Shortly after 9/11, on February 13, Senator Durbin and I introduced 
legislation which would have dealt with the military commission 
procedures. This is pursuant to the provisions of article I, section 8, 
clauses 10 and 11 of the Constitution, which confers upon the Congress 
the power ‗To define and punish   . . . Offenses against the Law of 




In the House of Representatives, Rep. Zoe Lofgren and Rep. Jane Harman 
―introduced legislation . . . that would authorize the tribunals with the stipulation that 
suspects be guaranteed the habeas corpus right to challenge the government‘s right to 
hold them.‖
540
 On December 12, 2001, Rep. Harman said: 
Today my colleague Zoe Lofgren and I are introducing legislation to 
authorize the President to use military tribunals to try foreign terrorists 
captured abroad. . . . The Administration's intention is to interview those 
who could provide information, and to prosecute the senior leadership. . . . 
This is a good strategy, and I support it. . . . But to execute that strategy 
consistent with Constitutional requirements, the use of those tribunals 
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Rep. Harman would repeat this argument five years later during debate over the Military 
Commissions Act: ―Mr. Speaker, I take a back seat to no one in my effort to understand 
the threats against us, find those who would cause us harm, and prevent them from 
harming us. I also believe strongly that Congress must act under article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution to regulate ―captures on land and on water.‖
542
 
 In February 2002, during discussion of his proposed Military Commission 
Procedures Act of 2002, Sen. Specter emphasized the same clause: 
The President issued an order establishing generalized procedures for 
trying members of al-Qaida and the Taliban. It is my view . . . that 
Congress ought to consider what are the appropriate procedures pursuant 
to our authority under the Constitution, article I, section 8, which gives to 
the Congress the responsibility and authority ‗To define and punish . . . 




In July 2002, Rep. Adam Schiff would too rely on Article 1, Section 8 in offering his own 
Military Tribunals Act, explaining that: 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that it is the Congress that 
has the power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court to 
define and punish offenses against the law of nations. . . . Some would 
argue, not implausibly, that despite the clear language of article I, section 
8, congressional authorization is not necessary; that as President and 
commander in chief, he has the authority, all the authority he needs, to 
regulate the affairs of the military, and this power extends to the 
adjudication of unlawful combatants. Ultimately, if the Congress fails to 
act, any adjudications of the military tribunals will be challenged in court 





Three years later (after the three important cases had been handed down in June 
2004), Chairman Specter began hearings over detainees by stating that ―[t]he starting 
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point of this issue is the Constitution of the United States. Under Article I, section 8, 
clauses 10 and 11, the Constitution explicitly confers upon Congress the power ‗‗to 
define and punish offenses against the laws of nations‘‘ and ‗‗to make rules concerning 
captures on land and water.‘‘
545
 During that same hearing, Sen. Feinstein remarked: 
It has been my view that Congress has both the power and the 
responsibility to take on the issue of detentions and interrogations, 
specifically pursuant to two clauses of section 8, to make rules concerning 
captures on land and water, and to make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces. . . . What is clear to me is that we 





In October 2005, during debate over the Detainee Treatment Act, Sen. Lamar Alexander 
said: 
So for the longer term, the people should set the rules. That is why we 
have an independent Congress. That is our job. In fact, the Constitution 
says quite clearly that is what Congress should do. Article I, section 8, of 
the Constitution says that Congress and Congress alone shall have the 
power to make ‗Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.‘ So 






 and Sen. Feinstein
549
 both agreed, as did Sen. McCain who stated: 
All my career I have supported the rights and prerogatives of the 
Commander in Chief. . . . [but] I would like to point out the Congress not 
only has the right but the obligation to act. Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution of the United States, clause 11: To declare War, grant Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land 
and Water[.] . . . I repeat: . . . make Rules concerning Captures on Land 
and Water[.] . . . Someone is going to come down to the floor and say that 
applied back in the time of the Framers of the Constitution; it didn't apply 
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to today. At least from my point of view, unless there is an overriding 
need to change the Constitution of the United States_if that clause of the 
Constitution no longer applies, then lets amend the Constitution and 
remove it; otherwise, lets live by it. . . . The Congress has the 
responsibility: To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 




THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE 
 
 More directly, the Suspension Clause
551
 was quite prominent in habeas discourse. 
In 2001, during her discussion of the proposed Military Commissions bill, Rep. Harman 
was adamant: ―we make clear that habeas corpus is not waived. Article 1, Section 9 of the 
Constitution requires action by Congress to suspend this right: a President cannot waive it 
by military order.
552
 Rep. Lofgren followed: 
We are a nation of laws. The most important, our original law, is our 
Constitution. . . . Article 1, Section 9 provides that the writ of Habeas 
Corpus may only be suspended when the public safety may require it and 
then only in cases of rebellion or invasion. Suspension require Congress to 
act. It is not the President's prerogative. Even President Lincoln, who felt 
the need to suspend Habeas during the civil war, had to seek and obtain 
approval from Congress to do so. We have expressly preserved habeas 




In December of that year, Sen. Specter reminded a witness: ―there is a provision in the 
Executive Order which essentially says that no one can have any redress to the Federal 
courts or any other court. And that runs directly in conflict with the constitutional 
provision which says that the writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended except in time 
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of invasion or rebellion.‖
554
 In support of his Military Commission Procedures Act of 
2002, Sen. Specter reminded his colleagues: ―[i]n the President's order, there was a 
provision that there could be no appeal from any order of the military tribunal. But that, 
on its face, was inconsistent with the Constitution, which preserves the right of habeas 
corpus unless there is rebellion or invasion, neither of which had occurred here.‖
555
 
During debate over the Military Commissions Act, Rep. Zofgren reminded her House 
colleagues: 
We all took an oath to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United 
States, and here is what article I, section 9 says: ‗the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion 
or invasion the public safety may require it.‘ . . . Congress may not 
suspend the great writ of habeas corpus and limit the checks and balances 
whenever it wants to. Congress may do so only in cases of rebellion and 




Sometimes members began with the assumption the clause applied to all 
individuals within United States proper and custody, not just citizens, and were thus 
insistent upon a certain textual interpretation. In introducing the Habeas Act, Sen. Specter 
proclaimed: 
Mr. President, I will introduce legislation denominated the Habeas Corpus 
Restoration Act. Last year, in the Military Commissions Act, the 
constitutional right of habeas corpus was attempted to be abrogated. I 
fought to pass an amendment to strike that provision of the Act which was 
voted 51 to 48. I say ‗attempted to be abrogated‘ because, in my legal 
judgment, that provision in the Act is unconstitutional. . . . It is hard to see 
how there can be legislation to eliminate the constitutional right to habeas 
corpus when the Constitution is explicit that habeas corpus may not be 
suspended except in time of invasion or rebellion, and we do not have 
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either of those circumstances present, as was conceded by the advocates of 




He would repeat these sentiments six months later by stating: 
 
There can be no doubt that habeas corpus is a constitutional mandate 
because the Constitution explicitly states that habeas corpus may be 
suspended only in time of invasion or rebellion, and no one contends that 
we have either invasion or rebellion. . . . It is true the statute was changed 
by the Congress of the United States, but the Congress of the United 





During debate over the Military Commissions Act, Sen. Leahy and Sen. Byrd would both 
issue emphatic statements: 
I would assume the Bush-Cheney administration is not saying we are 
handling this question of terrorists so poorly that we are under invasion 
now. And I have no doubt this bill, which will permanently eliminate the 
writ of habeas corpus for all aliens within and outside the United States 
whenever the Government says they might be enemy combatants, violates 
that prohibition. . . . What are we doing? What is going on? That is 
outrageous. That is running scared. That is so wrong. Is he saying that for 
5 years this administration has been allowing an ongoing invasion in the 
United States and we are not aware of it? Are we going to suspend the 
great writ on this basis? . . . The habeas provisions of this bill are 




I wonder whether those who drafted the provision in this bill to eliminate 
habeas corpus have read this clause of the Constitution. Inconceivably, the 
U.S. Senate is being asked to abolish a fundamental right that has been 
central to democratic societies, including our own, for centuries. . . . The 
provision in the bill before us deprives Federal courts of jurisdiction over 
matters of law that are clearly entrusted to them by the Constitution of the 
United States. The Constitution is clear on this point: The only two 
instances in which habeas corpus may be suspended are in the case of a 
rebellion or an invasion. We are not in the midst of a rebellion, and there 
is no invasion. It is notable that those who drafted the Constitution 
deliberately used the word ‗suspended.‘ They did not say that habeas 
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corpus could be forever denied, abolished, revoked, or eliminated. They 
said that, in only two instances, it could be ‗suspended,‘ meaning 




After the MCA had passed, Sen. Specter hypothesized that: 
 
the Federal courts will strike down the provisions in the legislation 
eliminating Federal court jurisdiction for a number of reasons. One is that 
the Constitution of the United States is explicit that habeas corpus may be 
suspended only in time of rebellion or invasion. We are suffering neither 
of those alternatives at the present time. We have not been invaded, and 




Another House member remarked, ―I think the meaning of the suspension clause of the 
Constitution is that absent some emergency, limited circumstances, this country will not 
be a party to a situation where any person can be held indefinitely without being 
confronted with the charges against him or her so there can be some fair and just 
resolution of those claims.‖
562
 One member summed up the debate over the Clause well: 
―what divides this discussion . . . is whether or not you think an enemy combatant [who] 
was captured on a foreign battlefield, a person who has sworn to kill each and every one 
of us, is covered by the U.S. Constitution.‖
563
 
HOW MANY WRITS? 
 
 During this congressional deliberation there was also a discussion over the 
content of habeas in the Constitution: whether it was fundamentally a constitutional right 
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or whether the presence of the term in the Constitution confirmed the need for a statutory 
right which could naturally then be restricted. 
 There were competing definitions of the writ upon which members differed. One 
was given, for example, by the Senate Judiciary majority report on the Habeas Bill: 
The writ of habeas corpus protects individuals against unlawful exercises 
of state power. It provides the means for a person detained by the state to 
require that the government demonstrate to a neutral judge that there is a 
factual and legal basis for his or her detention. The writ has roots at least 
as far back as 16
th
 century England, and beginning with Parliament‘s 
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, this protection became known 
as the ‗Great Writ.‘ . . . Habeas corpus has long been a cornerstone of 
Anglo-Saxon and American legal traditions. At English common law, 
courts exercised habeas jurisdiction not only within the Crown‘s formal 
territorial limits, but also over other areas which the Crown exercised 
sovereign control. The Great Writ was imported into the laws of all 13 
American colonies, and it was one of the first subjects to which the first 
Congress turned its attention. The Judiciary Act of 1789 specifically 
empowered federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ‗for the purpose 
of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.‘ . . . Habeas corpus is also the 
only common law writ mentioned in the Constitution.    . . . Thus, the 
Founders clearly established their intention that habeas corpus serve as a 




The other was expressed by the Chief Minority Counsel on the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, House Judiciary Committee: 
The Constitution, in referring to the writ of habeas corpus, did not create 
it, and the writ is understood as being granted by statute, as enacted by the 
legislature.
565
 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, has explained 
that ‗[t]he constitutional provision does not create a right to habeas corpus; 
rather, federal statutes [do so].‘
566
 . . . the Founders wrote Article I, 
Section Nine, Clause Two, in order to ensure that the federal government 
could not, absent cases of invasion and rebellion, trump state statutes 
establishing the writ.
567
 . . . The Founders understood that the federal writ 
could be created and altered by statute. The first Congress enacted the first 
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federal habeas corpus protections in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
568
 and that 
Act explicitly prohibited the use of the writ of habeas corpus in certain 
circumstances.
569
 If the Founders had understood that the Constitution 
created an absolute right to the writ in all circumstances, it would have 




Some members saw no distinction. For example, during debate over the Military 
Commissions Act, one member of the House exclaimed that ―[t]his bill is flatly 
unconstitutional, for it repeals the Great Writ_Habeas Corpus. Not a statutory writ, but 
the Constitutional Great Writ.‖
571
 Another member of the Judiciary Committee agreed, 
stating: ―[an opposing member] keeps trying to tell us that there are two writs of habeas 
corpus. A wonderful idea, if it were only true.‖
572
 
Others disagreed. One senator remarked that ―[w]e have the statutory jurisdiction 
to write whatever kinds of laws we want. We clearly have the statutory jurisdiction to say 
it does not apply to foreign terrorists,‖
573
 while Rep. Lungren stated, ―[w]e are not talking 
about the great writ that is found in the Constitution, the great writ of habeas corpus. We 
are talking about a statutory writ, which the Supreme Court has said time and time again 
Congress has the right to create, Congress has the right to constrict, Congress has the 
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 Rep. Sensenbrenner agreed, saying, ―[t]here are two types of 
habeas corpus: one is the constitutional great writ. We are not talking about that here. We 
can't suspend that. That is in the Constitution, and we can't suspend that by law. . . . The 
other is statutory habeas corpus, which has been redefined time and time again by the 






COOPERATION & COMMUNICATION 
 
 It would be peculiar for members of Congress to be apathetic toward their co-
equal branches of government, particularly the Supreme Court. They have a vested 
interest in knowing the current constitutional milieu in relation to individual cases and 
issues and what previous rulings have said as well as what precedents are considered at 
least minimally important. While we do have three distinct branches of government, the 
Supreme Court is given great deference in today‘s political environment. Thus, these 




 Many members of Congress spoke of the need for cooperation and 
communication between Congress and Court, or Congress and the Executive Branch. 
They believed there were specific benefits to such interactions or normative reasons for 
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For example, Sens. Kyl (R-AZ) and Specter (R-PA) have a long debate over how often the word 
―individual‖ and the word ―citizens‖ appear in the Hamdi plurality decision. One could obviously infer this 
would be of no concern if the Court was inconsequential to members. Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Sen. Arlen 








encouraging such behavior. Sometimes members interpreted Court language to indict 
their peers for failure to act. Here, Sen. Graham asserts the Court is asking Congress for 
further clarification on their intentions: 
The Supreme Court has been shouting to us in Congress: Get involved. . . . 
Habeas corpus rights have been given to Guantanamo Bay detainees 
because the location is under control of the United States, and Congress 
has been silent on how to treat these people. The Supreme Court has 
looked at section 2241, the habeas statute, and they are saying to us: Since 




Four days later, he again said: 
 
The court in Rasul is asking the Senate and the House, do you intend for 
al-Qaida terrorists, enemy combatants, to have access to Federal courts 
under habeas rights to challenge their detention as if they were American 
citizens? The answer should be, no, we never intended that. That is what 
my amendment does. It says to the courts and to the world that an enemy 
combatant is not going to have the rights of an American citizen, and we 





Here, Sen. Leahy laments the lack of cooperation on the part of the Executive 
Branch: 
Some members of the Senate have argued that these prisoners should be 
tried in the military justice system. I think that we could all agree on such 
a course if the administration had worked with Congress from the start and 
established with our approval procedures that are fair and consistent with 
our tradition of military justice. . . . If the administration wanted to use 
military commissions to try detainees, it should have sought and obtained 




Often, members expressed the salutary effects of such cooperation between 
branches. Sen. Graham expressed that ―[t]here is not enough buy-in by the Congress to 
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what is going on at Gitmo‖
580
 and that ―[w]hen it comes time to keep people off the 
battlefield, with this amendment we are stronger as a nation because Congress will have 
blessed what the administration has done.‖
581
 
As Sen. Specter pointed out, many felt the Administration oddly initially ignored 
Congress.
582
 Echoing one witness‘s comments about cooperation right after the attacks,
583
 
Sen. Leahy offered similar thoughts: 
But stepping back for a moment from who is right or who is wrong . . . 
Wouldn‘t it have made more sense—we are giving you all this extra 
authority, anyway—at the time when you were asking us for all these 
things, but apparently not telling us that you were thinking about military 
commissions, would it not have made some wisdom to come here and say, 
look, why don‘t you put in another section authorizing under—as has been 
done in the past, giving us specific authorization for the President as 
Commander-in-Chief to set up military commissions, thus removing the 
legal debate now going on in this country about whether you have the 




Sen. Lugar agreed, stating, ―the administration appears to be adamant about going it 
alone and risking a bad court decision on the underlying legality of the military 
commission. Why take a chance that the punishment meted out to terrorists by a military 
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 Other members were aware of Justice Jackson‘s three-pronged analysis of 
presidential power and felt that the respective branches should share authority.
586
 Rep. 
Schiff summarized this view: 
Through this bill, we can remove any legal cloud that would overhang 
these prosecutions. For one thing the Supreme Court has made abundantly 
clear is that the power of the executive when it acts in concert with the 
Congress is at its greatest ebb. But there is another reason, an even more 
compelling reason, for Congress to act, and that is the separation of 
powers. . . . No single branch should have the authority on its own to 
establish jurisdiction for a tribunal, to determine the charges, to determine 
indeed what defendants should be brought before that tribunal, to 




Sen. Feingold saw a direct power connection between the branches and warned: 
―[i]f the legislative body signals to the executive branch that they are going to be 
intimidated, they are going to receive more of the same.‖
588
 Whether the Court was 
asking for it or not, some members believed the Court needed to hear what Congress‘s 
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true intentions were in restricting habeas petitions from detainees. As Rep. Lungren 
succinctly stated: 
we already made this decision in this Congress a year ago. What this does 
is say to the Supreme Court, we meant what we said when we passed the 
law a year ago which said this should apply to people already in 
Guantanamo. That was our intent. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
believed it not to be found in the language. This makes it clear that what 
we said a year ago we say again, only we say to the Supreme Court, ‗This 




CHECKS & BALANCES 
 
 Quite similarly to the examples just described, habeas corpus also came up in 
congressional deliberation under the umbrella of checks and balances. Many members 
felt as if Congress had done a poor job of checking an overly-assertive Executive Branch. 
Sen. Byrd professed that ―[w]hile the President grabbed the wheel and the Congress 
dozed, the Court stepped in to remind us of the separation of powers and the 
constitutional role of each branch, thank God. Yes, thank God for the separation of 
powers envisioned by our forefathers. Thank God for the Supreme Court. Yes, I said this 
before; I say it again: Thank God for the Supreme Court.‖
590
 One day later he would 
proclaim: 
This flagrant attempt to deny a fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution reveals how White House and Pentagon advisers continue to 
chip away at the separation of powers. They relentlessly pursue their 
dangerous goal of consolidating power in the hands of the Executive at the 
expense of the Congress, the judiciary, and, sadly, the People. How can 
we even contemplate such an irresponsible and dangerous course as this 




During debate over the Military Commissions Act, Sen. Leahy said: 
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The Supreme Court said, you abused your power. And they [the Bush 
Administration] said we will fix that. We have a rubberstamp Congress 
that will set that aside and give us power that nobody – no king or anyone 
else setting foot in this land – had ever thought of having. . . . With this 
bill, the Congress will have completed the job of eviscerating its role as a 
check and balance on the administration. . . . It is not a check on the 




When he spoke on behalf of the re-introduced Habeas bill in January 2007, Sen. Leahy 
again stated: 
The conservative Supreme Court, with seven of its nine members 
appointed by Republican Presidents, has been the only check on this 
Administration's lawlessness. Certainly the last Congress did not do it. 
With passage of the Military Commissions Act, the Republican Congress 
completed the job of eviscerating its role as a check and balance on the 
Administration. . . . In standing up for American values and security, I will 
keep working on this issue until we restore the checks and balances that 
are fundamental to preserving the liberties that define us as a nation. We 




 Other members described how in addition to being important as an individual 
right in and of itself, habeas was also important as a means to the end of inter-branch 
balance. During debate over the Military Commissions Act, Sen. Levin articulated this 
view: 
Over the last 2 days, we have debated the habeas corpus provision in the 
bill. Most of that debate has focused on the writ of habeas corpus as an 
individual right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. The writ of 
habeas corpus does serve that purpose. . . . But the writ of habeas corpus 
has always served a second purpose as well: for its 900-year history, the 
writ of habeas corpus has always served as a means of making the 
sovereign account for its actions. By depriving detainees of the 
opportunity to demonstrate that they were detained in error, this bill not 
only deprives individuals of a critical right deeply embedded in American 
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law, it also helps ensure that the administration will not be held to account 




THE FINAL ARBITER? 
 In a three-branch system of government with an established practice of judicial 
review, perhaps it is not striking that members would discuss the possibility of a 
particular congressional action standing up to Court scrutiny. Thus, common 
observations, such as the following are probably not particularly noteworthy and reflect 
the overall importance of the Court: ―[w]e have seen in past years a number of U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions invalidating acts of Congress because there has not been a 
sufficient deliberative process. The Supreme Court says they have the authority to declare 
acts of Congress unconstitutional when, in effect, they are not thought through.‖
595
 
Similarly, ―[i]f I understand the Supreme Court decision correctly, detainees do have 
habeas corpus rights. They do have a right to be brought before a process.‖
596
 Chairman  
Specter commented:  
As I said at the outset . . . we are looking at the procedures here. The 
Committee is taking up about 15 Supreme Court opinions—one plurality, 
two five-person opinions, and a bunch of concurring opinions, and a 
bunch of dissenting opinions, and then three district court opinions. And it 
is a genuine crazy quilt to try to figure out where the due process rights lie. 




It was also not uncommon to view the Court as a check, which, again, would be expected 
in a system of governmental which includes judicial review. As Sen. Levin exclaimed:  
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The substance of the ruling in Hamdan establishes that the President, 
acting alone, lacks the power to unilaterally determine the legal rights of 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Only Congress and the President, 
acting together, have the power to make such a determination, the Court 
ruled. Today's decision demonstrates once again the vital constitutional 
role of the Supreme Court as a check on the actions of the executive and 




Rep. Jackson-Lee stated that ―Congress should pass legislation that will . . . . also respond 
to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in the Hamdan case and withstand judicial 
scrutiny, or it may not serve its other purposes.‖
599
 Sen. Specter said the ―procedures in 
Guantanamo . . . do not satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in having a collateral proceeding which is adequate to protect the rights of 
someone who is in detention.‖
600
 Sen. Feinstein exclaimed, ―[t]here are serious questions 
about whether this provision will withstand a court test. . . . From this case, we will find 
out whether the military commissions law, which prevents full appeals, in fact, can stand 
the court test.
601
 Sen. Hatch defended the President‘s constitutional prerogatives and 
acknowledged the Court‘s role in judicial review: 
Finally, there have been many alarmist and misleading statements about 
the potential use of military commissions. Most glaring is the claim by 
some of my colleagues this past weekend that military tribunals are 
‗unconstitutional.‘ The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the 
constitutionality of using military commissions to prosecute individuals 
charged with crimes under the law of war.
602
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113, S9233-9235 (16 Jul. 2007). 
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Sen. Hatch then mentions Ex Parte Quirin and In re Yamashita. Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), 
Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms 




 sess., 28 Nov., 3 Dec., 6 Dec., 2001 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001): 7. Later, in the same hearing, Hatch would add: ―some of my colleagues 
still question whether military tribunals are, in fact, permitted by the Constitution. The fact is that the 




 Some members exerted, if not departmentalist views, at least a willingness not to 
rely on the Court but to assert necessary congressional views. For example, one month 
after the initial attacks, Sen. Feingold said, ―[a]nd this is a job that only the Congress can 
do. We cannot simply rely on the Supreme Court to protect us from laws that sacrifice 
our freedoms. We took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States. In these difficult times that oath becomes all the more significant.‖
603
 In July 
2007, Sen. Leahy said, ―[w]e should not have to be bucking this to the Supreme Court for 
them to decide. We should correct the error here.‖
604
 Six months earlier he had flatly 
admitted that: 
Some Senators uneasy about the Military Commissions Act's disastrous 
habeas provision took solace in the thought that it would be struck down 
by the courts. Instead, the first court to consider that provision, a federal 
court in the District of Columbia, upheld the provision. We should not 
outsource our moral, legal and constitutional responsibility to the courts. 





 Sometimes, views became a little more ambiguous. On the same day he expressed 
his previously noted view of the Suspension Clause, Sen. Specter said ―[w]e have had 
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals charged with crimes under the law of war. As the Supreme Court has explained, ‗[s]ince our 
Nation‘s earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many 
urgent governmental responsibilities related to war.‘ Furthermore, contrary to recent suggestion, military 
tribunals can be—and have been—established without further congressional authorization. Because the 
President‘s power to establish military commissions arises out of his constitutional authority as 
Commander-in–Chief, an act of Congress is unnecessary. Presidents have used this authority to establish 
military commissions throughout our Nation‘s history, from George Washington during the Revolutionary 
War to President Roosevelt during World War II. Congress, for its part, has repeatedly and explicitly 
affirmed and ratified this use of military commissions. Article 21 of our Code of Military Justice, codified 
at section 821 of Title 10 of the United States Code, expressly acknowledges that military commissions 
have jurisdiction over offenses under the law of war. 125.‖ 
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Supreme Court decisions which have made it plain that habeas corpus is available to 
noncitizens and that habeas corpus applies to territory controlled by the United States, 
specifically, including Guantanamo.‖
606
 Six months later, Sen. Specter seemed to put 
constitutional fidelity above court deference.
607
 
To read the opinion of the Court of Appeals . . . is impossible to 
understand. I think a fair reading of the circuit opinion, simply stated, is 
that they flagrantly disregarded the holding of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, which under our system of laws they are obligated to 
uphold. They analyzed Rasul and said Rasul was based on the statute 
providing for habeas corpus and not on the constitutional mandate that 
habeas corpus is a part of the Constitution of the United States. . . . There 
can be no doubt that habeas corpus is a constitutional mandate because the 
Constitution explicitly states that habeas corpus may be suspended only in 
time of invasion or rebellion, and no one contends that we have either 
invasion or rebellion. . . . Now, it is true there is also a statute which 
provides for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals said the 
portion of Justice Stevens' opinion as to the constitutional basis for habeas 
corpus was dictum and that the holding involved the statute. The Court of 
Appeals says since the holding involved the statute, the statute could be 
changed. It is true the statute was changed by the Congress of the United 
States, but the Congress of the United States, by statute, cannot change the 
constitutional mandate of habeas corpus. . . . For the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia to say the constitutional basis for habeas corpus 





Some members thought it important to pass ―judicial scrutiny‖
609
 and ―the 
scrutiny of the Supreme Court.‖
610
 Others, like Rep. Conyers, went even further. Here, he 
seems to be asserting that Court opinions are all that matters when it comes to not only 
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Although here he is criticizing a Court of Appeals opinion and not the Supreme Court directly. 
608




 sess., 2007, vol. 153, no. 
109, S8910 (10 Jul. 2007). 
609




 sess., 2006, vol. 152, pt. 
123, H7556 (27 Sept. 2006). 
610




 sess., 2006, vol. 152, pt. 123, 
H7513 (27 Sept. 2006). 
146 
 
elucidating constitutional texts, but also in taking the initiative to propound constitutional 
law or applicable precedents. 
Recognizing the Supreme Court's concerns about judicial independence in 
cases such as City of Boerne v. Flores and United States v. Morrison, we 
have underscored that Congress is not attempting to settle any 
constitutional question that is the proper province of the federal courts. 
Thus . . . we have made clear, out of an abundance of caution, that we not 
purport to decide any constitutional question that remains within the 
proper bailiwick of the federal courts pursuant to Article III of the 
Constitution. Thus, this provision does not speak to the constitutionality of 





Similarly, it is one thing to desire legislation that will not be overturned by a court 
or the Court. It is entirely another to claim the Constitution requires Congress to pass 
such qualified legislation, as Rep. Conyers does here: ―Mr. Speaker, Congress has an 
obligation under the Constitution to enact legislation that creates fair trials for accused 
terrorists that will be upheld by the courts.
612
 Sen. Specter also frequently alluded to a 
view of judicial supremacy: ―[w]hen you have an issue of constitutionality, how can 
constitutionality be determined and interpreted except in the Court? . . . [W]ho is going to 
interpret the Constitution if the Court does not have jurisdiction?
613
 Thus, in ―the face of 
the explicit language of the Supreme Court of the United States there is a constitutional 
requirement, and it is fundamental that Congress cannot legislate in contradiction to a 
constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court. That requires a constitutional 
amendment . . . not legislation.‖
614
 A House member observed, ―[w]ell, of course,                                    
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. . . higher authorities . . . are going to litigate and decide that question, what the 
suspension clause means.‖
615
 Sen. Graham seemed to agree: I do not know what the 
Court will decide, but if the Court does say . . . there is a constitutional right to habeas 
corpus by those detained at Guantanamo Bay, then . . . We would have to make a different 
legal determination. We would have to make a different legal analysis.
616
 
However, this reliance on the Court is often tempered by criticism of the Court
617
 
and an acknowledgement that Congress needs to act, but often waits on the Court. As 
Sen. Specter exclaimed, ―[t]he Congress of the United States has the express 
responsibility under article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to establish rules 
governing people captured on land and sea. . . . But the Congress of the United States did 
not act after 9/11, and we had people detained at Guantanamo. . . . Congress did not act 
on it because it was too hot to handle. . . . Congress punted. It didn't act, left it to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.
618
 Finally, in defense of congressional prerogatives, 
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123, S10267 (27 Sept. 2006). 
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―This case [Hamdan] was a clear-cut example of, I believe, Supreme Court overreach. They 
seemed determined to do something about this. They wanted to do something about it. Apparently, they did 





 sess., 2007, vol. 153, pt. 137, S11565-11568 (17 Sept. 2007). 
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 sess., 2006, vol. 152, pt. 123, S10264 (27 Sept. 2006). Sen. Specter had echoed 
this theme over a year earlier: ―The only unifying factor coming out of the multitude of opinions by the 
Supreme Court [in June 2004] of the United States was that it is really the job of the Congress. . . . [T]here 
is a real question as to why Congress has not handled it. It may be that it is too hot to handle for Congress. 
It may be that it is too complex to handle for Congress. Or it may be that Congress wants to sit back as 
Congress, [as] we [] customarily do awaiting some action by the court no matter how long it takes, Plessy 
v. Ferguson in 1896 to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. But, at any rate, Congress has not acted. . . . 
Justice Scalia wrote in an opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, ‗Congress is in session. 
If it had wished to change Federal judges‘ habeas jurisdiction from what this Court held that to be, it could 
have done so.‘ Which is certainly true. . . . We constantly complain that the Court makes the law, and here 
we are having sat back with our constitutional mandate pretty clear. In more circumspect language, Justice 
Stevens went on to make a point which is[:] . . . [H]e could not determine the ‗Government security needs‘ 
or the necessity to ‗obtain intelligence through interrogation,‘ concluding, ‗It is far beyond my competence 
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Court stripping was briefly discussed,
619
 as were other departmentalist views,
620
 and, as 





In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
Military Commission‘s Act prohibition on lawsuits brought by enemy combatants at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. However, the Supreme Court reversed it and granted certiori 
(after previously rejecting it) for that particular slate of defendants. On June 12
th
, 2008, in 
Boumediene v. Bush, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, overturned the 1950 Johnson v. 
Eisentrager case and held that ―aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at 
Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. The Court . . . found 
that [the Military Commissions Act] did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and 
                                                                                                                                                 
or the Court‘s competence to determine that, but it is not beyond Congress‘. If civil rights are to be 
curtailed during wartime, it must be done openly and democratically, as the Constitution requires, rather 
than by silent erosion through an opinion of the Court.‖ Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), Congress, Senate, 




 sess., 15 June 2005 (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 2006), 1-3. 
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Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) discussed Ex Parte McCardle and the 





 sess., 2005, vol. 151, no. 167, S14263-64 (15 Nov. 2005). 
620
―The Supreme Court created a mess and hurt the Global War on Terror with its unnecessary and 
unconstitutional opinion in the Hamdan case. The Supreme Court had no authority to hear the Hamdan 
case. The Detainee Treatment Act gave the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit exclusive 
jurisdiction over the validity of any final decision of an enemy combatant status review tribunal. The 
Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ignored the provision of the DTA and a longstanding line of its own 
precedents which stood for the principle that Congress can limit jurisdiction in pending as well as future 
cases. . . . Because of our national security, Congress and the President jumped through a series of hoops 
set by the Court, rather than carry on a protracted power struggle over the Constitution with the Court. But, 
Mr. Speaker, Congress concedes no power to the Court not defined in the Constitution or specified by 
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―The Supreme Court clearly made a mistake [in Hamdan]. I must admit I was disappointed in 
some of the rulings of the judges, but it has forced our hand to try to make it clear in the law and with the 
administration how we are going to deal with this question of interrogating these terrorists, how we are 









therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas.‖
622
 Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, said ―[t]he laws and Constitution are 
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times‖ and that ―[t]o hold the 
political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will[.] . . . 
[would] lead . . . to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say 
‗what the law is.‘‖
623
 This majority opinion was not minimalistic in nature. As Stuart 
Taylor writes: 
Understandably determined not to be seen as putting its seal of approval 
on the gross denials of due process at Guantanamo, the Court could have 
administered cautious, modest rebukes to the Bush policy. Instead, in 2004 
and 2006 as well as in the latest decision, the five more liberal justices . . . 
eviscerated a major 1950 precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager; struck down 
major parts of the 2005 and 2006 laws; and asserted potentially sweeping, 
open-ended powers to oversee wartime polices traditionally deemed the 
exclusive province of the elected branches. . . . The elected branches' 
disrespect for constitutional values has put the Supreme Court in a 
difficult position. It has responded by appearing to arrogate to the 





This was the ―fourth major legal defeat for the Bush Administration on the issue 
of rights for foreign detainees‖
625
 and was the first decision ―in which the court has ever 
overturned . . . a law enacted by the President and Congress during what they deemed to 
be war time about matters of war.‖
626
 ―The courts, at first slow to respond to arrogations 
of executive power after September 11, have pushed back.‖
 627
 Many felt that ―[s]o much 
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of the anger against the Bush administration could have been avoided if Bush had gone to 
Congress in the first place.‖
628
 
The entire history of the habeas issue after September 11
th
, 2001 illustrates several 
important aspects of political regime and political cycle analysis. First, in relation to the 
underlying ―settled‖ value in terms of war powers and foreign policy decision-making, 
the executive continues to dominate, at least in the initial stages of crises, and Congress is 
reluctant to take the lead. Initial efforts at passing legislation related to detainees failed 
and it was only after the summer 2004 cases were issued by the Court that Congress 
chose to respond. Secondly, and concurrently, members of Congress, while engaging in 
judicial veto bargaining and a dialogue with the other two branches, were very symbolic 
and brief in their deliberations about habeas. More importantly, while in the past it has 
been said that war powers have been considered the Constitution‘s clearest ―textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment‖ of authority to the political branches,
629
 
members were still operating under the assumption of judicial supremacy, even failing to 
adequately discuss the appropriate precedents for Court-stripping when attempting to do 
just that in DTA and the MCA.  
The Court, after three years of silence in the face of a seemingly dominant 
coalition,
630
 and perhaps sensing a vacuum, given there appeared to be now no dominant 
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coalition on this issue, and dual-branch threat to its supremacist legitimacy,
631
 went 
against its previous collaborative effort and previous understanding of jurisdiction 
stripping in its Boumediene decision. This was a significant change from the Hamdi 
plurality, which suggested to Congress using Army Regulation 190-8 as a model for the 
level of procedural protections for an enemy combatant, when they then did, only to be 
rebuked by the Court. 
  
                                                 
631
―The president is in part an interpreter of the national heritage, of which the Constitution is a 
prominent part. In this effort, the judiciary is both a potential competitor and a potential ally.‖ Keith E. 
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George, eds., Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton: 




CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN AN AFFILIATED AGE 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Government officeholders and constitutional commentators often find themselves engaged in 
constructing constitutional meaning from an indeterminate text. In this context, the Constitution 
is often understood less as a set of binding rules than as a source of authoritative norms of 




Keeping the definition of constitutional deliberation in mind,
633
 the cumulative 
evidence from these case studies suggests that constitutional deliberation in Congress can 
best be understood through a political regime and cyclical analysis. More specifically, 
these cases, falling within reasonably the same contemporary era, demonstrate and 
illustrate the importance and effects of regime contestation: the normative engagement 
and debate between competing national governing coalitions over the proper scope, 
perception, and breadth of the state and of society. More specifically, they each are most 
fully explained by their place at an ―affiliated‖ stage in ―political time.‖ 
Operating within this regime and ―time‖ construct and, consequently, in an era of 
divided government, Congress is a highly political institution functioning within a highly 
political environment encompassing both fundamental ―settled‖ values and secondary 
―unsettled‖ values. Thus, its deliberation is for the most part symbolic and derivative in 
nature, acting under an umbrella of judicial supremacy and attempting to exert influence 
primarily on unsettled values reflecting members‘ regime preferences, by which 
fundamental regime shifts are sought. These cases belie the notion of ―settled‖ law and a 
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Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System, 64. 
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―settled‖ regime, yet, despite these deviations from an undiluted ―republic of reasons,‖
634
 
Congress plays an important representational role by acting, and, further still, continues 
and perpetuates an ongoing dialogue with the other branches which would not take place 
without their agency. 
REGIME, TIME & AFFILIATION 
As Whittington writes, ―[t]he political regime within which political time is 
played out is in part a constitutional regime, ‗the constitutional baseline in normal 
political life.‘‖
635
 Within this ―baseline‖ the notion of political regimes ―incorporates not 
only electorally dominant partisan coalitions, but also a set of dominant policy concerns 
and legitimating ideologies. A regime in this sense overarches contending policy 
orientations at lower levels such that even electorally successful oppositional figures can 




Within this framework, the Supreme Court plays an important part and ―[f]or at 
least fifty years, prominent political scientists have traced the decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court to the policy and political commitments of governing partisan regimes.‖ 
They have found that ―justices have almost always acted in alliance with the governing 
coalition of which they themselves are generally members.‖
637
 During these ―ordinary‖ 
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times, as Pickerill and Clayton write, ―one expects the Court‘s decisions to reflect 
broader regime values.‖
638
 While ―historically, the Court rarely exercise[s] its power in 
opposition to the substantive interests and values of the ‗national governing coalition,‘‖
639
 
―[u]nder some circumstances, the Court may stray quite far from some of the dominant 




 In the three cases studied here, despite competing governing coalitions, there were 
fundamental ―core‖ values, policy concerns, and legitimating ideologies that went 
unchallenged and virtually unspoken by both coalitions. They were reluctant to approach 
them until future elections or political factors change the regime dynamics so that the 
current underlying consensus is less secure or a new consensus has emerged. 
 In the civil rights case, there was fundamental agreement that thirty years after the 
civil rights movement and accompanying legislative actions, there would be federal 
involvement in civil rights policy. There were no vestiges of the Southern Manifesto. The 
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constitutionality of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was not mentioned. More importantly, 
Griggs, the case that established disparate-impact analysis, itself was not directly 
challenged. Its interpretation by the Court was criticized but an effort was not made to 
eliminate disparate-impact analysis or the 80% rule from Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission guidelines. 
 In the case of partial-birth abortion, an attack on Roe was explicitly disavowed. 
Griswold was barely mentioned. No one introduced the Human Life Bill. There was only 
one direct reference to fetuses falling within the Equal Protection Clause. A commitment 
of some kind to privacy was at least acknowledged as the reining regime value. In the 
case of habeas corpus, while less apparent, there was at least a fundamental value of a 
congressional commitment to participation in foreign affairs-related policy. The President 
would not simply act completely without congressional input. 
“UNSETTLED” VALUES 
 Given they are operating within a political regime context, combined with the fact 
that they are unable and unwilling to directly address the values of the fundamental 
regime, we see members of Congress being very willing to try and influence their body, 
the other branches, and the political context by influencing perceptions, facts, and 
outcomes at a secondary regime value level. National coalition members are willing to 
fight over these secondary values. These include the demarcation between racial intents 
and racial effects in public policy, the exact contours of the right to privacy, and the 
limits of habeas corpus itself. These issues are not settled, either because of their 
controversial nature, or because they simply are not as well-known, as may have been the 





As previously described, reconstructive presidents are presidents who have 
asserted an authority to ignore the Court‘s constitutional reasoning and act upon their 
own independent constitutional judgments.
641
 We do not see this behavior in these three 
cases. Both President Bushes were affiliated with President Reagan and thus unwilling to 
believe they inhabited reconstructive space within which to challenge a collapsing regime 
and propose new understandings of fundamental regime commitments and values or of 
articulating the foundations for a new regime. Both had expectations of the Court, given 
they were expecting ―to inherit an affiliated Court[] . . . whose personnel were largely 
selected and/or confirmed by his own political coalition. Moreover, the Court can be 
expected to be operating under the ideological assumptions of the constitutional vision 
established by the last reconstruction.‖
642
 Affiliated leaders ―interpret the inherited 
regime, not the constitutional order itself – that is, they interpret the interpretations of the 
previous reconstructive leader. They are the workaday practioners of constitutional 
politics, concerned with clarifying what the constitutional regime is rather than with 
specifying what it should be.‖
643
   
In these cases, we see that ―political actors are not unconcerned with 
constitutional meaning, but they have less direct investment in taking a leadership role in 
specifying its requirements. Under such circumstances, the Court can carve out a 
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constrained, but autonomous, role for itself as the ‗ultimate interpreter‘ of constitutional 
meaning, with the assistance and tolerance of other political actors.
644
 Whereas a 
―reconstructive leader must shoulder aside the Court‘s claim to be the primary expositor 
of constitutional meaning and must shift constitutional discourse more explicitly into the 
political arena,‖ an affiliated president will be much less inclined to do so, members of 




This is what we see in these cases. A newly empowered majority of the Court 
issued a striking array of rulings in a short span, a prerogative they inhabited given their 
slowly building alliance with Republican presidents, a President was unwilling to 
forcefully lead onto new constitutional ground, and members of Congress were either 
expressing outrage from the minority or arguing for a more moderate stance. In 2003, 
another affiliated President Bush was unwilling to lead an assault on Roe, but was willing 
to defer to Court‘s precedents and merely seek new incremental ground by which to 
please his coalition, while members of Congress from both parties deferred to the Court, 
either to claim their mantle of what was constitutional as sacrosanct, or to demonstrate 
the adherence by which the new law failed to stray from precedent. In 2007, while the 
President could arguably be said to have tried to assert new, or reassert old, constitutional 
ground in favor of executive power, he retreated when this seemed to fail. Congress 
                                                 
644
Keith E. Whittington, ―The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy,‖ in Sotirios A. Barber 
and Robert P. George, eds., Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and 
Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 270. 
645
Keith E. Whittington, ―The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy,‖ in Sotirios A. Barber 
and Robert P. George, eds., Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and 
Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 270. 
158 
 
deferred to the Court for a period of time, and the Court sought for itself a constrained 
institutional role as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 
Affiliated eras, while being compromised of a regime of settled values, can 
nevertheless be composed of divided political and electoral coalitions, which fact thereof 
then elicits its own expectations, which we do see in these cases. While in 1957 Dahl 
―argued that the Court rarely exercises the power of judicial review in a way that is 
contrary to the interests of the governing coalition in the national political system,‖
646
 the 
era encompassing these three cases has been dominated by a relatively divided, or 
competing, governing coalition(s) and partisan environment.
647
 This is evident in the 
partisan compositions of Congress over the past twenty to thirty years in which these 
cases and their antecedents inhabit.
648
 During times of divided government: 
‗regime‘ values will be less stable and more conflicted, since neither party 
enjoys consistent control over legislative institutions. It is true that even 
when a single party dominates the electoral system, regime values may 
conflict, as for instance in the conflict between blue-collar labor interests 
and the civil rights movement within the Democratic coalition of the 
1960s. But such conflicts are more prevalent when the regime lacks a 
unifying party structure to harmonize those competing interests. Even 
modest alterations to existing legal doctrines may induce dire warnings 
                                                 
646
Cornell Clayton and David A. May, ―A Political Regimes Approach to the Analysis of Legal 
Decisions,‖ Polity 32, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 242. 
647
As opposed to an era of realignment, as described by Fisher: ―The judiciary is most likely to be 
out of step with Congress or the President during periods of electoral and partisan realignment, when the 
country is undergoing sharp shifts in political directions while the courts retain the orientation of an age 
gone by.‖ Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 201, citing, Richard Funston, ―The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,‖ 
American Political Science Review 69, no. 3 (1975): 795-811, and David Adamany, ―Legitimacy, 
Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court,‖ Wisconsin Law Review 1973, no. 3 (1973): 790-846. 
648













 (49-49-2), and the 111
th
 Congress (57-41-2). Republicans were 

















 (55-44-1). The 107
th




















 (233-202), and the 111
th

















from politicians as the parties become ideologically more polarized and 
face a growing incentive to exaggerate the importance of change in an 
effort to lure independent voters. Third, the electorate is unlikely to 
mobilize against the Court's positions. To some extent, the polarization 
within the elected branches reflects polarization within the electorate 
itself. Indeed, the 2000 election saw the highest level of straight party 
voting in fifty years of National Elections Studies surveys, and, according 
to public opinion polls, marked the high point of a thirty-year trend of 
partisan and ideological polarization. During such periods of division, the 





Thus, due to the divided nature of the regime, the Court has more latitude to rule 
independently, possibly even on issues they would have not ruled on otherwise. Dahl 
wrote, ―[i]t is to be expected, then, that the Court is least likely to be successful in 
blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a major policy and most 
likely to succeed against a ‗weak‘ majority; e.g., a dead one, a transient one, a fragile one,  
or one weakly united upon a policy of subordinate importance.‖
650
 While it may be true 
that, ―[t]he influence of regime politics ensures that federal judges, especially at the top 
of the judicial hierarchy, will have concerns and preferences that are usually in sync with 
other national power holders,‖
651
 if those other national power holders are divided, so 
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 The ―dire warnings‖ at Court action threatening regime values is also what we see 
in these cases. During 1991 and 2003, members were outraged over what could be argued 
were minor changes in law. But, to them, even deviation from the status quo may have 
signaled a regime shift and this violated their fundamental regime preferences. It is 
important to keep in mind, that this correlation says nothing about the very personal 
nature of judicial decision-making and its relationship to institutional, legal, and 
normative commitments.
653
 ―From Dahl forward, the chief weakness in the regime 
politics literature has been a tendency to overstate the influence of external political 
pressure in a way that implies that the justices‘ actual decisions were inevitable and 
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neglects the possibility of relatively independent institutional action by the Court.‖
654
 As 
Keck points out, ―legal institutions and political values cannot be conceptually separated, 
and the ‗political regimes‘ insight that the values and attitudes found within the judiciary 
are shaped by (but in turn can also shape) the existing configuration of political 
institutions and power across the regime.‖
655
 As Clayton and May posit, there are 
simultaneous interactions and interdependent relationships taking place between 
changing social values and attitudes, elections, legal positions by key actors, litigation, 
Court decisions and articulations of the law, application of the law.
656
 
A POLITICAL BRANCH 
These cases also demonstrate that members of Congress operate in an extremely 
political environment. They often ―only have fifteen minutes to decide an issue‖
657
 and it 
is important to keep in mind what we already understand about members of Congress 
from previous studies. As Pickerill reminds us: 
[w]e should not expect members of Congress to routinely or 
systematically consider, of their own volition, constitutional issues raised 
by legislation. . . . [M]embers of Congress are primarily motivated by the 
‗electoral connection,‘ notions of representation, and the desire to make 
good public policy, and the institution of Congress is designed to help 
achieve these goals efficiently. However, Congress does not operate in a 
vacuum, and it may sometimes need to consider the actions of the 
judiciary, the presidency, or other institutions. Likewise, the Court‘s 
actions may be viewed as having important effects on other institutions of 
government and on the broader lawmaking process. . . . Constitutional 
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Given the increase in party polarization and the divided nature of the national 
governing majority and the characteristics it brings, within a regime structure of 
fundamental and secondary values, we would expect the deliberations to elicit predictable 
partisan divisions and responses. That fact continued here. As pointed out in each case 
study, in 1991 and 2003, votes on final passage were virtually along party lines. In 2007, 
in the preceding time to the actual bill, we know that Republican supporters of the bill 
most likely did not want to challenge a sitting Republican President on a foreign policy 
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issue and Democrats, fearing their electoral chances may suffer, may have withheld from 
speaking out too forcefully. 
 In the Civil Rights Act case, Republicans were more likely to argue for less race-
conscious and more color-blind policies and interpretations of civil rights law. Democrats 
were more likely to invoke the virtue of race-conscious policies and interpretations of 
civil rights law. Each party even inserted numerous ad hoc ―interpretive memos‖ at odds 
with one another stipulating what narrow interpretation would be counted as correct 
statutory instruction for the court system to use.
659
 In the abortion case, Republicans were 
more likely to argue against the procedure and invoke ―life‖, while Democrats were more 
likely to invoke ―choice‖ and the harms that would come from placing a restriction on 
abortion accessibility. In the habeas case, Republicans, as they did in the other two cases, 
were more likely to voice their support for a position their Republican President 
advocated and in favor of executive discretion in war-making, while Democrats, as they 
did also in the previous two cases, were opposed to a President of the opposite party and 
in disfavor of greater executive discretion in war-making. 
Again, these divisions highlight the presence of and the importance thereto of 
dueling governing coalitions that have been battling over the definition of the regime. 
Instead of one national governing coalition being dominant, there have been competing 
coalitions, and while at various times and in various circumstances each has been 
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successful to some extent, one has not been able to dominate the political landscape. 
Thus, as Pickerill and Clayton describe: 
[w]ithout taking a position in this debate, we simply note that in contrast 
to earlier periods of American history and previous constitutional regimes, 
the post-1960s American political system has been characterized by 
electoral dealignment, divided government, and a rise in partisan 
polarization. . . . Indeed, divided government has become the norm during 
this period; between 1968 and 2002, the same party controlled both the 
White House and both houses of Congress during only seven years. . . . 
The consequences of this political system for the role of the Court and 
judicial review are [that] during extended periods of divided government, 
a stronger form of judicial review becomes possible. Without a stable 
coalition controlling the elected branches, both parties have an incentive to 
turn to the courts to resolve political issues, while judges are less afraid of 
institutional retaliation if they make unpopular decisions. Unlike under 
unified government, presidents and legislators are unwilling or unable to 
coordinate an assault on judicial independence, and each party will 




This is exactly what we find in these cases. Each occurred during an era of 
divided government and a rise in partisan polarization. A stronger form of judicial review 
was seen in these cases as justices were perhaps less afraid of making unpopular 
decisions. The Court, inexplicably, ruled on numerous civil rights related cases within a 
brief span, ruling to a point where the coalition-affiliated administration and party 
members in Congress were even willing to work toward the rejection of several of the 
decisions. In 2000, as it had in 1992, the Court again was willing to stake out a forceful 
position that it would seemingly not be in the same position to make were it not confident 
in its electoral viability.
661
 By 2007, the Court had issued several rebukes of the 
Administration on detention policy, wading into an issue many did not expect it to 
address given the history of wartime-Court involvement. In each of these cases neither 
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presidents nor legislators were able to coordinate an all-out assault on judicial 
independence, and as seen in the 2003 case, each party will defend the judiciary from 
perceived encroachments by the other party. As one current member commented, ―[i]f 




In addition, as one would predict in a politically partisan and predictable 
environment, constitutional deliberation as seen in these three cases points to the fact that 
much of what gets said in Congress can be called ―symbolic speech‖ at the expense of the 
archeology of the specific issues. As Steven S. Smith writes, ―much of the talk on the 
House and Senate floors has merely symbolic and theatrical purposes.‖
663
 On one hand, 
much of it, by even fair estimation, would seem to be hyperbole or even vitriolic in 
nature. As shown, in these three cases there were accusations of outright allegiance with 
David Duke, Andrew Johnson, and Jim Crow-era segregation. An allegation was made 
that a particular administration was not enforcing 13
th
 Amendment. Support for the 
majority-preferred bill in 1991 was equated with ―quotas‖ and correlated with a business 
owner hanging a ―help-wanted‖ sign requesting statistically proportionate numbers of 
job-seeking applicants. 
This symbolic speech was present in all three cases, but most prevalent in the 
2003 case study. This demonstrates the nature of discourse related to the issue of 
abortion. Given the perceived clarity of the issue by all involved, the comparatively high 
number of co-sponsors and plethora of floor statements, point to the ―credit-claiming‖ 
role congressional deliberation often takes as members seek to profit from popular 
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legislation or oppose prominent legislation important to key constituents or interest 
groups. The 2007 case, for example, had drastically less numbers both of co-sponsors and 
member statements about habeas corpus. 
Secondly, we also see the rhetorical priority and reliance members place on the 
founding era, the Framers themselves, and the founding texts of our polity. In each case 
study this was done by opponents and supporters in an attempt to give authority to their 
positions. Appeals to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, in general, 
were made in each case, but most frequently about the 2003 bill. When members want to 
attempt to have the greatest emotional or rhetorical impact they turn to the documents and 
―values‖ related to these documents to articulate their generic or specific position. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we see the importance members place on, 
and how they place this ―symbolic speech‖ and these Founding references in, what one 
might call ―value narrative-arcs.‖ In each case study, there was a ―competition-of-
narratives‖ in argumentation. This exemplifies the ways in which members (attempt to) 
understand our political history in the United States, the ways issues are framed for the 
general public, and the ways in which members of both parties choose to interpret the 
issues‘ respective histories, beliefs, and coherence, and the history, beliefs, and coherence 
of the perceived national narrative. Each respective position is equated with the true 
founding principles in fact or aspiration of the United States and narratives are drawn 
from them to the case study period with the ―other‖ position framed as being on the 
―wrong side of history.‖ 
Thus, in 1991 we see a competition between ―equal opportunity‖ and ―quotas,‖ 
between ―civil rights‖ and ―discrimination,‖ between ―equality,‖ ―justice‖ and ―fairness,‖ 
167 
 
between ―color-blindness‖ and ―equal results.‖ In 2003 there was a competition between 
―life,‖ and ―liberty‖ or ―privacy,‖ between competing conceptions of ‗rights.‖ In 2007, 
although members did have the benefit of having specific constitutional clauses with 
which to appeal, we nonetheless see a competition between ―justice‖ and ―law,‖ between 
―American values‖ and ―human rights,‖ between safety and Executive aggrandizement, 
between citizens and ―aliens,‖ and between differing understandings of ―sovereignty.‖ 
Again, this points to the way in which the circumstances on the Hill, the time 
limitations, the plethora of issues, the demands of modern campaigns, and the limits on 
debate all compress any such statements into consumable sound-bytes. In each case study 
members tried to frame the issue to some broader moral, theoretical, historical, or 
rhetorical narrative. Are these values, rhetoric, and narratives evidence of constitutional 
deliberation? Are the ―implicit‖ statements alluding to constitutional values really explicit 
expressions of constitutional coherence? The answer is a qualified yes.
664
 Each offers an 
opportunity but these opportunities were often missed.  
Thus, deliberation involving the Civil Rights Act of 1991 stayed at the value-
laden broad level, with dichotomies drawn between ―equal results‖ and ―equal 
opportunity,‖ and competing interpretations of ―justice.‖ Griggs was not mentioned 
frequently in specificity as to its constitutionality. The constitutional basis of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was never discussed.
665
 There was no mention of entire historical 
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(1873, 1875, 1883) and constitutional facts (the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Strauder, and Harlan‘s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases) that could have been narratively 
utilized. Congressionally empowering language in the Reconstruction Amendments was 
not mentioned. These historical facts could have grounded arguments for both sides and 
given them narrative solidity rather than staying at the mere ―values‖ level.
666
 Since the 
                                                                                                                                                 
68, no. 5 Symposium: The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Theory and Practice (1993): 915-917. Kmiec draws 
from an analogy using Father Theodore M. Hesburgh. ―[O]fficial slavery coexisted with [Christianity] four 
hundred years after the death of Christ. When it reoccurred a millennium later, Christians were the best 
customers of the Arab traders. . . . Throughout the world, human dignity and human rights continued to 
exist in travesty rather than reality.‖ Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., The Humane Imperative 25 (1974). 
Introducing a symposium, Kmiec explains, ―All of the papers that follow assume the 1991 Act‘s 
constitutional validity. No one can fault either law professors or practitioners for this bit of practical legal 
realism. But being practical, does not make the proposition true. . . . the constitutionality of the 1991 Act . . 
. exists in travesty, rather than reality. . . . The two sources of constitutional power that the Act may be 
claimed to be premised upon seem unavailing. First, there is Congress‘ so-called section 5 authority to 
enforce the guarantee of equal protection. But, as already noted, the contours of equal protection are 
bounded by the necessity of showing discriminatory intent for its violation. True, former Justice Brennan 
claimed that Congress has the power to define equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment differently 
than the Court. But a majority of the Court has never formally acceded to Brennan's view because it 
fundamentally displaces the Court's article III role to ‗say what the law is.‘ And even if Congress has wide 
latitude to craft its own racial preference schemes, a narrowly affirmed federal liberality that still greatly 
divides the Court and does not extend to the states [Compare Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 
(1990) with Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)], the scope of Congress' authority to undertake such 
programs in its own right is arguably inapposite to its ability to define unintentional impacts to be 
discriminatory practices by private parties. . . . The alternative source of congressional power that may be 
claimed to underlie the 1991 Act is the power to regulate interstate commerce. The commerce power, of 
course, played an instrumental role in the validity of the 1964 Civil Rights Act [Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)]. But there, the assertion of authority made some sense. Congress was 
rightly concerned about removing impediments to the free flow of goods and persons that result from 
intentional racial discrimination. The Hesburgh Civil Rights Commission's difficulties in securing 
accommodations is illustrative. Admittedly, too, the Court's Commerce Clause cases hold that Congress 
may legislate against individual action under the analytically boundless ‗cumulative effect‘ principle.
665
 
Yet, as broad as the commerce power is, it is hard to see how commerce is advanced by de facto racial 
employment quotas. In actual fact, commerce is very likely burdened, not advanced, by such social 
engineering. In all events, whatever the scope of the commerce power with respect to private parties, 
Congress should not disregard hornbook equal protection guarantees, at least with respect to public 
employers, and those again relate to intent, rather than impact. . . . For political reasons and others, these 
constitutional misgivings are not likely to be soon addressed in court. So disregard the constitutional 
muddle, if you will, and turn to the statute.‖ 
666
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cases called into question the 1971 case which ―first grafted disparate-impact rules onto 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,‖
667
 it would have been an opportune time to revisit the intent 
of the 1964 Act. Members could have discussed Griggs, what it meant, and why it was 
important.
668




 In the 2003 case, supporters of the ban did not offer detailed arguments of why 
the Roe and Dalton understanding was misguided. Griswold was in fact only mentioned 
twice.
670
 A ―pro-life‖ position supporting a different principle of ―privacy‖ was not 
                                                                                                                                                 
floors. Deliberation in this sense is a nonlinear, free-form process that depends on strictly limiting the size 
of the group; sub-committees, other small groups, and possibly committees are the forums where this sort 
of deliberation might be fostered. Deliberation so defined certainly did not occur on the House floor before 
restrictive rules became prevalent. . . . What we can and should expect on the chamber floors in informed 
and informative debate and sound decision making. Restrictive rules can in fact contribute toward those 
goals. Rules can provide order and predictability to the consideration on the floor of complex and 
controversial legislation; they can be used to ensure that floor time is apportioned in a reasonable and 
sensible way for each bill, and that debate focuses on the major alternatives, not on minor or side issues.‖ 
Barbara Sinclair, ―Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and 
Procedures,‖ in Congress and the Constitution, 303. 
667
Stuart Taylor, ―Sotomayor And ‗Disparate Impact,‘‖ National Journal Magazine (30 May 
2009), available at NationalJournal.com. 
668
As Nicole Gueron writes, ―The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to prohibit not only intentional discrimination or ‗disparate treatment,‘ but also unintentional 
discrimination that has a ‗disparate impact‘ on protected class members. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact exists if facially neutral selection or promotion criteria, for 
example, operate to exclude or reduce the opportunities of protected class members at a disproportionate 
rate. id, at 431-32. Employers may argue as an affirmative defense to a disparate impact charge that the 
challenged criteria are a ‗business necessity.‘ id, at 431. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989), the Court reinterpreted several aspects of disparate impact theory, thus raising numerous 
questions about the proper interpretation of business necessity doctrine. These issues included the extent to 
which business necessity would require that disputed hiring criteria be related to successful job 
performance, the location of the burden of proof of business necessity, and the specificity with which 
complaining employees or job applicants would have to pinpoint the employment practices that caused the 
disparate impact.‖ Nicole L. Gueron, ―An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative Procedural History 
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991,‖ The Yale Law Journal 104, no. 5 (Mar. 1995): 1204. 
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Between 1982 and 1988, Congress overruled seven Supreme Court decisions concerning 
interpretation of antidiscrimination provisions; in each instance, Congress increased the ability of plaintiffs 
to bring and prevail in suits compared to the rights recognized by the Court. See Abner J. Mikva and Jeff 
Bleich, ―When Congress Overrules the Court,‖ California Law Review 79, no. 3 Symposium: Civil Rights 
Legislation in the 1990s (May 1991): 740. 
670
Rep. King (R-IA) does mention it in his brief outline of the trajectory of abortion jurisprudence: 
―I am not a lawyer. I grew up in a cornfield and rode out on a bulldozer, but I can tell you I know this much 
about law. How did we get here to this point? I do not think anybody has referenced it now, and that is the 
case in 1965, Griswold v. Connecticut, right to privacy, when Connecticut outlawed contraceptives and the 
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offered. Opponents of the ban did not offer any explanation for how they might respond 
to a Court they were giving enormous deference, were that Court to start enforcing, as 





 Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Black‘s dissent in 
Griswold was not mentioned. We did not see detailed discusses of constitutional first 





 In 2007, we did not hear supporters of the President‘s detention policies making 
forceful articulations and defenses of executive prerogative in foreign policy and war 
policy. Most defenses focused on the ―rights‖ or non-rights of citizen and aliens or enemy 
combatants. They did not enter into prolonged discussions on the debate between declare 
and make war and the philosophical reasons why the executive needs a free hand in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Supreme Court ruled that the State of Connecticut had no business getting into the privacy of the family 
and, therefore, found their law that outlawed contraceptives unconstitutional. That is the foundation for 
right to privacy. Just a few years later, 8 years later, along came Roe v. Wade. That was the piece that said, 
well, that right to privacy extends to the woman‘s womb and in our declaration where it defines life, liberty, 
pursuit of happiness, those rights are prioritized except that the right of the liberty of the pregnant female 
takes priority over the life of the unborn. And then Roe v. Wade, of course, outlawed, though it did not 
make an exception for, late-term post-viability abortions. But same day, concurrent decision, Doe v. Bolton 
gave that definition that I think we have heard that addresses the health of the mother. It does not prohibit 
any abortion if in the medical judgment of the attending physician the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the woman or to avert serious adverse health consequences to the woman, a hole you could drive a 
truck through. That is also what this amendment seeks to do, and that is another reason that I oppose it. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey reaffirmed Roe v. Wade. That is what it looks like to this fellow who did not 





sess., 2003, vol. 149, no. 81, H4943 (4 Jun. 2003). Using Lexis Nexis Congressional, only one other 
mention of ―Griswold‖ relevant to partial-birth abortion entries can be found in the Congressional Daily 




 Congresses. Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA) quickly mentions it as a 




 sess., 149, no. 128, S11601 (17 Sept. 2003). 
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As for example, found in Nathan Schlueter and Robert H. Bork, ―Constitutional Persons: An 
Exchange on Abortion,‖ Human Life Review 29, issue 1 (Winter 2003): 17-33. This article first appeared 
in First Things (Jan. 2003). See also, for one such grounding, see Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Hadley 
Arkes and The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence In Support of Petitioner NO. 05-
1382 In The Supreme Court of the United States Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Petitioner, v. 
Planned Parenthood Fed. Of America, Inc., Et al., Respondents, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit. This amici curiae asked three main questions which seem pertinent 
here: ―Whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is a valid exercise of Congress‘s authority under 
the Commerce Clause (either as originally understood or as presently interpreted)? Whether, apart from the 
Commerce Clause, Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003? Whether this Court‘s enunciation of an abortion right permits it to lay claim to the inherently 
legislative authority to determine the scope and weight to be given to that right?‖ 
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detention policy and war-making decisions. Virtually no members offered a robust 
explanation of the role of the Executive, of the Legislature, and of the Judiciary in war-
time, in foreign affairs, and in war-related issues. No correlations were made to the 
philosophy behind an executive in republican government. We did not references to 
Jefferson‘s application of habeas rights to non-citizens, to McCardle to support Court-
stripping, to the Prize Cases to support congressional involvement, to Ex parte Bollman 
to support Congress‘ suspension of the writ, or historical discussions of Article I, Section 
8 and 9, nor the discussions pertaining to habeas during the Constitutional Convention. 





Elections are obviously also important for members of Congress.
673
 They are 
another factor, Pickerill argues, that enhance congressional constitutional deliberation.
674
 
Keith Whittington writes, ―elections seem to have the potential to encourage even greater 
discussion of constitutional matters, either because they have brought to power new 
legislative majorities with a new agenda to discuss or because incumbent legislators turn 
to constitutional issues in their quest to gain advantage in an upcoming electoral 
contest.‖
675
 This was true in these three cases. As already mentioned, the upcoming 
congressional and presidential elections seemed to have a strong affect on the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act. Many argued the President switched his position at the last moment because 
of these elections. The 2003 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was affected by the election 
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election.‖ Staff Interview, 2009. 
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of 2000, the 2002 midterm elections, and the upcoming elections in 2004. The election in 
2000 allowed supporters to know they had a White House willing to sign the bill. The 
2002 elections solidified majorities in both chambers supportive of the bill. Finally, it 
could be argued that the 2004 election constrained the supporters of the bill given that not 
knowing the outcome of the election, they stuck with a very confined bill rather than a 
more expansive one that may have been more controversial. The Military Commissions 
vote was scheduled right around the 2006 election. The Habeas Corpus Restoration Act 
of 2007 was affected by the election given that supporters simply didn‘t have the votes to 
pass the bill and thus the upcoming election allowed those opposed to the bill time to wait 
to see what direction the Court took next. 
As previously discussed, Judge Mikva‘s dated observation is still relevant: many 
members who speak on the floor or in hearings may only be doing so to get their already 
predetermined views into the official record.
676
 As one member stated lamenting the 
―lack of understanding of the Constitution and what is constitutional,‖ members have to 
be concerned with what ―can . . . be put on a TV ad. . . . Most members don‘t deal with it 
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Mikva wrote, ―both houses are large, making the process of engaging in complex arguments 
during a floor debate difficult. For the most part, the speeches made on the floor are designed to get a 
member‘s position on the record rather than to initiate a dialogue. Because of the volume of legislation, the 
time spent with constituents, and the technical knowledge required to understand the background of every 
piece of legislation, it is infrequent that a member considers the individual merits of a particular bill. Often 
a vote is determined by a thumbs up-or-down sign by the party leader, or by a political debt that needs to be 
repaid. While it is true . . . that a majority of the members of Congress are lawyers, they have not kept up-
to-date on recent legal developments. In fact, most Supreme Court opinions never come to the attention of 
Congress. Unlike judges, the Representatives and Senators are almost totally dependent on the 
recommendations of others in making constitutional judgments.‖ Abner J. Mikva, ―How Well Does 
Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,‖ North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 609. A former 
House Parliamentarian reminds us of the importance of television. ―It should be remembered that on March 
19th, 1979, television first came into the House. As a former Parliamentarian describes, ―there was a 
downside. ‗Once television was in place,‘ ‗members were less willing to take on their opponents and to 
potentially be embarrassed, preferring, instead, to have prescripted speeches and then sit down. And that‘s 
virtually all you see now.‘ Today, rarely, if ever, does a speech on the House floor change a single vote. 
Members are more likely to direct their remarks at an unseen television audience, not their colleagues.‖ 
Robert V. Remini, The House: The History of the House of Representatives (Collins: Smithsonian Books, 




[the Constitution] as an everyday issue. . . . Some people don‘t care about the words or 
phrases. You try to make it relevant but to some people it‘s just not relevant.‖
677
 
Nevertheless, arguments to the contrary, judging from the partisan votes, 
predictable words, symbolic gestures, and missed opportunities, this evidence affirms 
what we know Congress to be: a very political institution.
678
 In fact, For example, in 1991 
they ducked the ―business necessity‖ issue.
679
 They avoided the retroactivity issue and 
wanted no part in re-discussing Runyon.
680
 They were intentionally statutorily 
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The same member added, ―[i]f 1% of the bill you find unconstitutional that‘s probably not 
enough to make you vote against it.‖ Member Interview, 2008. 
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When asked about Congress‘ constitutionally deliberative capacities, one former member 
commented: ―[T]here are premises in your questions that seem to envision a kind of deliberation that is not 
common to the legislative process. The Congress is neither a court nor a law school. The discussions 
involved in legislation center on policy preferences and, as a part of that process, different perceptions of 
fact and differing assessments of likely outcomes. Legislation is always carefully drafted to meet 
constitutional standards, but of course lawyers and even Supreme Court justices disagree about what is 
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op[-]eds, in letters to other members, etc. But there will never be a debate about constitutionality as there 
will be in court. The civil rights act of 1991 was probably seen by most members not as a constitutional 
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constituent concerns and preferences are included, properly, in the decision[-]making process, among a 
great number of factors.‖ Member Interview, 2008.  
679
―Instead, Congress left that issue to future litigation, and delegated to the Court the power to 
breathe life into the defense of ‗business necessity‘ – to either narrow its protective umbrella or expand it. It 
was Congress, not the Court, that created a vacuum and invited the judiciary to fill it. Congress could have 
overturned, modified, or elaborated on the Wards Cove test for ‗business necessity,‘ but it did not do so. 
The only reason that the buck stops with the Supreme Court on this issue is that Congress chose to pass the 
buck.‖  Ronald D. Rotunda, ―The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the 
Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation,‖ Notre Dame Law Review 68, no. 5 Symposium: The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991: Theory and Practice (1993): 937. The definition of ―business necessity‖ was 
changed from some disputed action by necessity being ―essential to effective job performance‖ to that 
action ―bear[ing] a substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective job performance.‖ 
680
Likewise, in preparing to hear Patterson, the Supreme Court apparently touched a political 
nerve when it requested that the parties brief for reconsideration the decision in Runyon v. McCrary. In 
response, Congress filed an amicus brief signed by 66 Senators and 118 Representatives urging the Court to 
reaffirm its Runyon holding. The brief stated candidly that the members of Congress wished to avoid the 





 they curiously exempted themselves,
682
 and they even excluded Wards 
Cove itself, the central entity the legislation was supposed to address. In 2003, it held but 
                                                                                                                                                 
restore [Runyon] would likely be fractious and divisive, since corrective legislation would, in all likelihood, 
compel the Congress to address numerous peripheral questions concerning the scope and application of 
Section 1981.‘ Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Patterson, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-
107).  
681
―[T]he 1991 Act is a case of ‗planned ambiguity‘ and that ‗[t]he inherent result of [this] planned 
ambiguity in the Civil Rights Act is unnecessary make-work for lawyers‘ as well as increased and 
burdensome litigation for employers and employees.‖ Douglas W. Kmiec, ―Foreword: The 1991 Civil 
Rights Act: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Philosophical Enigma,‖ Notre Dame Law Review 68, no. 5 
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Rotunda, ―The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to 
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As Nelson Lund wrote two years later, ―[d]uring the Senate‘s debate on the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, its Members had occasion to exercise that responsibility in response to demands that the employment 
discrimination laws be extended to cover the Senate. The content of that debate, however, suggests 
Congress can be trusted to discern the limits of its own constitutional rights to about the same degree it can 
be trusted to police its own compliance with the laws against employment discrimination. . . . In reviewing 
the Senate‘s debates, it is important to keep in mind the difference between reasoned interpretation of the 
Constitution, an undertaking that transcends persons and interests, and self-serving policy judgments 
masquerading as ‗separation of powers‘ arguments that are untethered to any specific constitutional 
provision. . . . The Civil Rights Act of 1991 resulted from a compromise between the Bush administration 
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this compromise, which was reached late in the 1991 session, was taken directly to the floor of the Senate, 
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congressional coverage issue. Because the Senate bill was considered by the House of Representatives 
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revisions of the employment discrimination laws might also have been quite different. The new statute 
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this statute – and there was almost no opposition in either chamber to the final bill – might not have been 
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expected to have to live with them.‖ Nelson Lund, ―Congressional Self-Exemption from the Employment 
Discrimination Laws: A Rational Choice Analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,‖ Louisiana Law Review 
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one hearing on the issue and in 2007, Congress was routinely and loudly criticized for not 
legislating enough. 
ALWAYS A BRANCH 
DIALOGUES 
Participatory members do deserve some credit for doing so because this meets the 
minimal standard of informing their constituents where they stand on an issue and 
allowing for a collective parliamentary rule-bound discussion to take place. As Gutmann 
and Thompson write 
[i]n its strongest form, constitutional democracy tells representatives to 
consider how the Constitution should be interpreted, not simply to accept 
how the courts have so far interpreted it. Deliberative democracy goes 
further. To satisfy its demands, a representative . . . must consider, and 
encourage his constituents to consider with him in public discussion, what 
basic liberties should be protected by the Constitution. Without engaging 
in deliberation about this question, neither he nor his constituents can 
regard their conclusions about constitutional liberties as warranting the 
respect of their fellow citizens. They may be convinced that they are right 
– they may even be right – about what the Constitution requires or should 
require. But if they are deliberative democrats, they will submit their 
constitutional conclusions to the critical scrutiny of their fellow citizens, 
conducted in accord with principles of reciprocity and publicity. They will 
regard the capacity to survive such scrutiny as a necessary condition and a 




As Mayhew writes, ―[t]aking stands is one of the fundamental activities that members of 
Congress engage in.‖
684
 Thus, members can be commended for going on the record and 
whatever their motive, registering their public position on these controversial issues. 
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Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 163-164. Also, as cited earlier, Garrett and Vermeule write, ―[i]t seems 
indisputable that on balance, some congressional deliberation on constitutional questions is better than none 
at all.‖ Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, ―Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,‖ in 
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―Looked at one way, politics is an unending sequence of contributions to a national 
conversation – an often crankly and contentious one, to be sure.‖
685
 
It is important to understand the branches in the reality in which they exist. As 
Whittington argues, ―[a]n examination of the political considerations of presidents [in, we 
might add, their relationship to the other branches] sheds light on how constitutions are 
constructed and maintained in politically fractious environments. For constitutions and 
institutions like judicial review to exist in historical reality as more than imagined moral 
abstractions, powerful social actors must have political reasons to support them over 
time.‖
686
 Thus, in relationship to the Court: 
―the presidency is perhaps the most significant competitor with the Court 
for constitutional authority. The president is a highly visible institutional 
representative with numerous political and constitutional resources and 
functions that could easily lead him into conflicts with the judiciary. The 
president and the Court are, therefore, likely to compete for the right to 
authoritatively determine constitutional meaning. If the Court is to 
establish its authority as the ultimate interpreter of constitutional meaning, 
and thus secure judicial independence, it will have to contend with 
presidential challenges. Judicial success in this competition . . . depends 
crucially on the incentives facing the president. The president has the 
formal tools to defeat the Court. The interesting question is whether he has 
the will or political support needed to successfully challenge the Court for 
constitutional leadership. Generally, he does not, creating a politically 




Nevertheless, the fact that Congress was acting is important because it continues 
the process of dialogue between the branches, informs the electorate and citizenry where 
they stand, and provides means by which that electorate can now receive new information 
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and cues with which to then decide before the next election how well they are pleased 
with the status quo attempt to change it through other means. 
 More importantly, these cases and this analysis highlight the importance of the 
understanding of inter-branch dialogues. Because affiliation assumes the presence of 
dialogue, since a reconstructive leader is not present and strong enough to shift regime 
changes into the political arena alone, it is important Congress view its deliberation as an 
important part of the inter-branch conversation. 
VETO BARGAINING 
 An important aspect of these relationships is a ―veto bargaining‖ mechanism 
whereby Congress and presidents negotiate compromises and solutions through 
institutional ―bargaining.‖
688
 As Whittington writes, ―[a] president‘s authority to lead is 
partly determined by his relationship to the dominant political ‗regime‘ and the relative 
strength of that regime. . . The authority for a president to act is structured largely by the 
expectations of other political actors, which help define ‗what is appropriate for a given 
president to do.‘ ‗A president‘s authority hinges on the warrants that can be drawn from 
the moment at hand to justify action and secure the legitimacy of the changes affected.‘
689
   
This can very clearly be seen in 1991. President Bush very publicly vetoed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990 and it was debated between the White House and Congress for 
two full years. In addition, given President Bush‘s reliance on and success with his anti-
quota position and rhetoric, the House leadership added specific language to the final bill 
                                                 
688
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cases Congress and the president find their way to an agreement that reflects the preferences of both 
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explicitly banning any use of quotas in employment, thereby attempting to allow 
supporters cover from the ―quota‖ charge. 
This is less the case in 2003 and 2007. In 2003, what had changed from the 1990s 
inter-branch debates was a change in administration. Thus, a majority in Congress and 
the President agreed on the issue, thereby lessening the need for bargaining. In the 
Habeas case, the President had congressional majorities for five years opposing habeas 
rights for detainees, and that position may have been strengthened by the fact that a more-
than-likely veto awaited if it did pass. Nevertheless, by asserting such executively 
unilateral power, President Bush probably misread the regime within which he was 
operating. By interpreting a ―weak‖ regime for a strong one, he acted as if his regime was 
stronger than it actually was.
690
 The President clearly emerging weaker, especially 
considering that ―in fact most legal issues of executive branch conduct related to war and 
intelligence never reach a court, or do so only years after the executive has acted.‖
691
 As 
Jack Goldsmith writes: 
The Military Commission Act was a victory for it only against the baseline 
of expectations established by the Supreme Court a few months earlier. 
Measured against the baseline of what it could have gotten from a more 
cooperative Congress in 2002-03, the administration had lost a lot. If it 
had earlier established a legislative regime of legal rights on Guantanamo 
Bay, it never would have had to live with the Court‘s Common Article 3 
holding, or with the War Crimes Act. If the administration had simply 
followed the Geneva requirement to hold an informal ‗competent 
tribunal,‘ or had gone to Congress for support on their detention program 
in the summer of 2004, it probably would have avoided the more 
burdensome procedural and judicial requirements that became practically 
necessary under the pressure of subsequent judicial review. It surely could 
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have received an even more accommodating military commission system 






 Pickerill and many others have written extensively about veto bargaining in the 
judicial realm.
693
 Pickerill found that  
legislation may be modified after judicial review to accommodate the 
Court and reflect the preferences of both institutions. That is, when the 
Court strikes down legislation as unconstitutional, Congress may choose 
to make concessions to the Court by modifying the law to comply with the 
Court‘s constitutional interpretation while maintaining the basic statutory 
policy. Veto-like bargaining between Congress and the Court will surely 
be different from that between Congress and presidents. Congress and 
presidents can negotiate directly, face to face. Communication between 




The Habeas Restoration Act does seem to provide an example of judicial veto 
bargaining.
695
 Preceding it were numerous inter-branch developments. During the first 
several years after 9/11 Congress was unwilling to pass any substantive legislation 
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Review in a Separated System. Given the habeas-related efforts at jurisdiction-stripping and the Court‘s 
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ambiguity about its position on habeas, as habeas, it can be argued, and many members may have felt, cuts 
to the heart of the ―terror‖ dilemma: what is the ultimate identity of the enemy and who gets to so define it? 
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dealing with habeas corpus and detainees at Guantánamo. Then, in reaction to the three 
major Court rulings in 2004, Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla, Congress actively debated and 
deliberated over the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005. After Hamdan was issued in 2006 
Congress actively debated and deliberated over the Military Commissions Act (2006). 
Some in Congress tried to pass the 2007 Act. The Court issued Boumediene a year later, 
after previously declining to take the case. Various members in Congress have responded 
again with the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
696
 the Enemy Belligerent 
Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, and the Terrorist Detention 
Review Reform Act of 2010.
697
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inadmissible in a trial by a military commission; (5) specifically requiring procedures and rules of evidence 
applicable to trials by general courts-martial to apply in trials by military commissions, except when 
necessitated by the unique circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations during 
hostilities or other practical need; (6) the accused's right to the suppression of evidence that is not reliable 
or probative; (7) specific limitations on the use of hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under rules of 
evidence applicable in trials by general courts-martial; (8) specific procedures for the treatment and 
protection of classified information; (9) appeal rights with respect to classified information; and (10) 
adding contempt and perjury and obstruction of justice as triable offenses. Directs the Secretary to report to 
the defense committees: (1) setting forth revised rules for military commissions as amended by this section; 
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a significant degree on the adequacy of defense counsel and associated resources for individuals accused, 
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http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40968.html. Sen. Lindsey Graham filed the Terrorist Detention 
Review Reform Act on August 4, 2010. As Gerstein writes, ―Graham . . . may have concluded that filing 
formal legislation was the best way to pressure the administration into a position on the politically sensitive 
issue. . . . The bill would apply to anyone whom the federal government seeks to detain as an ‗unprivileged 
enemy belligerent‘ – including U.S. citizens. It could also apply to anyone apprehended on U.S. soil, since 
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 The data points are less frequent but we can see the same framework in the 2003 
case. For half-a-decade bills were introduced in Congress and vetoed by the President, 
never reaching the Court. However, the Court did overrule a state statute that was in 
effect a proxy for what congressional majorities had been trying to do. Congress 
responded to the Court by specifically operating within the Court-delineated 
jurisprudential confines of the issue, rather than attempting a more sweeping piece of 
legislation. The Court upheld the response, giving the parties what Whittington calls a 
―win-win,‖
698
 a situation in which the Court has kept important parts of its institutional 




                                                                                                                                                 
there is no geographic limitation. . . . Asked whether the bill has missed its political moment, [Brookings 
Institution scholar Benjamin] Wittes said he doesn‘t know whether it ever had one, because Graham ‗is the 
only voice for something that really should be a matter of political consensus.‘ ―‗The administration hasn‘t 
been able to get its act together to give a serious response,‘ Wittes said. Republicans, he added, ‗have been 
too busy demagoguing the issue to engage seriously and the Democrats have just abandoned the field.‘‖ 
Also, Justice Kennedy recently endorsed civilian courts for detainees, saying the ―attack on the rule of law 
[military tribunals]‖ has failed.‖  See ―Kennedy favors civilian courts in terrorism cases.‖ Available at 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100820/ap_on_re_us/us_judicial_conference_ kennedy. 
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Mitchell Pickerill University of Chicago Law Review 72 (summer 2005): 1146. He is referring to 
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Also, here Congress engaged in ―anticipatory obedience.‖ ―A legislature engages in anticipatory obedience 
when it predicts what a court would say about the constitutionality of a proposal were it to be enacted, and 
adapts the proposal to ensure that it will survive judicial scrutiny.‖ Mark Tushnet, ―Evaluating 
Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies,‖ in Congress 
and the Constitution, 271. 
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Pickerill also reminds us that ―Other scholars have shown that legislative responses to Roe v. 
Wade (1973) indicate challenges to the Court‘s decision establishing abortion rights for women. While 
Congress did not ignore or successfully override Roe, it did, along with state legislatures, pass legislation 
that made it more difficult for women to obtain abortions, often with the avowed intent of discouraging and 
reducing the number of abortions. [Pickerill cites Susan R. Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority: 
The Abortion and War Powers Debates (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992) and Neal Devins, 
Shaping Constitutional Values: Elected Government, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) while adding, ―[t]his does not mean that members of 
Congress did not try to override Roe by constitutional amendment or other legislative means, but only that 
successful congressional enactments did not ultimately rise to the level of an override.‖] Congress passed 
legislation limiting the availability of federal funding for abortions, and state legislatures passed numerous 
regulations intended to discourage and reduce abortion. While not an instance of an override, coordinate 
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The 1991 case is more difficult to assess. While it may not have been thought of 
as ―bargaining,‖ the Court, by taking so many civil-rights cases, appeared to have been 
sending a message to Congress. In fact, the most important question was never answered: 
why did the Court agree to take so many civil-rights cases in a single term?
700
 What were 
the motivating factors for this decision? No explanation has been found.
701
 Obviously, the 
new Court majority (with the then-addition of Justice Kennedy) may have been trying to 





As mentioned earlier, these cases all occurred within an era of divided 
government. While it may be true that ―[w]hen bargaining among multiple institutions 
results in a more comprehensive justification for law and policy, the normative 
                                                                                                                                                 
constructionists view the abortion saga as evidence of both legislative authority and the ability to engage in 
constitutional construction, influence the course of constitutional law, and reject the notion that the Court‘s 
exercise of judicial review is the final say in a constitutional matter.‖ Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation, 
32-33. Thus, after all these years, we still have a vast milieu of permissible and impermissible regulations. 
See Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, American Constitutional Law, Vol. 2 Constitutional Rights: Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, 911. 
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As Mikva and Bleich write, the ―Court contributed to the perception of activism by agreeing to 
decide so many questions concerning that policy area within a relatively brief period of time, and in 
particular by abandoning the Court‘s general policy against revisiting its statutory precedents.‖ Abner J. 
Mikva and Jeff Bleich, ―When Congress Overrules the Court,‖ California Law Review 79, no. 3 
Symposium: Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s (May 1991): 745, citing, Eskridge, ―Overruling Statutory 
Precedents,‖ Georgetown Law Journal 76 (1988): 1361. 
701
Mikva and Bleich offer their own partial explanation: ―[t]hree lessons can be drawn from the 
New Deal experience that appear applicable to the present relationship between the Court and Congress. 
First, when either branch quibbles with the language of a statute, it risks unsettling its legitimate objectives. 
When Congress tries to avoid a difficult issue by including vague language, it may only promote 
antagonism and, ultimately, more intense scrutiny of the issue by the Court and the public. Likewise, when 
the Court quibbles with the language of Congress, it may only entrench contrary congressional opinion and 
reduce the healthy deference that Congress ought to give to the Court's decisions. Second, parties who seek 
to win in the Court what they lost in Congress must be wary of what they pray for. Frequently, these parties 
win the battle but lose the war by galvanizing congressional forces to overrule the Court and advance to an 
even higher policy ground.‖Abner J. Mikva and Jeff Bleich, ―When Congress Overrules the Court,‖ 
California Law Review 79, no. 3 Symposium: Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s (May 1991): 730. 
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The Court had no immediate response, but did rule two years later the Act did apply 
retroactively, a policy supporters of the Act desired. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); 
Rivers v. Roadway Exp. Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994).  
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preference for a republic of reasons has been more fully realized,‖
703
 divided government 
complicates the bargaining task. As noted before, and as expected under divided 
government, we also see the importance and prevailing umbrella of judicial supremacy 
that members were operating under as one would expect in competing national majorities 
look to shield the Court from their counterpart when necessary to protect their regime 
values. In all three cases, but more forcefully in 2003 and 2007, we see members arguing 
that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter in constitutional questions. A departmentalist 
perspective was rarely mentioned. During the 1991 debate, there were few 14
th
 
Amendment Section 5 orations on congressional enforcement power related to civil rights 
laws. As one staffer commented about congressional constitutional prerogative, 
―environmental issues . . . have been settled,‖
704
 and settled obviously by the Court. 
Members often ―defer[] to the Supreme Court‖ on constitutional matters.
705
 An inter-
branch scholar lamented that over the ―last 20-25 years, members don‘t have a clue. . . . 
Members have no interest in educating constituents and lose interest quickly when you 
talk to them‖ about constitutional issues or values. ―Everybody is looking to the Court.‖
 
706
 Many members think that ―if something is important it must be constitutional.‖
707
 
―Elected officials have an incentive to bolster judicial authority not only to encourage the 
judiciary to take independent action but also to weaken the voter‘s ability to trace 
responsibility back to elected officials.‖
708
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Affiliated presidents are powerful, but they operate under constraints. The 
twin imperatives of pursuing their substantive goals and maintaining their 
political coalition are increasingly in tension. Moreover, the ideological 
constraints of the inherited regime limit the options of affiliated 
presidents. These characteristics of affiliated politics favor judicial 
independence and power in constitutional interpretation. When 
constitutional politics is primarily interpretive rather than creative, the 
Court can claim a larger space of operations, and affiliated leaders have 
strong incentives to bolster judicial authority. An independent judiciary 





 We do see greater calls for cooperation with the Court in the habeas case, perhaps 
being attributable to its more unsettled nature historically, thereby allowing more room 
for maneuvering. Members were also not only looking to the Court as the final arbiter of 
constitutional matters but of devising controversial detainee policy. In July 2008, even 
after his party had gained control of both chambers of Congress and appeared to have a 
more than plausible shot at winning the White House, Sen. Patrick Leahy 
essentially said that Congress trusts the courts, not the White House, to 
come up with solutions to these issues. ‗The courts have a long history of 
considering habeas petitions and of handling national security matters, 
including classified information,‘ he said. ‗The administration made this 
mess by seeking to avoid judicial review at all costs, causing years of 




His counterpart in the House, Rep. Jerrold Nadler (NY), when asked the chances 
Congress would enact the kind of laws then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey was 
advocating after the Boumediene decision was announced, answered ―‗[z]ero. . . . We 
don‘t have to pass anything.‘ ‗Let the courts deal with it.‘ ‗Most of them [the detainees] 
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are guilty of nothing.‘‖
711
 This reflects an earlier sentiment expressed by the new 
majority after the 2006 mid-term elections. ―‗This is definitely not going to be the first 
thing out of the box for us,‘ one Democratic Senate staffer said. ‗We make fun of 
Specter, but we‘re basically leaving it up to the Courts, too.‘‖
712
 This may all reflect the 
fundamental fact of political reality faced by those in Congress, as best expressed by Sen. 
Specter four years ago: 
The Supreme Court finally took the bull by the horns and came down with 
the three decisions in June of 2004 because the Congress had not acted. It 
didn't know what to do. It didn't know quite how to approach it. And 
perhaps it was too hot to handle. But the Congress frequently is inactive in 





We also do not see members of Congress arguing on the floor or in committee 
hearings that the Court is completely wrong and should be challenged, ignored, or 
overruled. Morgan‘s insight into the change the New Deal era wrought seems to have 




Despite this highly political and predictable context, congressional action and 
deliberation is still important due to this regime nature of our inter-branch and political 
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 sess., 2005, vol. 151, pt. 149, 
S12659 (10 Nov. 2005). 
714
As mentioned earlier, Donald Morgan, ―examin[ed] a wide range of cases that traced 
congressional responsibility for constitutional interpretation over the course of American history.‖ He 
argued that Congress changed during the New Deal and he was ―particularly distressed to find a decline in 
the acceptance of such congressional responsibility and the rise of ‗judicial monopolism‘ by which the 
‗legislative function could receive definition solely in relation to policy‘ while the Constitution was 
understood to be ‗technical, and too abstruse for any but lawyers in the courtroom and judges on the bench 
to discuss with sense.‖ Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington, ―Introduction,‖ in Congress and the 
Constitution, eds. Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 5, citing, 
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environment. These cases illustrate the unsettled nature of these three issues and thus the 
importance of congressional involvement in these ―dialogues.‖
715
 Were we to witness 
silence by Congress and an abdication to judicial monopoly of these issues, then it could 
be said Congress‘ deliberative actions were of no import, something our tripartite 
representational system did not anticipate.
716
 
 Instead, the employment-related civil rights issues were home to numerous inter-
branch movements, an ongoing dialogue in affect. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
in 1964. The Court issued Griggs in 1971. Congress passed the Equal Employment 
Amendments in 1972. The Court and Congress went back and forth over civil rights laws 
throughout the 1980s. The Court ruled in these cases in 1989. Congress acted in 1990 and 
1991 to respond to the Court and to a regime largely committed to imposing color-blind 
policies. Yet, disparate impact analysis is still part of Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission guidelines and our employment laws, and has recently returned to 
prominence with the 2007 Ricci case and the new ―strong basis-in-evidence‖ standard.
717
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This may also be an example of adhering to the ―Madisonian Constitution.‖ See George 
Thomas, The Madisonian Constitution (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008). Thomas 
argues that ―[w]hile sustaining the ultimate sovereignty of the text . . . Madison designed a constitution that 
calls forth institutions that each have the equivalent responsibility for articulating explanations of what the 
Constitution means. As a result, constitutional meaning can never be settled, as each branch properly 
asserts its own interpretation.‖ Douglas C. Dow, Review of The Madisonian Constitution by George 
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―No one doubts the right of Congress to pass legislation that overturns what it considers to be 
judicial misinterpretations of statutes. But even when the courts render a constitutional interpretation, it is 
usually only a matter of time before Congress prevails if it wants to. Through changes in the composition of 
courts or adjustments in the attitudes of judges who continue to sit, a determined majority in Congress is 
likely to have its way. At some point, a similar statute, struck down in the past as unconstitutional, will find 
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In Ricci, Justice Scalia pointed out the discrepancy between the Court‘s strict scrutiny for race-
related policies and its disparate impact holdings.  
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Abortion jurisprudence continues to evolve with a fifty-year dialogue continuing 
to take place,
718
 and while in 2003, the legislation and subsequent Court validation did 
break new ground, it was not that far outside already tilled ground, stemming from 
Akron, Thornborough, Webster, and even Casey, where the Court wrote that state 
considerations of the value of human life is a worthy consideration. As mentioned at the 
end of the case study, despite the Court carving out room for its jurisprudential 
prerogative, the partial-birth abortion bill also fits within a recent trio of abortion-related 
measures passed since Stenberg,
719
 that may speak to a pro-life ―determined majority‖ at 
least able to pass incremental measures.
720
 In 2007, Congress helped stop a determined 
President. They possibly encouraged the Court in now believing the consequences of 
overturning Eisentrager were minimal, which may have helped lead to Boumediene. 
 We can also say Congress partook in a serious constitutionally deliberative 
process if for no other reason than that they also responded relatively quickly to Court 
action. Pickerill argues that the average congressional response time to a judicial review 
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action by the Supreme Court is four years.
721
 Overall, these three cases would indicate a 
quicker response time from Congress, perhaps indicating the three issues‘ salience to 
members. The civil rights related cases struck down by the Court were in the 1988-89 
term with deliberation over the responding Act immediately following during the next 
two years. The Court case to which the Partial-Birth bill responded was in 2000, with the 
Act passed within three years. The Habeas Act, while not passed, was proposed and 
debated soon after Hamdan was announced.  
In all three cases, they kept the discussion going despite the regime divisions. 
Thus, even though Congress‘ deliberation was often rhetorical, symbolic, and operates in 
a political environment, because these actions radiate back to other malleable entities 
within our political culture, they affect both more secondary levels of regime values and 
can affect the fundamental regime values that guide actors within their eras. 
As previously mentioned, David Currie described members of Congress during an 
earlier period in our history as ―center[ing] on the task of determining [the Constitution‘s] 
meaning.‖
722
 In recent times, by contrast, it may simply be that ―[u]ltimately, with 
fundraising, constituent service, and other demands, members of Congress cannot pursue 
                                                 
721
Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 42-43.  
722
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University of Chicago Press, 1997), 116-117. As noted in Chapter 1., here Currie writes, during the First 
Congress, ―[r]espect for the Constitution . . . went far beyond ritualistic acknowledgement of its authority; a 
remarkable proportion of the debate centered on the task of determining its meaning. At the outset Madison 
admonished the House, as Washington had admonished him, that constitutional issues should be given 
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 sess., H514 (17 June 1789)]. 
Constitutional questions cropped up in the House and Senate every time somebody sneezed, and one 
proposal after another was subjected to intensive debate to determine its compatibility with relevant 
constitutional provisions. Members of Congress plainly thought it necessary to demonstrate that the 
Constitution supported their actions, and thus everything they did as well as everything they said helps to 
inform our understanding of particular constitutional provisions.‖ 
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knowledge for knowledge‘s sake.‖
723
 Nevertheless, if it is true that ―the original 
constitutional understanding [was] that the Court and the President and the Congress (not 
Congress alone) would determine statutory policy,‖
724
 then these Congresses succeeded.  
It has also been said that ―[c]onstitutional scholarship today tends to focus on 
yesterday‘s Supreme Court decision and tomorrow‘s pending case, ignoring, to our 
detriment, the more fundamental shaping of the Constitution through great historical 
events in favor of the study of the latest doctrinal ripples in Supreme Court decisions of 
middling importance.‖
725
 This may be true. It may also be true that contemporary 
congressional scholarship minimizes Congress‘s overall relationship to the Constitution 
and constitutional structure as well as the important role it has played in proposing, 
debating, stifling, influencing, ignoring, and grabbling with the issues which have defined 
our history. Nevertheless, it is important to not encourage legislative supremacy at the 
detriment of the other branches and actors. As Paulsen writes, ―[t]he text designates ‗this 
Constitution‘ – the document itself – as the supreme law of the land, and not the 
interpretations of any specific actor or body.‖
726
 After all, if George Thomas is correct, 
―[t]he ‗settlement‘ of constitutional issues is not an essential feature of our constitutional 
system and, thus, constitutional politics with overlapping views, discontinuities, and 
essentially unsettled meanings are inherent features of the Madisonian Constitution.‖
727
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―Indeed, the Constitution itself, by dividing power between institutions, calls forth debate about 
constitutional meaning and the proper ordering of constitutional values. . . . Constitutional meaning may be 
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Do these deliberations fall short of a republican ideal of debate and the authentic 
exchange of ideas grounded in reasoned arguments or are they merely interest-group and 
permanent-campaign based exhibits in vacuous partisanship? Were he still with us and 
writing on this era instead, would David Currie describe with great admiration for how 
serious and constitutionally deliberative members of Congress were in these three cases? 
Probably not. We know that many of the statements are often mere assertions, are the 
translation of talking points meant to frame issues and shield members from difficult 
votes or having the explain their position in any substantive detail. 
 We should be thankful for our constitutional system. After all, ―[t]hough there 
may be a long gap between our present ideals and practice of democracy and those at the 
birth of the republic . . . that gap is nothing compared to the gulf that separated the 
founding generation from any that had come before or that lived anywhere else in the 
world during the late eighteenth century.‖
728
 Six years ago one scholar wrote that the 
―Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were a great 
national interpretation and implementation of the Republican Form of Government and 
                                                                                                                                                 
settled over time and in ways that cannot be divorced from politics. Such settlements are likely to depend 
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